CA Unpub Decisions

Denise Cable met O’Neill in approximately 2014 when he was a student in a scuba diving instructor class that she taught for Ocean Enterprises. At the time, Ocean Enterprise conducted three different types of business: a scuba gear retail store, which included service, rental, and instructional departments; military sales; and a travel division that took clients on scuba diving trips. Denise and O’Neill became work associates at Ocean Enterprises and friends. O’Neill also became friends with Denise’s husband, James.
In the summer of 2015, O’Neill expressed interest in purchasing the retail scuba gear rental portion of Ocean Enterprises. O’Neill loaned the owner of Ocean Enterprises, Werner Kurn, money to pay off some business debts while they discussed the potential sale.
The Cables considered investing in O’Neill’s purchase of the business.

On July 20, 2020, defendant Deandre Harper pleaded no contest to a charge of burglary under Penal Code section 459. The trial court sentenced him to 11 years, suspended execution of sentence, and placed him on formal probation for five years. One condition of that probation was to “obey all laws . . . .”
Less than a year later, on June 22, 2021, defendant was arrested for willful infliction of corporal injury (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and criminal threats (id., § 422, subd. (a)) following a domestic violence incident with his girlfriend, C.S. On July 8, 2021, the trial court revoked defendant’s probation and issued a bench warrant. Defendant appeared on July 13, 2021.
The trial court held a parole violation hearing on August 10, 2021. The People called C.S. as a witness. C.S. testified that at the time of the domestic violence incident she had been dating defendant for about three years.

Because the sole issue on appeal relates to compliance with ICWA, we limit our summary of the facts to those relevant to that issue except as necessary for context.
Father had sole physical custody of M.T. pursuant to a custody order issued in 2019, at the termination of a previous dependency case involving the family. The custody order permitted M.T.’s mother, Martha A. (mother), to have only monitored visitation with M.T. The family came to the attention of DCFS in April 2021, when a reporting party alleged that father allowed M.T. to have unsupervised and overnight visits with mother, who had a history of substance use and was residing in a homeless encampment.
During its ensuing investigation of the allegations, DCFS spoke with paternal grandmother, paternal aunt, paternal uncle, and father’s adult daughter, some on multiple occasions.

Brooks was an employee of AmeriHome. In January 2019, Brooks submitted a PAGA notice (§ 2699.3) to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) alleging violations for failure to (1) pay minimum and overtime wages, (2) provide meal periods and rest breaks, (3) timely pay wages during employment, (4) timely pay wages upon termination, (5) provide complete and accurate wage statements, and (6) reimburse business expenses. The next month, Brooks filed a PAGA complaint in Ventura County Superior Court in case number 56-2019-00524903 (Brooks Action) alleging the same violations.
AmeriHome moved to stay the PAGA action pending arbitration of Brooks’s individual claims. Brooks filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin the arbitration proceedings. The trial court granted Brooks’s injunction and denied AmeriHome’s stay. AmeriHome appealed, and we affirmed. (Brooks v. AmeriHome Mortgage Company, LLC (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 624.)

Allison Ewart was hit by a car and seriously injured when Widge Galloway, serving as a volunteer traffic control officer for Los Angeles County during a triathlon, directed an automobile to turn into Ewart’s path. Although Ewart prevailed at trial in her negligence action against both Galloway and the County, the court of appeal reversed the judgment against the County, holding, because Ewart was an unpaid volunteer, the County could not be found vicariously liable for her negligence. (Ewart v. County of Los Angeles (July 9, 2019, B286379) [nonpub. opn.].)
Faced with a $1.2 million judgment, Galloway assigned to Ewart any rights she might have against the County. Ewart, as Galloway’s assignee, then filed this lawsuit against the County alleging Galloway, who had been provided counsel by the County during the negligence action, was entitled to be indemnified for the judgment.

In 2017, plaintiff was an Uber driver. Plaintiff had immigrated to the United States from Asia.
On October 2, 2017, plaintiff picked up a passenger who appeared to be of Korean descent and who used the name “Maverick.” After plaintiff refused to use the passenger’s preferred route to his destination, the passenger started hitting the back of plaintiff’s head with his fist and, when plaintiff turned his head, landed a blow near plaintiff’s right eye and broke plaintiff’s sunglasses. When plaintiff called 911, the passenger hopped out of the car and fled on foot.
B. Investigation and nonprosecution of passenger
Two Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers responded to plaintiff’s 911 call. The officers interviewed plaintiff about the incident, documented plaintiff’s injuries, and obtained from plaintiff the destination address the passenger had provided for his Uber ride.

Richard Finley Shumate was involved in a multi-car collision and brought a products liability case against the distributor of his car, American Honda Motor Co., Inc. The case culminated in summary judgment for Honda. We affirm because Shumate failed to raise a triable issue of material fact on the key issue of defect.
The core facts are few. Shumate drove a Honda CR-V. In June 2015, he was at a standstill on the 405 freeway, about 18 feet behind a Chevrolet Equinox. While stopped, a BMW Z3 hit him from behind, pushing his car into the Equinox. Shumate sued and settled with the BMW driver.
In 2017, Shumate sued Honda and other companies claiming his airbag was defective and should have deployed when he struck the Equinox.
Years passed, the parties tried and failed to settle the case, and then Honda moved for summary judgment on the issues of defect and causation.
Honda supplied expert evidence about the airbag system.

A firm called Engage BDR, LLC entered a Master Agreement requiring it to remit payments to Amobee, Inc. When Engage repeatedly failed to pay, the parties entered a succession of five more agreements that gave Engage more time to pay but increased its debt to Amobee. Engage paid most of what it owed but then sued Amobee, claiming Amobee breached the Master Agreement and used the follow-on agreements to charge usurious interest rates. Engage maintained it was entitled to rescind the later agreements because it entered them only under financial duress.
The trial court sustained Amobee’s demurrers and granted it attorney fees. In 2021, we affirmed the court’s judgment on the demurrers. (Engage BDR, LLC v. Amobee, Inc. (July 15, 2021, B305770) [nonpub. opn.].) Now we confront Engage’s separate attack on the fees award to Amobee. This attack fails. Engage sued Amobee on contracts containing attorney fees provisions.

1. On page 25, the first paragraph of footnote 19 is modified to read as follows: “In their respondents’ brief, defendants do not argue expressly that Gail waived or forfeited her claim of instructional error by failing specifically to request an instruction that the Hollanders were not obligated to negotiate with XL Specialty reasonably and in good faith. Rather, in a section of their respondents’ brief that appears under the main heading ‘Plaintiffs are Estopped by the “Invited Error” Doctrine from Challenging Special Instruction 1’ and the subheading ‘Plaintiffs should be estopped from raising arguments challenging Special Instruction 1 not raised below’ (boldface omitted), defendants maintain that Gail ‘should be barred from challenging Special Instruction 1’ because she ‘never submitted an “unfettered right” instruction . . . to the court.’ Insofar as defendants seek to invoke the forfeiture and/or waiver doctrines, they fail to do so properly.

Ulloarivera lived in the home of 13-year-old M. Doe and her family, although by the time these events occurred he had moved into the garage. Doe’s mother observed Ulloarivera, then 28, flirting with Doe, and found suggestive text messages between the two. Doe admitted to her mother that Ulloarivera had sexual intercourse with her on three occasions and had kissed her on the lips. She did not want to have sex with him.
During a pretext phone call, Doe’s mother falsely told Ulloarivera that he had impregnated Doe. Ulloarivera responded that had fallen in love with Doe and had not meant to impregnate her. He indicated he was aware of Doe’s age and later explained that it is not uncommon in his native Honduras for adult men to date young girls. He admitted to police that he had sexual intercourse with Doe approximately six times.
Ulloarivera was charged with eight counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon the body of a child under the age of 14. (Pen. Code § 288, subd.

Defendant was charged by an amended information with two counts of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)) and one count of forcible oral copulation (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A)) against one victim, and with an additional count of forcible rape involving a second victim. The amended information also alleged various enhancements including that defendant inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.7, 12022.8) during the commission of the rapes.
Defendant pled no contest to two counts of rape and admitted the great-bodily-injury enhancement on one of the counts in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and allegations and a stipulated sentence of 17 years, which was significantly lower than the life term he could have received if convicted of all charges after a trial.
Before sentencing, defendant made an oral motion to withdraw his plea and requested a new attorney.

We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, Title 8, Standard 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853–855.)
Defendant Moises Birelas was convicted of first degree murder in 2007. The jury found true a felony murder special circumstances allegation that Birelas was a major participant in an attempted robbery causing the victim’s death and acted with reckless indifference to human life. He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
In 2019, Birelas petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, which allows a defendant convicted of murder on a theory of imputed malice (such as felony murder) to be resentenced consistent with recently enacted changes in the law. (See Sen. Bill No. 1437, eff. Jan. 1, 2019, redefining “malice” as required for murder by Penal Code section 188 to exclude imputed malice.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)

Unfortunately, consideration of appellant’s appeal from the December 2019 order begins and ends with a discussion of the deficiencies in appellant’s briefs on appeal. Rule 8.204(a)(2), requires an appellant to “[s]tate the nature of the action, the relief sought in the trial court, and the judgment or order appealed from” in the opening brief, and to explain why the order is appealable. Moreover, each brief filed in an appeal must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.” (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Specifically, the appellant must include “a summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record.” (Rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Each point raised in the brief must be supported “by argument, and if possible, by citation of authority[.]” (Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Appellant has failed to comply with rule 8.204 in several regards.

Former restaurant employees initially filed this case in 2010 as a wage and hour class action against defendants Koji’s Japan Incorporated (Koji’s) and Arthur Parent, Jr., who had been Koji’s president, sole shareholder, and director. After over a decade of litigation which produced several appellate court opinions, the trial court preliminarily approved the parties’ class action settlement agreement. As relevant to the issues presented in this appeal, the preliminarily approved agreement provided for the defendants to make a nonreversionary settlement payment in the total gross amount of $2.2 million, which included an attorney fee award in the amount of $1,040,000 and enhancement awards totaling $100,000 to be distributed among the named plaintiffs and declarants. That agreement also provided that unclaimed class payments would be allocated to a designated cy près recipient.