CA Unpub Decisions

Delacruz argues that his right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution were prejudicially violated at trial, necessitating reversal of his convictions. We affirm.

D.E. (mother) appeals the summary denial of her Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition requesting another chance to have Z.S. (the child) returned to her custody. She contends that because the child’s guardians are now divorced (requiring him to go back and forth between the two households) and she is able to provide a stable home, it is in the child’s best interest to return to her care. Because we find that mother did not demonstrate any significant change in circumstances or establish that returning the child to her custody was in his best interest, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying her section 388 petition. Consequently, we affirm the order.

Defendant and appellant Frank Ernest Gutierrez brought a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a protective sweep of his residence. The trial court partially granted defendant’s motion as to a rifle found inside a case and denied the motion as to all other items found inside the residence. Thereafter, in a plea to the court, defendant pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a); count 3), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 4), and possession of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (c); count 5). Defendant also admitted that he had suffered four prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and two prior felony strike convictions. In return, the trial court sentenced defendant to the indicated sentence of 32 months in state prison.

In April 2014, Muhammad Mohsin (Mohsin) sued (1) Geltmore 4G, LLC (Geltmore); (2) Two Guys, LLP (Two Guys); (3) BOKF, NA, doing business as Bank of Albuquerque (Bank); (4) Mohamad Saiful Hassan; (5) Ruhi Fatema Hassan (Ruhi) ; (6) Strata Realty, Inc. (Strata); (7) Adam N. Silverman; (8) Town & Country Escrow (Escrow); and (9) Northwest Aviation Services Group, LLC. A copy of the complaint is not included in the record on appeal. However, the judgment reflects the causes of action included: (A) quieting title; (B) cancellation of an instrument; (C) constructive trust; (D) negligence; and (E) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The Orange County Water District (the District) filed this action against RadioShack Corporation (RadioShack) and several other owners and operators of sites in the South Basin area of Orange County for allegedly contributing to the contamination of groundwater in the South Basin region. As discussed more fully in our prior opinion arising out of this case, Orange County Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343 (Sabic), the District asserted statutory claims for damages under the Carpenter–Presley–Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act (HSAA; Health & Saf. Code, § 25300 et seq.)

A jury convicted Eric Jon Boissonnault of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 1) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 2). It found true that Boissonnault committed count 1 for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). In bifurcated proceedings, Boissonnault admitted he suffered three prior prison convictions under the "Three Strikes" law. The court sentenced him to 11 years in prison as follows: four years on count 1 plus four years on the gang enhancement and three years on his prior prison convictions. It stayed the count 2 sentence under section 654.

Robert Garfel appeals from an order denying his petition for the recall of his 25-year-to-life sentence and for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. He contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was ineligible for resentencing because he had been armed with a firearm during the commission of his third-strike offense: possession of a firearm by a felon. (Former Pen. Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1), now § 29800, subd. (a)(1).) We affirm.

Mother M.Z. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and setting adoption as the permanent plan for her 11-year-old son, N.Z. (minor). Mother challenges the court’s finding that the beneficial parent child relationship bar to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) does not apply. The court determined that although mother consistently visited the minor during the four years of the dependency proceedings and the two have a strong bond, the benefit of maintaining the parent child bond does not outweigh the benefits adoption would provide the minor in this case. That finding, which rests not only upon the written reports from the Department of Children and Family Services (Department) but also upon testimony by mother and the minor, is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Bobby Moorehead appeals an order committing him to the California Department of Mental Health as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that his severe mental disorder was not in remission. (§ 2962, subd. (a)(1).) We affirm.

T.R. (Father) appeals juvenile court jurisdiction findings and a disposition order concerning his son P.R. (Minor) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 395. Father contends the juvenile court erred when it determined the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its inquiry and notice obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law in connection with his claim of Indian heritage. Father, DCFS, and Minor have stipulated to a limited remand to the juvenile court to permit proper compliance with ICWA and related California provisions. We accept the parties’ stipulation.

The juvenile court declared Torrence S. and his brother, Tobias S., dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, and ordered both children removed from parental custody.
Torrence S. and his parents, Cynthia W. and Titus S., appeal the court’s jurisdictional finding and removal order as to Torrence on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Vincent Thomas guilty of one count of inflicting corporal injury on his girlfriend and acquitted him of two counts of witness intimidation. The trial court sentenced him to a total of nine years in prison. Defendant timely appealed. His appointed counsel filed a brief that raised no issues and requested independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

This appeal arises from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders declaring the three children of T.O. (Mother)—one-year-old Z.C., four-year-old Chance L., and 10-year-old A.S.—dependents of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j), and removing the children from her custody. Mother contends the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) failed to provide adequate notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq (ICWA)) with respect to Z.C. The Department concedes, and we agree. We conditionally affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional orders as to Z.C., but remand with directions that the juvenile court direct the Department to comply with the notice provisions of ICWA.

Following a guilty verdict on a criminal threats charge, the trial court initially sentenced defendant and appellant James Ware, Jr., (defendant) to 35 years to life in prison—comprised of a 25-years-to-life Three Strikes sentence for the conviction plus ten years under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for sustaining two prior serious felony convictions. In a prior appeal, we reversed that judgment for instructional error and gave the People the option of retrying the case or accepting a reduction of the conviction to attempted criminal threats.