CA Unpub Decisions

Generally, an applicant for a government-issued permit must litigate an administrative mandamus challenge to the conditions upon which such a permit is granted before commencing the permitted activity. Prior cases, including Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470 (Lynch), have held that failure to litigate in advance operates as a forfeiture of the permit holder’s right to contest the conditions imposed. We consider whether this forfeiture principle (which Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County (the County) dubs the Pfeiffer-McDougal rule ) can be invoked in a mandamus action filed by petitioner Chiquita Canyon, LLC (Chiquita) that challenges various conditions imposed in a conditional use permit authorizing continued operation of the Chiquita Canyon Landfill (Landfill). Specifically, we decide whether Chiquita’s allegation that the County should be estopped from invoking this forfeiture rule fails as a matter of law.

Plaintiff and real party in interest Top Kick Productions Inc., filed a motion to disqualify counsel for petitioners and defendants CBS Broadcasting Inc. and CBS Corporation. Before the trial court heard the disqualification motion, CBS filed a petition to compel arbitration and a motion to stay the litigation pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. CBS challenges the trial court’s denial of its stay request; we agree that the trial court erred.

Antonia C. (mother) appeals from the findings and order terminating parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to her daughter, Mia C. She also appeals the subsequent order denying her petition to change court orders under section 388. Mother contends the court committed prejudicial error because it terminated her parental rights under section 366.26 before conducting a hearing on her section 388 petition, and instead denied the petition 51 days later, in violation of her due process rights. Finding harmless error, we affirm the order terminating parental rights.

W.W., the father of 11-year-old Y.W., appeals the juvenile court’s April 11, 2018 jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring Y.W. a dependent child of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300, subdivision (b)(1), and 361, removing Y.W. from his parents’ custody, ordering Y.W. suitably placed under the supervision of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services and directing the Department to provide W.W. with family reunification services and monitored visitation.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jorge Rodriguez (Rodriguez) of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), and found true the allegation that Rodriguez personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to a total term of 50 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, Rodriguez contends the trial court erred by: (1) failing to make an adequate inquiry into prospective juror bias or prejudice; (2) admitting statements Rodriguez made to undercover agents while in jail; and (3) failing to instruct the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. Rodriguez further contends these errors accumulated so as to deprive him of his right to a fair trial.

This appeal follows defendant Mildred Jean Matthews’ conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, felony vandalism, and corporal injury on a spouse. She challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and argues that the trial court should have reduced that count to a misdemeanor. Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to strike a prior serious or violent felony. Finally, defendant argues that the case must be remanded to permit the trial court an opportunity to decide whether to strike a Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement under a newly enacted statute affording trial courts such discretion.

Princess Coleman appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which she was convicted of one count of first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, § 459.) Appellant admitted the prior convictions as alleged and was sentenced to 9 years in state prison. She contends the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to give an expert witness instruction sua sponte and by limiting her cross-examination of one of the police officers who testified for the prosecution. We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction. However, in light of the recent enactment of Senate Bill No. 1393, we remand the matter to the trial court to exercise its new discretion to impose or strike the serious felony enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).

Plaintiff Martin Moyeda, dba Sound Music Records, appeals the judgment dismissing this action without prejudice. The trial court granted defendant Jesus Ojeda’s motion for judgment on the pleadings for failure to pursue an administrative determination with the Labor Commissioner (the Commissioner) under the Talent Agencies Act (Lab. Code, § 1700 et seq.) (the Act). Plaintiff contends the Act did not require him to exhaust administrative remedies and the trial court should have stayed, rather than dismissed, his action. We reverse and remand.

Defendant Kevin Bernard Jefferson was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, § 212.5, subd. (c).) Prior to sentencing, the People dismissed five prior prison term allegations on their own motion and defendant admitted a prior strike conviction. The trial court denied defendant’s Romero motion. The court then sentenced defendant to 11 years in state prison on count 1—which included a five-year enhancement for a prior serious felony conviction—and to three years on count 2, with the latter to run concurrent with the sentence on count 1. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss his prior strike conviction. We remand the matter for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1393), which grants courts discretion to dismiss or strike a prior serious felony conviction for sentencing purposes. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

The trial court assessed $557,236 in damages against Andrew Scott for embezzling from a company called Intelligent SCM, LLC. Scott appeals, making six diverse arguments. He claims plaintiff Alex Knowles lacked standing to sue Scott in a derivative suit. Scott likewise attacks the trial court’s finding that four members of Intelligent signed a written document that changed the company’s governance structure. Third, Scott claims that, in various ways, the evidence did not support the damages award. Fourth, Scott complains about the testimony of witness Lew Finkelstein. Fifth, Scott maintains the trial court’s charging and foreclosure orders were improper. And sixth, Scott says the trial court mishandled his crossclaim. All these arguments are erroneous. We affirm.

The juvenile court sustained a wardship petition alleging C.T., a minor, committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211/212.5, subd. (c)), a felony. C.T. now appeals from the juvenile court order vacating his dependency status under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and declaring him a ward under section 602.

Defendants FibroGen, Inc. and Elias Kouchakji, a former vice-president at FibroGen, (collectively FibroGen) appeal from an order denying their motion to compel arbitration of a discrimination, harassment, and retaliation lawsuit filed by plaintiff Joanne Imperial, a former employee at the company. We find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that the complete lack of mutuality in the arbitration provision of the employment contract rendered the provision unconscionable and unenforceable. Accordingly, we shall affirm the denial of the petition to compel arbitration.

In the midst of a custody dispute, Roxanne Suzuki applied for a restraining order against her husband, Eisho, under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA, Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). Roxanne alleged that Eisho had physically and emotionally abused their children and had sexually assaulted and emotionally abused her. After a hearing, the trial court issued a restraining order against Eisho based on findings that he abused Roxanne by his actions at a swim meet, where he drunkenly pestered her to kiss him, and by using a mobile phone app to find her location when she was not at home. On appeal, Eisho argues there was insufficient evidence to support the restraining order. We disagree, and therefore we shall affirm.

Plaintiff Christopher Parker appeals from the trial court’s refusal to certify as a class action what plaintiff describes as “a routine consumer-fraud case about misleading advertising and [defendant] Logitech’s failure to disclose material information to consumers before they spent hundreds of dollars purchasing Logitech’s expensive home-security systems.” After reviewing the exhaustive record of conflicting evidence before the trial court with respect to the certification motion, we cannot say that the court’s conclusion that common issues of fact do not predominate constitutes the “manifest abuse of discretion” that is required for reversal. We shall therefore affirm the order.