CA Unpub Decisions

On October 20, 2017, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services (Santa Clara Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) relative to a boy, M.O. (the minor), who was then four years old. According to an attachment to the initial hearing report, the minor was diagnosed with cerebral palsy at the age of one. B.L. is the minor’s mother. The minor was placed into protective custody after having sustained a suspicious leg fracture about which mother had given an explanation that was inconsistent with the type of injury sustained. The juvenile court of Santa Clara County declared the minor a dependent child, and he was initially placed in out-of-home foster care. The minor was returned to mother’s care in November 2017, and in January 2018, the juvenile court ordered that mother receive family maintenance services.

In this juvenile dependency case, law enforcement took two-year-old T.P. into protective custody due to physical abuse by her mother (Mother) and general neglect by D.M. (Father). Father appeals from the juvenile court’s order made at the combined six-month/12-month review hearing. Specifically, Father argues substantial evidence did not support the court’s determination T.P. would be at risk of detriment if returned to his care. He also asserts the Orange County Department of Social Services (SSA) did not comply with its inquiry and notice duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) provisions found in Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (e) (all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated).

A jury found defendant John William Labudis guilty of arson of a structure. (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation on condition he serve 360 days in county jail. Defendant received credit of 143 actual days and 143 days of conduct credit for a total of 286 days.

A jury found defendant John William Labudis guilty of arson of a structure. (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (c).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation on condition he serve 360 days in county jail. Defendant received credit of 143 actual days and 143 days of conduct credit for a total of 286 days.

In this juvenile dependency case, the juvenile court found 12-year-old A.O. came within its jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 because of risk of harm due to conduct by both his parents and removed him from his parents’ custody pursuant to section 361, subdivision (c). Crystal D. (mother), the noncustodial parent at the time of removal, appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders. Mother contends the allegations of her conduct in the jurisdictional findings were not supported by sufficient evidence. She also contends the court erred by “removing” A.O. from her custody under section 361, subdivision (c) because she was a noncustodial parent, and the matter must be remanded for a hearing on whether A.O. should be placed with her pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (a), the statute governing placement with noncustodial parents. We affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Juan Leo Gonzales asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant did not respond. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Rowan Crosby Brooks, Jr., asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant responded, contending (1) the trial court erred in denying his Penal Code section 1170.95 petition for resentencing, (2) he had the right to be present at the hearing on the petition, (3) he had the right to present evidence at the hearing, and (4) section 1170.95 is void for vagueness on its face. Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm.

A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and found true the attendant allegations that he personally used a firearm during the commission of each of those felonies (Pen. Code, §§ 245, subd. (b), 12022.5, subd. (a)), drawing and exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner and in the presence of another occupying a motor vehicle on a highway (§ 417.3), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant admitted a prior prison term conviction. In January 2014, he was sentenced to a total of 15 years in state prison, which included five years four months imposed for the two enhancements for personal use of a firearm and one year for the prior prison term enhancement.

In 2015, a jury found defendant and appellant Tony Earnest Wilson guilty of kidnapping (Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)) , torture (§ 206), and other crimes. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant inflicted great bodily injury on the victim in the commission of the kidnapping. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) In a prior appeal in this case, defendant asserted the trial court erred by not staying, pursuant to section 654, the sentences for the kidnapping and the associated great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement because they overlap with the torture. (People v. Wilson (Jan. 23, 2018, E064116) [nonpub. opn.] [2018 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS 523, *2].) This court reversed the kidnapping and GBI enhancement sentences to allow the trial court to resentence defendant and give a clear factual basis for its section 654 decisions. (Wilson, at pp. *21-23.)

On August 31, 2015, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant Jeffrey Edward Sapienza pled guilty to criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422, count 2.) The court imposed the upper term of three years of imprisonment, but it suspended execution of sentence and placed defendant on three years of formal probation from which defendant did not appeal. On January 5, 2018, the trial court found defendant in violation of his probation. On March 23, 2018, the court imposed the three-year suspended sentence and awarded defendant 903 days of custody credits.

Jorge Llamas, Jr. sued Robert J. Spitz, an estate planning attorney, alleging causes of action for legal malpractice and intentional interference with expected inheritance, based on a trust document that Spitz drafted at the request of Llamas’s sister, Julia Sanabia (Sanabia). The trial court sustained Spitz’s demurrers to both causes of action without leave to amend. Llamas appealed and subsequently filed with this court a document styled a “request for dismissal,” in which he sought to dismiss his legal malpractice claim. At oral argument, Llamas’s attorney acknowledged he was abandoning the malpractice claim in the third amended complaint.

Plaintiff City of Sunnyvale, like cities throughout the state, dissolved its redevelopment agency as required by law, became the successor or caretaker agency to wind down its affairs, and attempted to obtain approval from an oversight board to reenter a 1998 reimbursement agreement between the former redevelopment agency and the City of Sunnyvale (Sunnyvale) so as to enable Sunnyvale to continue to receive property tax revenue to pay its preexisting obligation.

Mother L.P. has three daughters, So.H. (now nine), Sa.H. (nearly seven), and S.S. (now two). S.S. has a different father than the older girls. Mother appeals the jurisdictional order declaring So.H. and Sa.H. dependents under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), based on domestic violence perpetrated by S.S.’s father, A.S. She also challenges the jurisdictional findings based on her substance abuse as to all three children, the dispositional order removing all three children, and the order terminating jurisdiction over the older two girls with a family law order granting custody to their father, D.H. We affirm.

Police officers ordered Mason Gerald Miller to stop the car he was driving. Miller initially complied with the officers’ commands, but then sped away, driving across medians, onto sidewalks, and into oncoming traffic. After his car was disabled, Miller got out and fled on foot. Officers eventually caught and arrested him.
Miller pled guilty to evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2), and admitted that he had suffered a prior “strike” conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court sentenced him to two years eight months in state prison.