CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Vicki Corona appeals from a judgment entered in favor of defendant Mariyam Gasparyan following a court trial. We conclude the appeal must be dismissed because Corona failed to timely file her notice of appeal.

Plaintiff Elza Khachatrian appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Talin V. Yacoubian, Yacoubian Law Offices, PC, and Yacoubian and Powell, LLP (collectively Yacoubian). Khachatrian contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the expiration of the statute of limitations, in that Yacoubian willfully concealed her legal malpractice and engaged in actual fraud, triggering the application of the three-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Layne Kelani Bishop appealed from a judgment entered after he pleaded no contest to second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). His appellate attorney has asked the court for an independent review of the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We conclude that because Bishop waived his right to appeal under the plea agreement, the appeal must be dismissed.

James Dekalb broke into his grandparents’ home and stole guns, jewelry, electronics and his grandfather’s pickup truck. A jury convicted him of burglary, theft and firearms charges. He contends the court should have suppressed evidence found during a warrantless search of his backpack; the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with the mental states required for conviction; and the court misinstructed the jury on the use of circumstantial evidence. Dekalb also contends the court erroneously admitted evidence about an earlier crime under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), and that a purported failure by counsel and the court to correct false testimony deprived him of a fair trial. None of Dekalb’s contentions are meritorious, so we affirm the judgment.

E.P., a minor, appeals from a juvenile court order finding that he violated his probation by obtaining a gang-related tattoo. E.P. contends that we must reverse the juvenile court’s determination for insufficient evidence. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the juvenile court.

Nearly two years after Clinton Wyatt (Wyatt) purchased a used car from Own a Car of Fresno (Seller), he sought to rescind the parties’ retail installment sales contract (Contract) based on alleged violations of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The matter proceeded to an arbitration through the American Arbitration Association (AAA) pursuant to an arbitration provision in the Contract. The arbitration was conducted in two phases. The arbitrator first determined liability and damages and issued an interim award in Wyatt’s favor for rescission and damages, along with injunctive relief, and awarded him attorney fees and costs, with the amount to be determined in a second proceeding. Seller then discovered the arbitrator failed to disclose he served as an arbitrator in an arbitration held two years earlier in which Wyatt’s attorney represented the losing party. Seller asked AAA to vacate the interim award and appoint a new arbitrator.

Defendant Roberto Lopez Cruz was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)); oral copulation with or sexual penetration of a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)); two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child (§ 269, subd. (a)(1)); forcible oral copulation (former § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(B)); and possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to prison for the indeterminate term of 70 years to life, and for the determinate term of 12 years 8 months. Although defendant was provided an advisement under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), he asserts he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights when he was interrogated by detectives. Upon review, we affirm.

This is an appeal from a postjudgment order in a matter in which the superior court has consolidated three actions for all purposes. The postjudgment order vacated and set aside a default and a default judgment in one of the three actions.
Since the judgment that preceded the postjudgment order on appeal did not terminate the litigation between all of the parties in all of the actions in the consolidated case, the judgment is not final as to those parties who still maintained claims and defenses that were not fully and finally resolved by the judgment. Because the judgment was not final as between those parties, the postjudgment order as between those parties is not an appealable order. Thus, as we explain, appellate jurisdiction is lacking, and we will dismiss the appeal as to them.

A jury convicted Hasani Valentino Moton of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and of being an accessory after the fact to the crime of robbery (§§ 32, 211; count 2). The court sentenced Moton to the low term of two years in prison for count 1 and a middle term of two years for count 2, with the sentences to run concurrently.
On appeal, Moton contends: (1) there was insufficient evidence of force used against the victim to support his convictions for robbery or being an accessory after the fact to robbery, (2) the court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of theft, (3) there was insufficient evidence to uphold convictions for both being an aider and abettor to robbery and an accessory after the fact to robbery because they were based on the same factual act, i.e. being the getaway driver, and (4) if count 2 is not reversed, the sentence should be stayed pursuant to section 654.

A jury found Sonny Mitchell guilty of two counts of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) (Counts 1, 3), two counts of theft from an elderly person (§ 368, subd. (d)) (Counts 2, 4), and one count of failure to appear while on bail (§ 1320.5) (Count 5). With respect to the burglaries charged in counts 1 and 3, the jury found that each of the burglaries was of an inhabited dwelling (§ 460, subd. (a)), against an elderly person (§ 667.9, subd. (a)), and that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the residence during the commission of the crime (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)).

Defendant Clyde Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of simple possession of methamphetamine, and a jury found him guilty of one count of possession of methamphetamine for sale. He admitted certain enhancement allegations, and the trial court sentenced him to a six-year split sentence. On appeal, Johnson contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). He also contends the trial court erred by admitting for impeachment purposes a 2004 conviction for possession of methamphetamine for sale. We affirm.

Appellant F.C. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order removing her four children from her custody following true findings made on Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 supplemental petitions. (Unless otherwise stated, statutory section references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings that the previous placement with her was ineffective in protecting or rehabilitating the children and that removing the children from her custody was necessary to prevent substantial danger to them. She also argues that the court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to removal.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s findings and dispositional order as to the section 387 supplemental petitions. We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Rotheree Rene Foster was charged by a complaint deemed an information with assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)—count one) and battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)—count two); Jeff S. was the alleged victim in both counts. As to count one, it was alleged that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). As to both counts, it was alleged that defendant had suffered four strikes (§§ 667, subd. (e)(2), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)).
A jury convicted defendant on count one but found the allegation of personal infliction of great bodily injury not true. As to count two, the jury acquitted defendant of the charged offense, but convicted him of misdemeanor battery (§ 242), a lesser included offense.

After a jury trial, defendant Edward John Tholl was found guilty of committing numerous sex crimes against four minor victims over the course of 10 years. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 70 years eight months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the trial court erred in denying his postconviction motion for the appointment of substitute counsel under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), there was insufficient evidence to support two of his convictions, the trial court committed instructional error, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by violating a pretrial order and misstating the law to the jury, the trial court erred in requiring him to testify before his defense expert, and the trial court incorrectly calculated his presentence custody credits. We agree with defendant that the trial court erred in denying his Marsden motion. The error requires conditional reversal.