CA Unpub Decisions

Susan S. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring her children, J.P. and B.K., dependents of the juvenile court, removing them from her custody, and ordering reunification services. She also appeals from orders following a contested six-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (e). Susan contends substantial evidence did not support the court’s initial or continued jurisdiction findings under section 300, subdivision (b), or the court’s finding that reasonable efforts were made to eliminate the need to remove her children. She also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by removing the children and ordering monitored visitation, both after removal and following the six-month review hearing.

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on January 22, 2021, be modified

Mother D.W. appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order concerning her then eight-year-old son, T.W., arguing T.W. was in his father’s care at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, and therefore there was no current risk of harm. She does not otherwise challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting jurisdiction, or the custody order or order terminating jurisdiction. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Emmanuel Perez guilty of one count of rape of an unconscious person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4)), and one count of unlawful sexual intercourse (§ 261.5, subd. (c)). Defendant challenges on appeal the trial court’s evidentiary rulings admitting the victim’s hearsay statement, excluding defendant’s proffered character evidence, and admitting the victim’s identification of defendant from a photographic lineup. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm.

In 1990 Gabriel Mendez pleaded no contest to second degree murder pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement and was sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of 15 years to life. In 2019 Mendez petitioned to vacate his murder conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95 on the basis he was convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could not now be found guilty of murder in light of changes in the law. The superior court summarily denied Mendez’s petition without first appointing counsel, finding the facts at trial showed Mendez had been convicted as a direct aider and abettor with the intent to kill and therefore he was ineligible for relief.

Defendant Eduardo Llamas Cabrera was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to 159 years to life in prison. On appeal, Cabrera contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports his attempted murder conviction; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike his prior strike convictions; and (3) the court erred in failing to stay the sentence for his robbery conviction under Penal Code section 654. We reject these arguments and affirm.

Defendants and appellants Tyrone Swain and Todd Stroud appeal from orders summarily denying their petitions to vacate their second degree murder convictions and be resentenced pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1437 (S.B. 1437), which added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code. Section 1170.95 provides that if defendants previously have been convicted of murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and qualify for relief, the statute permits them to petition to vacate the convictions and obtain resentencing on any remaining counts.

Tiffany Becker (mother) appeals from a judgment of the Los Angeles County Superior Court granting John Minkiewitz’s (father) petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, October 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670 (Hague Convention), as implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, title 42 United States Code section 11601 et seq., to return their son, C.M., to Mexico. She contends that the trial court erred in finding Mexico to be C.M.’s country of habitual residence. As the evidence in the record reveals no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings and the trial court correctly applied the Hague Convention to those facts, we affirm the judgment.

Penal Code section 1170.95 (section 1170.95) permits resentencing defendants convicted of felony murder or natural and probable consequences murder, but not defendants who (with malice aforethought) are a murder victim’s “actual killer.” (People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54, 58, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410.) We consider whether the trial court correctly concluded defendant Cornelius Caldwell (defendant) was ineligible for section 1170.95 relief because he is an actual killer.

Defendant’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 was summarily denied. As defendant was not eligible for relief as a matter of law, we affirm.

Defendant Cesar Moises Hernandez was convicted of murder and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was sentenced to 80 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash a search warrant, the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal argument, trial counsel was ineffective, and the matter should be remanded to allow the court to strike or dismiss the firearm and serious felony enhancements. We affirm.

This appeal concerns the sale of four luxury watches and a buyer who suffered no cognizable injury. The watches work and there was nothing wrong with the internet sales of these watches. The buyer, Channah Grundman, appeals from the order granting seller/defendants, Tranik Enterprises, Berj Kacherian, and Shant Kacherian (Tranik) summary adjudication on the first cause of action (Consumer Legal Remedies Act; Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.), the second cause of action (Magnusson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act; 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.), and the fourth cause of action (Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act; Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) in appellant’s first amended complaint. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings on the third cause of action for violation of the Grey Market Goods Act (Civ. Code, § 1797.8 et seq.). We affirm.

A jury convicted Charles Daniel McKenzie of three counts of resisting an executive officer in the performance of his or her duty under Penal Code section 69. The jury found true that in the commission of counts 2 and 3, McKenzie personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon, specifically, a screwdriver, as set forth in section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison.

Dorothy Green (Dorothy) and Irwin Green (Irwin), established the Irwin L. Green and Dorothy L. Green Revocable 1998 Trust (the Trust). In 2016, as Irwin was dying of cancer, Dorothy attempted to revoke the Trust and executed deeds purporting to transfer two real property parcels—the Trust’s largest assets—to herself and Irwin as community property. After Irwin died, two of the couple’s adult children, Matthew Green (Matthew) and Robert Green (Robert), filed a petition challenging these actions and alleging Dorothy was subject to the undue influence of their sister, Paula Green (Paula). Dorothy, in turn, filed a petition alleging elder abuse by Matthew and Robert.