CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff Dienna Hollie appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant City of Long Beach (City) in her lawsuit alleging a single cause of action for disparate treatment racial discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12940, et seq.). She appears to contend (see section A of the Discussion, post) that the trial court improperly denied her request for a continuance of the motion to allow her to obtain additional information and failed to consider her evidence showing that the reason for her termination was pretext for discrimination. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Alston & Bird, Jeffrey D. Dintzer, Matt Wickersham and Nathaniel Johnson, for Intervenor and Respondent.
After three nonprofit environmental and social justice organizations sued the City of Los Angeles (the City) for allegedly permitting oil drilling in violation of environmental and civil rights laws, an oil industry trade group intervened in the case. Without the participation of the intervenor, the City and nonprofits settled the case and the City adopted policies to address the nonprofits’ concerns. We consider whether there is any merit to the oil industry group’s contention—specifically, the merit necessary to survive a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 —that the conduct of the City and nonprofits infringed the group’s due process right to block the settlement and compel a decision on the merits of the case.

This is a dispute between the owner of a film and the agent hired to license and distribute the film. Plaintiff and appellant Maron Pictures Ltd. entered into a Sales Agency Agreement (SAA) with defendant and respondent Mainsail, LLC to license and distribute Maron Pictures’s film Strength and Honour. Disputes arose between the parties within a few months of executing the SAA, but Maron Pictures did not file this action until four years later.

Plaintiff Jesus Raymon Valenzuela appeals from the summary judgment entered against him and in favor of defendants Unified Grocers, Inc., Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., Unified Grocers (collectively, Unified), and Tim Lucchino (erroneously sued as Tim Lichino), and the denial of his motion for a new trial. He contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there were disputed issues of fact precluding summary adjudication of his claims for disability discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900, et. seq.), retaliation for taking leave under the California Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA) (Gov. Code, § 12945.1, et seq.), and wrongful termination. He also contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of defendants’ conduct prior to a settlement agreement Valenzuela entered into with United in which he released all claims related to his employment with United.

Defendant Sharron Renee Wingham appeals from a judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of felony forgery (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d)) and felony theft from an elder (Pen. Code, § 368, subd. (e)). Her appellate counsel has raised no issues and asks this court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to defendant, result in reversal or modification of the judgment. (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly); People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Defendant was notified of her right to file a supplemental brief but has not done so. Upon independent review of the record, we conclude no arguable issues are presented for review and affirm the judgment.

Following a search of his apartment pursuant to a search warrant, defendant Jose Montano was charged with possession of heroin with a semi-automatic handgun (count 1) and possession of heroin for sale (count 2). After Montano’s preliminary hearing and his unsuccessful motions to quash and traverse search warrants that were based on partially sealed affidavits, Montano pleaded no contest to count 1 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)), and was sentenced to three years of formal probation and 90 days in the county jail. In this appeal, he asks us to “examine the sealed affidavit and the in camera proceedings to determine whether . . . the motion to quash the warrant was properly denied.” We have done so, and affirm the judgment.

Noel Lee challenges an order requiring him to pay temporary spousal support and interim attorney fees and costs. He claims the trial court erred in ordering temporary support and interim fees because the parties’ premarital agreement precludes such an award. We conclude that the court was not required, as its first action in this dissolution proceeding, to determine the validity of the parties’ premarital agreement, and that the court did not err in awarding temporary support and interim fees and costs which, if ultimately determined to be barred by the agreement, Noel may recoup from Lily. We therefore affirm the challenged order.

Defendant Gustavo M. was convicted of first degree murder, shooting at a vehicle, and assault with a firearm, with firearm enhancements. He was 15 years old at the time of the crimes. In his original briefs on appeal, he contended that his confession should not have been admitted, that the trial court committed instructional error, that the evidence was insufficient to show he acted with malice, that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that his sentence of 50 years to life constituted cruel and unusual punishment, that he was entitled to a transfer hearing on whether the matter should have proceeded in juvenile court, and that the trial court should consider whether to strike the firearm enhancement.

Defendant Adrian Moreno pleaded no contest to attempted second degree robbery. As part of the plea agreement, he entered a broad waiver of his appellate rights. The trial court placed defendant on three years’ formal probation as called for by the plea agreement. On appeal, defendant’s counsel filed an opening brief in which no issues are raised and asked this court to independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We sent a letter to defendant notifying him of his right to submit a written argument on his own behalf on appeal. He has not done so.

Defendant Robert Thomas Bagwell appeals after a jury found him guilty of possession of a billy club (Pen. Code, § 22210; count 1); possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 3); possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); counts 4-6); possession of a short-barreled shotgun (§ 33215; count 7); possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 8); possession of a firearm by a person convicted of section 242 within the past 10 years (§ 29805; count 9); possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a); count 10); and possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a); count 11). The trial court sentenced defendant to serve six years eight months in prison.

This action arises out of a defunct corporation’s nonpayment of legal fees and costs to its longtime patent counsel. After Shocking Technologies, Inc. (Shocking) filed for bankruptcy protection, the attorney, appellant Zurvan Mahamedi brought suit against two directors, one officer, and the major corporate investor of Shocking to collect the unpaid fees and costs. The named defendants were Shocking’s president, chief executive officer, and director, Lex Kosowsky, general counsel Marius Domokos, outside director and respondent David Heinzmann, and leading investor and respondent LittelFuse, Inc. (LittelFuse). In December 2015, the court below sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of LittelFuse and Hinzmann (hereafter, collectively, respondents) to Mahamedi’s second amended complaint (Complaint), and he appeals from the dismissal entered on that order.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant Mauricio Javier Soriano-Moreno on appeal. Counsel filed a brief which set forth the facts of the case. Counsel did not argue against the client, but advised the court no issues were found to argue on defendant’s behalf. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, counsel provided one possible issue to assist this court in its review: “Does the ‘10 years of age or younger’ requirement in [Penal Code] section 288.7 encompass crimes which occur when the victim is over the age of 10 but under the age of 11?” (All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.)
Defendant was born in July 1998. L. was born in October 2006. She was 11 years old when she testified on June 21, 2018. At the time she testified, she had just finished the sixth grade and was going to begin the seventh grade in the fall of 2018. She and her parents share a bedroom, although she has her own bed.

Plaintiffs The Bank of New York Mellon, as trustee for Structured Asset Securities Corporation Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-16 (BONY) and Nationstar Mortgage LLC (Nationstar) filed a post-foreclosure unlawful detainer action seeking possession of defendant Nancy M. Horner’s Huntington Beach home (the Property). The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and awarded possession of the Property to plaintiffs. Defendant appeals from the judgment, contending the court erred because the foreclosure sale was void. According to defendant, plaintiffs failed to show the foreclosure sale complied with Civil Code section 2924 or that BONY duly perfected title to the Property. For the reasons stated below, we disagree and affirm the judgment.

Oscar Rodolfo Hernandez appeals from a judgment after a jury convicted him of sexual offenses involving his stepdaughters. Hernandez argues the following: the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for precharging delay; the court made various evidentiary errors; the court erred by limiting his right to cross-examine witnesses; and there was cumulative error. None of his contentions have merit, and we affirm the judgment.