CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Jermaine Cornelius Carter appeals from an order denying his petition to vacate his murder conviction and obtain resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.95, which was enacted by the Legislature through its passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). In denying the petition, the trial court found Senate Bill 1437 unconstitutional and, alternatively, concluded defendant was ineligible for relief.

According to the probation report filed in this case, a law enforcement officer responded to a call of an intoxicated motorist at a Poway carwash after an employee of the carwash reported the motorist had driven his car into a trash can. The responding officer found defendant, Mark Ashton, who appeared to be intoxicated, inside an automobile that had been reported stolen. Defendant stated that he and a friend had been drinking when they found the car at a trolley station with the keys inside; and that they drove the car to the carwash and his friend left. A field sobriety test was administered to defendant, which he failed. Two hours later, defendant’s blood reflected an alcohol level of .047 percent as well as the presence of benzodiazepines.

Defendants L1 Technologies, Inc. (L1 Technologies) and Brian Verdugo (jointly “the defendants”), appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 to strike claims brought against them by plaintiff Jasmine Dimagiba.
Dimagiba was employed as an administrative assistant at L1 Technologies. During the course of her employment, she obtained counsel and filed a lawsuit against L1 Technologies and her direct supervisor, Verdugo, alleging, among other things, causes of action for sexual harassment, retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. While the lawsuit was pending, Dimagiba continued working at L1 Technologies for a period of time, but eventually decided to resign.

On November 13, 2001, defendant Orrin Ralph Johnson, Jr., was convicted of rape in violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision(a)(2), resulting in a lifelong sexual offender registration requirement pursuant to section 290. He now appeals the judgment entered after a jury found that he failed to register a new address, arguing the definition of residence found in CALCRIM No. 1170 is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. We disagree and affirm.

In a global settlement agreement resolving multiple criminal matters, defendant Derrick Wayne Horn pleaded no contest to several offenses in exchange for a negotiated sentence of 11 years four months in state prison, including two 1-year enhancements for serving two prior prison terms under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). After sentencing, but while his case was pending on appeal, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1) (Senate Bill 136), amending section 667.5, subdivision (b) to eliminate the 1-year enhancement for offenses that are not sexually violent.

A jury found defendant Morgan Raymond Ast guilty of spousal abuse with corporal injury, making criminal threats, and violating a domestic violence restraining order. The jury also found true the enhancement allegation that defendant caused his wife great bodily injury. The trial court found several prior convict allegations true, including four prior prison term enhancements

After a plea of no contest, the trial court sentenced defendant Jullien Braddon Oakley to a stipulated term of 12 years in state prison (which included one year for a prior prison term enhancement) in exchange for the dismissal of certain other charges. Defendant contends the prior prison term enhancement should be stricken based on the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), and the Attorney General agrees. Both parties posit that remand is not required. We will strike the prior prison term enhancement, accept the Attorney General’s representation that the People do not seek remand, and affirm the judgment as modified.

After a jury found defendant Anthony Rayshawn Greer guilty of one felony and two misdemeanors, the trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison, including two consecutive one-year terms for two prior prison enhancements. On appeal, defendant contends (1) the prior prison term enhancements should be vacated based on the retroactive application of Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), and (2) the abstract of judgment erroneously ordered AIDS testing of defendant under Penal Code section 1202.1. The People agree with both contentions, and we do too. We will strike the prior prison term enhancements, remand the case for resentencing, and direct the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Having reviewed the record as required by Wende, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

Darrell Jones appeals from a trial court decision denying his motion for vacatur and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 regarding his 1980 first degree murder conviction. He contends the trial court erred in denying relief without first issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing. Instead the trial court found at the prima facie stage, based on the record of Jones’s conviction, including the unpublished decision affirming his conviction on appeal, that Jones was a “major participant” in the felony that resulted in the murder and that he acted “with reckless indifference to human life.”

The Solano County District Attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging appellant committed misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(2); count 1), driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a); count 2), and driving at an unsafe speed (Veh. Code, § 22350; count 3).

Daniel Diaz (Diaz), doing business as Performance Production Company (PPC), sued Virus International Inc., Virus Tech, LLC and Russell Stone (collectively Virus), alleging Virus violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. and Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq. (UCL).) by underreporting the value of its products for the purpose of paying lower import tariffs. Virus successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diaz lacked standing to sue under the UCL because he failed to establish the fact that he sustained any financial losses attributable to its alleged tariff impropriety.

Y Travel, LLC (Y Travel) appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order awarding 4444 W. Sunset Rd., LLC (Sunset) $113,740 in contractual attorney fees after it prevailed in its action for unpaid back rent. Y Travel does not challenge the merits of the attorney fee order, but instead pursues this appeal only “[i]n the event that this Court reverses the Superior Court’s decision [in a concurrently pending appeal concerning the back rent in] G058803.” We have affirmed that decision. (4444 W. Sunset Rd., LLC et al. v. Y Travel, LLC (Feb. 2, 2021, G058803) [nonpub. opn.].) We therefore also affirm the trial court’s attorney fee order.

Sylvester Weldon Morrison, an 83-year-old prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence for second degree murder, petitions for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from a decision by the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) finding him unsuitable for parole.
After we summarily denied his petition, the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to us with orders to vacate our denial and issue an order to show cause why the Board did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we vacated our summary denial and ordered the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to show cause why the Board did not abuse its discretion in finding petitioner unsuitable for parole.