CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Mark Jaime of four sex offenses for molesting his daughter over a period of several years. The trial court sentenced him to 38 years to life in state prison. On appeal, Jaime raises three arguments: (1) statements he made during a police interview were inadmissible because he was in custody and not given Miranda warnings; (2) the statements were inadmissible because they were involuntary; and (3) the trial court prejudicially erred by giving a modified version of the flight instruction. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Marcus West (defendant) of criminally threatening his wife, M.W., via a Facebook message and of violating a criminal protective order that prohibited such communication. The only documentary evidence at trial of the threatening message was a screenshot printout of the offending message. We are asked to decide whether the printout was sufficiently authenticated to permit its introduction into evidence, whether defendant’s convictions are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats.

Defendant and appellant John Horton, who was convicted of first degree murder, appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under newly-enacted Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel for Horton and set the matter for a hearing, then denied the petition. On appeal, Horton argues, respondent concedes, and we agree the trial court erred in concluding Horton had not stated a prima facie case for relief. We reverse.

Defendants appeal from an order denying their special motion to strike plaintiff’s complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion under the first step of the statutory analysis on the ground that, because defendants’ settlement demand letter constituted extortion as a matter of law, plaintiff’s claims did not arise from constitutionally protected speech or activities under section 425.16. We reverse.

Jasmine Cherie Duran appeals a post-judgment order following conviction of fleeing the scene of a vehicle accident causing permanent, serious injury. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2).) We affirm the victim restitution order imposed at a separate hearing following sentencing. (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)

Defendant Clyde Davis appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, arguing that his court-appointed attorney was so ineffective as to constitute the denial of counsel entirely. The Attorney General responds that the trial court was justified in denying defendant’s petition as a matter of law, without the appointment of counsel, so any inadequacies in counsel’s performance were necessarily non-prejudicial. We conclude defendant’s petition could not have been denied as a matter of law; he should have been granted a hearing, with counsel, on the issue of whether he was entitled to relief under the statute. As the trial court denied the petition without a hearing, we reverse. Given the error in the trial court’s procedure, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether counsel’s deficient performance was additionally prejudicial.

Following a court trial, an appeal, and further proceedings on remand, cross-complainant and appellant Belmont Station, Inc. (sometimes referred to as Belmont) appeals a judgment on remand, insofar as it found in favor of cross-defendant and respondent Dogz, LLC (Dogz) on Belmont’s third cause of action of the cross-complaint, which alleged a fraudulent conveyance to Dogz of Full House Enterprises, Inc.’s (Full House) 65 percent interest in CNR Holdings, LLC (CNR).

Defendant and appellant Rashied Sims, who was convicted of first degree murder, appeals from an order denying his petition for resentencing under newly-enacted Penal Code section 1170.95. The trial court appointed counsel for Sims and set the matter for a hearing, then denied the petition. On appeal, Sims argues, respondent concedes, and we agree the trial court erred in concluding Sims had not stated a prima facie case for relief. We reverse.

Daniel Lloyd Cooper, representing himself, pleaded no contest to shooting at an occupied motor vehicle and received a seven-year state prison term. At sentencing the court imposed a $30 court facilities assessment, a $40 court operations assessment and a $300 restitution fine.
Following appointment of counsel on appeal, Cooper, through counsel, moved in the trial court pursuant to Penal Code section 1237.2 to vacate the assessments and to stay the restitution fine based on this court’s decision in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas). In the alternative, Cooper requested the trial court conduct an ability-to-pay hearing. The court denied the motion. We reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for the court to conduct a hearing to determine Cooper’s ability to pay the assessments and fine imposed.

Appellant Javier Victor Camba was convicted by a jury of receiving a stolen car. At trial, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Manan Butt testified that he found appellant seated in the driver’s seat of the stolen car, in which the steering column had been removed and a screwdriver had been inserted into the ignition. Appellant was in possession of a shaved car key, a tool commonly used by car thieves. Immediately after he was advised of his Miranda rights, appellant asked whether the deputy had seen him driving the car (suggesting, as appellant now concedes, his knowledge that he should not be associating with the car).

Appellant Javier Victor Camba was convicted by a jury of receiving a stolen car. At trial, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Manan Butt testified that he found appellant seated in the driver’s seat of the stolen car, in which the steering column had been removed and a screwdriver had been inserted into the ignition. Appellant was in possession of a shaved car key, a tool commonly used by car thieves. Immediately after he was advised of his Miranda rights, appellant asked whether the deputy had seen him driving the car (suggesting, as appellant now concedes, his knowledge that he should not be associating with the car).

Defendant and appellant Juan Anthony Martinez was found guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale and one count of transporting methamphetamine and sentenced to four years in state prison. The sole issue on appeal is whether the prosecutor made statements during closing argument that improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant. We conclude defendant forfeited the contention and therefore affirm.

A jury convicted Johnny Mata of attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. Mata appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69] and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, commonly referred to as a Batson/Wheeler motion. (People v. Mata (Mar. 26, 2018, B270264) [nonpub. opn.] (Mata I).) In that appeal we held the trial court erred in failing to complete the three-step inquiry required to rule on a Batson/Wheeler motion, conditionally reversed the judgment, and directed the trial court to complete steps two and three of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. On remand the trial court ruled Mata failed to demonstrate the prosecutor exercised any peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner.

After slipping and falling on loose rocks as she walked across a street to reach an elementary school in South Pasadena, Rosa Northcott sued the South Pasadena Unified School District under Government Code section 835 for maintaining a dangerous condition of its property. She appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.