CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant, a borrower and former homeowner, sued the corporation that acted as trustee under the deed of trust on his residence and conducted a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Appellant attempted to state causes of action for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, and recording false documents. The corporation filed a demurrer, contending appellant failed to allege facts sufficient to show the foreclosure was wrongful or he continued to own any interest in the residence after the nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered a judgment of dismissal.

Defendant Floyd Foster, Jr., was convicted of two counts of felony driving while intoxicated and one count of driving without a license. He contends on appeal that (1) the trial court erred in imposing indeterminate life terms of imprisonment pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C), despite striking his conviction for a sexually violent offense (one of the “super strike” felonies listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)), and (2) his two one-year prior prison term enhancements should be stricken pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), as amended by Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 136). The People agree with defendant on both issues. We vacate the two indeterminate life terms and remand with direction for the trial court to strike the prior prison term enhancements and resentence defendant.

Theresa Cuellar and Jose Cuellar were married and had three children: Am.C. (born in 2001), An.C. (born in 2004), and E.C. (born in 2006). Theresa filed for divorce in 2008. A judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on June 7, 2011. It granted the parents joint legal custody and joint physical custody of the children. Jose, who lived in Manteca, was named as the primary care provider and the children primarily resided with him in Manteca. Theresa, who lived in Fresno, had the children on weekends, holidays, as well as for extended stays.

Donald Edward Anderson was convicted of various crimes for driving under the influence of drugs (DUI) and causing a collision with another vehicle. He raises two questions on appeal. One, did the prosecutor err in closing argument by shifting the burden of proof to Anderson? Two, did the court err in imposing certain fines, fees, and assessments as part of the sentence without first holding an ability to pay hearing?

In June 1997, a woman who was six months pregnant was on the shoulder of a road, trying to push her car while steering through her open driver’s door. A truck driven by defendant and appellant John Lopez, Jr., sideswiped the car, killing the woman and her unborn child. Defendant’s three-year-old son was riding unsecured in the truck but was not injured. Defendant’s preliminary blood-alcohol test results were 0.204 percent and 0.195 percent.
A jury found

A jury found defendant and appellant Kiet Van Nguyen guilty of engaging in sodomy with a person age 10 or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a), count 1), aggravated sexual assault involving sodomy (§ 269, subd. (a)(3), count 2), aggravated sexual assault involving oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4), count 3), and three counts of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 by force (§ 288, subd. (b)(1), counts 4-6). A trial court sentenced him to a total of 62 years to life in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support two of his convictions for committing a lewd act on a child under 14 by force. We affirm.

Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended Penal Code sections 188 and 189 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2, 3) to limit the application of the felony-murder rule and the crime of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. In addition, Senate Bill No. 1437 enacted section 1170.95, which permits persons previously convicted of first or second degree murder under the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, but who could not be so convicted under the amendments enacted by Senate Bill No. 1437, to petition the superior court to vacate their murder convictions and to resentence them on any remaining counts.

Tonya Arrieta and Connor Arrieta sued Snowline Joint Unified School District (the District) and Leonard Lopez (Lopez) for (1) failing to prevent a hostile work environment (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (k)); (2) retaliation (Gov. Code, § 12940); (3) false imprisonment; (4) stalking (Civ. Code, § 1708.7); and (5) a violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1). After a 29-day trial, the jury found in favor of the District and Lopez (collectively, defendants). On appeal, Tonya and Connor (collectively, plaintiffs) raise issues pertaining to the trial court’s response to a question from the jury. We affirm the judgment

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel Rogers and Lise Jacobson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Plaintiff Dawn Kali underwent surgery for breast cancer in 2007. Kali thereafter was introduced to the books and products of defendant Robert O. Young, dba pH Miracle Living, and ultimately in 2009, to Young himself. In his books, Young claimed an alkaline diet and related alternative methods prevented and treated disease, including cancer. Kali began following Young’s treatment regimen. Although her breast cancer returned, against her doctors’ recommendations she decided to forgo chemotherapy, radiation, and other traditional cancer treatment in favor of Young’s methods.

In February 2009, Delina Guzman suffered injuries in an automobile accident, for which she was not at fault. She sought underinsured motorist coverage (UIM) from her insurer, Allstate Indemnity Company (Allstate). While that matter was pending, Guzman was injured in a second automobile accident on January 20, 2010, for which Guzman also was not at fault. Guzman filed a second UIM claim with Allstate. Allstate began investigating Guzman’s injuries after her formal demand in 2012. By 2014, Allstate had not settled the matter, so Guzman filed for arbitration, which increased her attorney fees. The arbitrator awarded Guzman the full limits on the policy. Guzman then sued Allstate for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or bad faith. Following trial, the jury awarded Guzman economic damages but no noneconomic damages.

B.N. (mother) and A.S. (father), parents of the minor (parents), appeal from the juvenile court’s orders denying father’s petition to change the court’s order terminating his reunification services and thereafter terminating parental rights, freeing the minor for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 388, 395.) We will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

After a jury found defendant Denzel Alden Patterson guilty of robbing a jewelry store, the trial court imposed a sentence of 19 years in state prison, including a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term, and ordered defendant to pay $208,000 in victim restitution. On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of an uncharged robbery; (2) his prior prison term enhancement must be stricken; and (3) the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect joint and several restitution with defendant’s codefendants. Disagreeing with defendant’s first claim, but agreeing with his two other claims, we will remand for resentencing

Defendant Cedric Lee Brooks was convicted by jury of possession of a controlled substance, i.e., methamphetamine, for sale. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found defendant was previously convicted of a strike offense within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and also served four prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). Following an unsuccessful motion to strike defendant’s prior strike conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero), the trial court sentenced him to serve eight years in state prison.