CA Unpub Decisions

Following the juvenile court’s termination of reunification services and setting of a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, Tamara J., the mother of 10-year-old S.J., petitioned to reinstate reunification services under section 388, arguing her participation in individual therapy had resulted in improved emotional stability. The court denied the petition. On appeal Tamara contends the court erred in finding she had failed to carry her burden to show changed circumstances and that reinstatement of services was in S.J.’s best interests. We affirm.

After more than three years of dependency jurisdiction over minor K.H., the juvenile court terminated family reunification services provided to her mother T.H. (Mother) and later terminated Mother’s parental rights over K.H. as well. Mother challenges both decisions. Specifically, we consider (1) whether Mother can attack the order terminating services even though she did not seek writ review of that order, and (2) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying a continuance of the parental rights termination hearing so Mother could testify about her visitation with K.H. and the nature of their relationship—in the hope of establishing the parent-child relationship exception to termination of parental rights.

Defendant Arturo Aguirre appeals the trial court’s order that revoked his parole, arguing that there was insufficient evidence he willfully violated parole by failing to report to his parole agent. We reverse, concluding the court abused its discretion by revoking defendant’s parole.

Defendant Natasha G. (mother) appeals from jurisdiction and disposition orders of the juvenile court, sustaining a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b), with regard to her son, K.B., and placing K.B. with his father, Jermaine B. (father). Mother’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief under In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, stating that she found no arguable issues and asking this court to exercise its discretion to allow mother to file her own brief. (See id. at p. 845 [Court of Appeal is not required to allow an indigent parent to file a brief when appointed counsel has concluded there are no arguable issues, but it has discretion to permit the parent to do so].)

Defendant and appellant Austin Hieatt pled no contest to two counts of second degree robbery. He admitted personally using a handgun during the commission of one robbery (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and one prior strike allegation (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12).
Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 18 years in prison: six years for count 5, plus two years for count 1, and 10 years for the firearm enhancement. Various fines and fees were imposed. Defendant received 465 days of presentence custody credit. The trial court issued a certificate of probable cause, and defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On appeal, defendant argues that pursuant to People v. Hurlic (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 50 (Hurlic), his case must be remanded so that the trial court can exercise its discretion as to whether to lessen defendant’s sentence pursuant to amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h).
We affirm.

In 1995, appellant Louis White was convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon and sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison pursuant to the “Three Strikes Law” (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). In 2012, White petitioned for recall of his sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (§ 1170.126), enacted by the California electorate as Proposition 36. The trial court denied the petition, finding White ineligible for relief because he was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. We affirm.

Appellant Anastacio Sandoval-Mora (appellant) was severely injured when he fell from the second-story roof of a house he was painting. At the time of his fall, appellant was employed by and working for LA Construction Services, Inc. (LA Construction), which had been hired as an independent contractor to perform painting at a residential construction project. Respondent Ronen Yehezkel supervised the construction project, and his wife, respondent Malli Yehezkel, and their company, respondent Romm Remodeling, Inc. (collectively, respondents), also were involved with the project to varying degrees.

This action involves claims by Plaintiff Ardreda Johnson (Johnson) against defendant PennyMac Corp. (PennyMac) for, among other things, unfair debt collection practices pertaining to a mortgage on Johnson’s home. Her action was dismissed after the trial court sustained PennyMac’s demurrer to the first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend. On appeal, Johnson seeks review of (1) the August 30, 2017 order granting PennyMac’s motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Johnson, and (2) the October 11, 2017 order, sustaining PennyMac’s demurrer.
We dismiss the portion of the appeal pertaining to the order setting aside the default and default judgment. We affirm the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and the subsequent judgment.

Julia Andrea Grau Gomez obtained a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6) against her neighbor, Paul Bukowski. Bukowski appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to establish harassment. Concluding that substantial evidence supports the court’s implied findings, we affirm.

Defendant George Alfaro (defendant) appeals from a criminal judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and second degree robbery (§ 211). The charges were predicated on evidence that, in October 2015, defendant broke into the home of victim Carol Cortes (Cortes) and stole a television and cash, and later, in December 2015, robbed the same victim of her cell phone after punching her in the face. At sentencing, the trial court granted a defense motion pursuant to People v. Romero (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) and sentenced defendant to a total of 24 years in prison.

In this insurance fraud case, Sharon Davis was injured by a door at her place of employment, the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, VA Medical Center in Long Beach. She submitted three claim forms under a private accident insurance policy she had obtained from Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Company and was paid about $2,700. She was eventually charged with four counts of insurance fraud, one count of forgery, and one count of grand theft for: (1) falsely claiming that she sustained the injury while “off-job” as defined in the insurance policy; (2) falsely claiming she had not applied for workers’ compensation benefits; and (3) forging a signature in the employer verification portion of two claim forms. Following trial, a jury convicted her on all but the forgery count, on which it deadlocked and the court declared a mistrial.

Michael Alexander Rivera was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery. Although the court found at a bifurcated bench trial that Rivera had suffered three prior strike convictions, it dismissed all three for sentencing purposes under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 and sentenced Rivera to 18 years in state prison: the middle term of three years for second degree robbery, plus three five-year enhancements for Rivera’s prior serious felony convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). Rivera appealed the judgment, contending the trial court erred in imposing three, rather than one, prior serious felony enhancements. The People conceded the error, and we vacated Rivera’s sentence and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to reconsider all lawful sentencing options.

Defendant Raymond Gallegos pleaded no contest to second degree murder and was convicted by a jury of carjacking, three counts of robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, Gallegos contends the evidence was insufficient to support two of the robbery convictions. We affirm.

This action involves in-laws litigating over $10.8 million that a deceased man and his wife allegedly stole from the man’s mother and brother. Louise Yi Liu (Liu), the widow of the deceased man, lost below. She appeals a $4 million judgment against her for money had and received in favor of Mico Chong Liang Chung (Mico) as the personal representative of the Estate of Wang Say Ching Chung (Wang’s Estate). In addition, Liu appeals the posttrial order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). We conclude that JNOV should have been granted and reverse the judgment on that basis. On remand, judgment shall be entered for Liu.