CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, in case No. RIF1801071, defendant and appellant, Kevin Bryan Johnson, pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance while in a detention center (Pen. Code, § 4573.6). Defendant also pled guilty to second degree burglary (§ 459) in case No. RIF1802781. In return, the remaining allegation in case No. RIF1802781, as well as four unrelated pending cases were dismissed. Defendant was sentenced to eight months in county jail in case No. RIF1802781, a consecutive eight months in an unrelated matter, a consecutive term of 364 days in county jail in another unrelated case, and four years on mandatory supervision in case No. RIF1801071. Defendant appeals from the judgment in both cases. Based on our independent review of the record, we find no error and affirm both judgments.

This is another action in a long line of cases challenging the constitutionality, on First Amendment grounds, of a city’s ban on “off-site” billboards. (See Lamar Central Outdoor, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 610, 614-615 (Lamar).) In 2004, plaintiff, cross-defendant, and respondent, City of Corona (the City), adopted ordinance No. 2729 (the 2004 ordinance), banning the placement anywhere in the City of new “off-site” billboards or “outdoor advertising signs,” regardless of their content, but allowing “grandfathered” billboards (those placed in the City before the 2004 ordinance went into effect) to be relocated in the City pursuant to a relocation agreement with the City.

Defendant Walid Samir Ayass appeals from a judgment entered after a bench trial. The trial court found Ayass guilty of committing one count of assault with a deadly weapon, a vehicle, and three counts of making a criminal threat, stemming from an incident at a gym during which Ayass accelerated his car toward another gym member and directed verbal threats toward that member, the gym owner and a gym employee.

A jury found Andre Lamont Taylor guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) (count 1) and possession of a firearm as a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2). The jury also found that Taylor personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in committing the murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). After the jury rendered its verdicts, in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true two serious felony allegations pursuant to the 'Three Strikes' law (§ 1170.12) (strike priors) and two serious felony enhancement allegations (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) based on the same two prior convictions.

In this appeal, we consider the limits on a trial court’s authority to seize, for the payment of restitution, funds held in a county jail inmate’s commissary account. Defendant Daniel Deluna-Martinez challenges the trial court’s order seizing 90 percent of his jail inmate commissary account. We will affirm.

A jury found defendant Adam Nersesyan guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (b)(1)) and found true the allegation he used a deadly or dangerous weapon (knife) in the commission of the robbery (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to prison. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred by admitting other crimes evidence and hearsay evidence, and in failing to instruct the jury about accomplice testimony.
We agree the trial court erred, but find the errors did not prejudice defendant, who was first caught on camera and then identified by two different people as the robber. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

Appointed counsel for defendant and appellant Melvin Williams filed a brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) asking this court to review the record and determine if any colorable appellate issues exist. Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief and did not do so. Having concluded upon our review that defendant appealed from a nonappealable order, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant and appellant S.A. (Mother) is the mother of two children: six-year-old K.B. and five-year-old S.B. (collectively, the Minors). In dependency proceedings, the juvenile court found Mother was unable to provide regular care and supervision to the Minors due to mental and emotional problems (including depression, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder) for which she failed to consistently seek treatment. The juvenile court removed the Minors from Mother’s custody, placed them with their father B.B. (Father), and granted Mother monitored visitation once per month. We consider whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding and removal order.

Defendant and appellant Rajohn Charles Douglas was convicted by jury of three counts of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and two counts of second degree commercial burglary (§ 459). He was sentenced to a term of 28 years 4 months. Appellant filed a petition under Proposition 47 to reduce his burglary convictions to misdemeanors. The trial court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. The sole contention on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Respondent concedes that the failure to hold a hearing was error and that the matter accordingly should be remanded. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing. Appellant has the right to counsel and the right to be present at the hearing.

This appeal concerns the development of a mixed-use commercial and affordable housing project at the intersection of 7th Street and Witmer Street in Los Angeles. Appellant 1305 Ingraham, LLC filed an administrative appeal challenging respondent City of Los Angeles’s project permit compliance review. The City scheduled but never held a hearing on the appeal. A few days after the hearing date, the City approved the project; it filed and posted a notice of determination with the county clerk approximately one week later. Real party in interest/respondent 7th & Witmer, LP moved forward with the project.

As charged by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, a jury convicted defendant and appellant John Burns with human trafficking of a minor, Carmen L. (Carmen), for a commercial sex act (Pen. Code, § 236.1, subd. (c)(1); count 1), pimping of Haylie R. (Haylie) and Jonequa I. (Jonequa) (§ 266h, subd. (a); counts 3 & 5), possession of a firearm by a felon
(§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 7), human trafficking to commit pimping of Kamyn R. (Kamyn) (§ 236.1, subd. (b); count 8), and dissuading Haylie and Carmen from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); counts 10 & 11). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had five prior serious felony/strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)), and that he had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).

A jury found Miguel Jose Mora (Mora) guilty of one count of elder abuse and one count of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Mora concurrently on the two counts. On appeal, he contends his sentence on the assault count should have been stayed under Penal Code section 654. As we now discuss, we agree and modify the judgment.

Respondent parties, which consist of three nonprofit environmental and social justice organizations—Youth for Environmental Justice, Center for Biological Diversity, and South Central Youth Leadership Coalition (collectively, Nonprofits)—and the City of Los Angeles along with its Department of City Planning and that department’s director (collectively, the City), filed special motions to strike the operative cross-complaint of appellant California Independent Petroleum Association (CIPA) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.

Joel Velazquez appeals the judgment entered following a jury trial in which he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).) The trial court found the prior conviction allegations true and sentenced appellant to an aggregate term of 46 years to life.
Appellant correctly contends that the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct on the applicable theories of involuntary manslaughter. We therefore reverse the judgment of conviction.