CA Unpub Decisions

Petitioner N.H. (Father) seeks extraordinary writ review (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452) of the juvenile court’s orders terminating his reunification services at the six-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e)) on December 7, 2020 and setting a section 366.26 hearing regarding his son H.H. Father contends that the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic justified extending his reunification services beyond the six-month review. We deny the petition.

Defendant Dominick Matthew Holt entered a plea of no contest to one count of forcible sexual penetration (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)), and was sentenced to the low term of six years in state prison. Holt appeals from the judgment of conviction challenging the denial of his request to withdraw his plea of no contest. His counsel has asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Holt was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. We conclude there are no arguable issues and affirm.

Tyler R. Johnston appeals from the denial of his “Application for Reduction to Misdemeanor” pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (f). His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
Appellant’s counsel declares that she has thoroughly reviewed the entire record in this appeal and on that basis determined that the filing of a Wende brief is appropriate. Counsel additionally represents she has advised appellant such a brief would be filed in this case, that he may personally file a supplemental brief raising any issues he wishes to call to the court’s attention within 30 days, and that she will send him the record upon request.

Defendant Shelly Breshears pleaded guilty to employee embezzlement and admitted that she took property exceeding $65,000 in value. The trial court sentenced her to four years in state prison, which included a one-year excessive taking enhancement under Penal Code former section 12022.6, subdivision (a)(1). The statute, in effect when the offense occurred, was repealed by its own terms a month before defendant was charged. On appeal, defendant contends the repeal of former section 12022.6 applies retroactively to her. We disagree and affirm.

Plao Viengvilai appeals from denial of the petition he filed in propria persona to recall and vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1170.95. His petition asserts he had been convicted of murder in the second degree under the felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and therefore could no longer be held liable due to recent amendments to sections 188 and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–4.)
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no legal issues and asking this court to independently review the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Counsel declares that she advised appellant she will be filing a brief pursuant to the procedures prescribed in Wende, provided appellant a copy of that brief, and advised appellant that he may request this court to relieve her as counsel.

Amy Wittenberg, co-owner and managing member of Hertzel Enterprises LLC (Hertzel), sued attorney Daniel Cravens for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and other claims relating to his legal representation of Hertzel. Cravens appeals after the trial court denied his special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, et seq.). We affirm.

Christopher Melvin Holland appeals from the judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of the murder of Cynthia Munoz with a rape murder special circumstance. Holland was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Holland contends that his conviction must be overturned for two reasons. First, he contends that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a mistrial after a witness testified in violation of the court’s pretrial order to evidence implying that Holland had admitted to committing two murders unrelated to this case. Second, the trial court excluded what Holland contends was relevant and critical third party culpability evidence. Holland contends that these errors, separately and together, violated his right to due process and restricted his ability to present a complete defense. Holland also seeks to correct errors in the amount of the restitution fine and in the imposition of a parole revocation fine.

In 2005, defendant Marco Antonio Monroy was convicted of eight counts involving several victims and sentenced to a total term of 25 years, 4 months, plus life with the possibility of parole. One of the counts was attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187). On direct appeal, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Monroy (Dec. 14, 2006, G035580) [nonpub. opn.] (Monroy I).)
In January 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing in superior court pursuant to section 1170.95. The petition incorrectly stated defendant was convicted of either second degree murder or felony murder. The court summarily denied the petition. We conclude that because defendant was not entitled to relief as a matter of law, the order must be affirmed.

Defendants are Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (Integrated) and the four hospitals it operates in Orange County. Integrated is the hospitals’ alter ego. Plaintiff ReadyLink, Inc., a Nevada corporation, is a staffing agency that contracted with the four hospitals to provide temporary nurses. ReadyLink, Inc. sued defendants for breach of contract and fraud, arising from defendants’ admitted failure to pay it for services provided. Two years into this lawsuit, ReadyLink, Inc. discovered it was not a party to the relevant contracts. Instead, the contracts identified a variety of similarly named ReadyLink entities as parties. After a bench trial, the trial court found the parties had intended to name ReadyLink, Inc. as the contracting party but had not done so due to mutual mistake. It granted ReadyLink, Inc.’s request to reform the contracts to insert itself as the contracting party.

Defendant ReadyLink, Inc., is a staffing agency that agreed to provide temporary nurses to plaintiff Western Medical Center – Santa Ana (Western). The parties’ contract contained an indemnity agreement, in which ReadyLink agreed to indemnify and defend Western for any patient injuries caused by a ReadyLink nurse. Nonparty Daniel Stearns was injured in a car accident and taken to Western for surgery and recovery. Months after his hospitalization, Stearns sued Western for injuries allegedly arising from the postoperative care he received. One of his postoperative nurses, Suvarna Durgiah, was from ReadyLink. So, Western requested that ReadyLink indemnify it for the claim and provide a defense per the contract. ReadyLink refused both requests, and Western eventually settled with Stearns for $450,000.

jury convicted defendant James Carter Wells in 2014 of corporal injury to a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2)). The court found true allegations defendant had suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) in addition to other enhancement allegations.
Defendant appealed the judgment and our court remanded the matter to the trial court to conduct a resentencing hearing to consider whether to strike defendant’s prior serious felony enhancements in light of the passage of Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1393).

Defendant Eloy Joven, Jr. was charged with 10 counts of child molestation committed against his stepson, as follows: two counts of sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1–2), four counts of oral copulation with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 3–6), and four counts of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 7–10). The jury convicted defendant of all counts and as to counts 7 through 10, found true that defendant had substantial sexual conduct with a victim under 14 years old for the purpose of precluding probation or a suspended sentence. (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(8).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a total determinate term of 12 years in prison plus a consecutive indeterminate term of 110 years to life in prison.

M.D. (mother) filed this petition for extraordinary writ after the juvenile court set a hearing to terminate her parental rights. Mother and father, who is not a party to the writ, have one daughter, A.V. She was five months old when the juvenile court took jurisdiction over her and removed her from her parents’ custody based on allegations of physical abuse. During the reunification period, mother was offered and participated in services for 12 months. At the 12-month review hearing (Welf. And Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1), unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code) the juvenile court followed the recommendations of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the department) by terminating services and setting a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.

N.L. (mother) petitions for extraordinary relief pursuant to rule 8.452 of California Rules of Court for an order of this court (i) setting aside the juvenile court’s order setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 permanent plan selection hearing as to one of her three children, H.D. (the child), and (ii) instructing the court to provide her additional family reunification services. She contends the reasonable services finding made nearly 25 months after the child was taken into custody was not supported by sufficient evidence because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the Department) did not make timely good faith efforts to provide conjoint therapy sessions ordered at the 12-month review hearing. She posits that the delay was the sole cause of her inability to be reunified with the child. We deny the petition.