CA Unpub Decisions

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, Ernesto Sanchez pleaded guilty to possessing more than 20 kilograms of cocaine for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11351, 11370.4, subd. (a)(4).) The court sentenced Sanchez to two years in jail and 15 years of supervised release under various terms and conditions.
On appeal, Sanchez contends that (1) police conducted an unlawful warrantless protective sweep of his residence; (2) his on-scene admission that 10 kilos of cocaine were in his residence is fruit of that illegal search and should be suppressed; (3) absent that admission, there is no probable cause to support the subsequently issued search warrant; and (4) the court erred in placing the burden on him to show that his admission was the result of an unlawful search.

In a first trial, a jury convicted Dana Glenn Rye of possession of child pornography but could not reach a verdict on numerous child sex crimes. In a subsequent bench trial, Rye was convicted of 17 counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14 ); oral copulation or sexual penetration with a person under the age of 10 years (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 3, 4, 6), sexual intercourse or sodomy with a person under the age of 10 years (§ 287, subd. (a); counts 5, 7) and lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 16 years and more than 10 years younger than him (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 15, 16, 17). The court sentenced Rye to a determinate term of 23 years four months plus an indeterminate term of 95 years to life.

Dallin Young appeals a judgment dismissing his petition for an alternative writ of mandate, which petition sought injunctive relief after Jacqueline M. Kelly, in her official capacity as City Clerk for the City of Imperial Beach (City), rejected his petitions for an initiative measure relating to City's marijuana regulations. In rejecting his petitions, Kelly cited their noncompliance with Elections Code section 9207's requirement that the petitions include a copy of the notice of intention to circulate petition that Young had previously filed with City and published. The petitions included City's title and summary for the proposed measure, the full text of the proposed measure, and a notice of intention to circulate petition but, unlike the notice filed with City, the petitions' notice twice included the adjective "medical" before the term "marijuana regulations."

This case involves a dispute between neighbors regarding whether Steven Johnson can drive his truck and boat trailer over an asphalt berm and through a dirt area at the end of a paved lane to park his boat trailer on his property. Johnson contends he is entitled to do so based on an easement established either by grant or prescription, but his neighbors, Santos and Kumson Kiyoko Anguiano (the Anguianos), blocked access to the area by placing obstructions such as concrete blocks, sandbags, and trenches in the area. Johnson sued the Anguianos for trespass, private nuisance, public nuisance, and intentional interference with emotional tranquility.

A jury found defendant Rafael Correa guilty of transportation of a controlled substance (cocaine) for sale, and found true the allegation that the quantity of cocaine exceeded 20 kilograms. The trial court imposed an 18-year split sentence. Correa contends the trial court erred by failing to adequately instruct the jury that it was required to find that he harbored the specific intent to transport the cocaine for sale. Similarly, he contends insufficient evidence supports the jury's finding he harbored such an intent. These contentions lack merit.
Correa also requests that we independently review the trial court's proceedings on his motion to discover law enforcement personnel records. (See Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).) We have done so, and find no error.
Accordingly, we affirm.

In October 2014, defendant took courtesy checks from the victim’s mailbox, depositing one for $1,200 and another for $2,700 into what police identified as defendant’s account. Although the victim’s names were on the checks, she neither signed them nor wrote them to defendant, whom she did not know.
After initially denying having deposited the checks into his account, defendant eventually admitted cashing them for a friend, Jessica Gomes, who defendant described as a “shady” drug dealer. Later, defendant told detectives that Gomes, who was married to his son, had asked him to deposit the checks for her because she did not have her own identification. He claimed Gomes told him the money was to be used to help with legal fees for defendant’s son, who was in jail on pending criminal charges. Defendant withdrew the funds, kept $200 for himself, and gave the remainder to Gomes.

Plaintiff and real party in interest Top Kick Productions Inc., filed a motion to disqualify counsel for petitioners and defendants CBS Broadcasting Inc. and CBS Corporation. Before the trial court heard the disqualification motion, CBS filed a petition to compel arbitration and a motion to stay the litigation pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. CBS challenges the trial court’s denial of its stay request; we agree that the trial court erred.

A.S. (Mother) appeals an order terminating her parental rights over her daughter, V.S. Years earlier, when Mother was detained from her legal guardians and placed in foster care, her grandmother (V.S.’s maternal great-grandmother) told a dependency investigator that “there may be Native American heritage from [Mother’s] grandfather’s side of the family” and “the tribes may be Cherokee or Chippewa.” The appellate record does not indicate whether or how the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) investigated Mother’s possible Chippewa ancestry in that earlier case, but we know that in this one, the Department did not provide notice of the juvenile court proceedings to any Chippewa tribes. We consider whether such notice should have been given under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law.

Santiago B. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding his sons Nathaniel B. (born in Oct. 2011) and Sebastian B. (born in Nov. 2012). Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by (1) removing Nathaniel and Sebastian from father’s custody, and (2) ordering father to participate in sexual abuse counseling. We find no error, and thus we affirm.

Steven Gordon and Jonathan Roth entered into a Memorandum of Understanding concerning the formation of a joint venture to identify and manage real estate investments and other business opportunities. After Roth located a real estate opportunity, however, he informed Gordon that it would not be part of the joint venture. Gordon and his business associate and partner, Robert Ormond, then commenced this action based on contract and tort theories. On Roth’s demurrer to their first amended complaint, the trial court determined the MOU was unenforceable because its terms were too uncertain and it constituted only an “agreement to agree.” The court therefore entered judgment in favor of Roth. This appeal followed. We agree Gordon and Osmond (“Appellants”) failed to state any claims and affirm the judgment.

Appellant/defendant Public Storage (PS) appeals the trial court’s ruling denying its motion to compel arbitration against respondent/plaintiff Rachel Gilgar. The trial court ruled that PS had failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, finding that the parties had not consented to contract electronically under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), and that PS had failed to authenticate Gilgar’s purported electronic signature. We affirm the trial court’s holding on the ground that PS failed to meet its initial burden of establishing a valid agreement to arbitrate.

Defendant and appellant Elmer Sherman pleaded no contest to possessing a controlled substance in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a) and admitted serving five prior prison terms within the meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in county jail, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed defendant on supervised probation for five years.
The trial court subsequently found defendant to be in violation of probation. On appeal, defendant contends his right to due process was violated because the trial court found him in violation of probation for conduct about which he was not provided written notice; the trial court’s admission of a supplemental probation report violated his right to due process; the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted hearsay testimony; and the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of possession for sale of phencyclidine (PCP) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378.5). In a bifurcated trial, the jury also found true appellant’s five prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), one prior strike (§ 667, subd. (d)/ § 1170.12, subd. (b)), and a controlled substance offense involving a minor (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (b)).
Appellant was sentenced to a prison term of 12 years, consisting of a four-year midterm for possession for sale of PCP, doubled for the prior strike, and four years for each of four prior prison term enhancements. The trial court struck the remaining prior prison term enhancement, as well as the allegation that appellant previously committed a controlled substance offense involving a minor.

A jury convicted Christopher Griffis of first degree murder of Lorenzo Amrosio (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and shooting at an occupied building (§ 246). The jury found the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)) and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the crimes (§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1)). The trial court sentenced Griffis to an aggregate prison term of 50 years to life.