CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Robert Reagan guilty of second degree murder, finding that he intentionally stabbed his girlfriend to death in their bedroom while their five-year-old son slept in the next room. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred: (1) by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) when it admitted evidence of defendant’s motive; (3) when it allowed the prosecutor to ask a hypothetical question based on speculation; and (4) by instructing the jury on the relevance of defendant’s failure to explain or deny adverse evidence. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct by failing to introduce certain evidence until rebuttal.

Hector Bravo pleaded no contest to second degree burglary of a vehicle in August 2013 and was sentenced to serve 16 months in Los Angeles County Jail. On July 17, 2017 Bravo, representing himself, moved to vacate his conviction pursuant to former Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), on the ground the conviction was legally invalid due to a prejudicial error damaging his ability to meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his plea. The superior court denied the motion, finding Bravo did not fall within the class of persons eligible for relief under section 1473.7 because he was “currently incarcerated at the Adelanto Detention Facility of the California Department of Corrections.”

Jose Castellanos (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered following a jury trial that resulted in his conviction of attempted second degree robbery as an aider and abettor (Pen. Code, §§ 662, 211), assault with a semiautomatic firearm as an aider and abettor (§ 245, subd. (b)), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subds. (b), (c)).
On appeal, defendant contends his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred by admitting evidence of: (1) a prior robbery to prove intent pursuant to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b); and (2) a recorded jailhouse conversation between his codefendant, Jonathan Noriega (Noriega), and an informant.

Evan Lionel appeals from the judgment in a marital dissolution proceeding, arguing that the determination of the court was unfair, and reflected bias and prejudice. Because Evan has waived his contentions on appeal, we affirm.

Appellants were plaintiffs in a personal injury action involving an automobile collision. The action went to jury trial and the jury found Respondent was not negligent. Appellants seek reversal of the judgment in favor of Respondent, arguing the trial court erred: 1) by granting Respondent’s motion in limine precluding argument, evidence, and instruction regarding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; 2) by refusing to instruct the jury regarding negligence per se on the theory that Respondent violated the duty imposed on drivers by Vehicle Code section 21703 to follow at a safe distance; and 3) by altering the wording of the jury instruction on alternative causation.
We disagree with Appellants’ contentions, and affirm the judgment entered by the trial court on April 25, 2017.

Appealing the judgment entered following his conviction for unlawful possession of ammunition, Davion Douglas argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding he had dominion over, or a right to control, the ammunition found in a bedside dresser in the home where he was staying. Douglas also asks this court to independently review the sealed affidavit that supported the warrant issued to search the house, which led to the discovery of the ammunition. We affirm.

Appellant Dedrick Jordan appeals from his judgment of conviction of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of possession of a firearm with a prior violent felony conviction (§ 29900, subd. (a)(1)). Among other arguments, Jordan asserts the evidence at trial was insufficient to support each of his convictions. We agree that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding that Jordan had actual or constructive possession of a firearm, and on that basis, reverse his judgment of conviction.

A jury found Israel Magana guilty of two first-degree murders and illegal possession of a firearm, and found true gang and firearm enhancements and a multiple murder special circumstance. Magana appeals, and we affirm.

Satish Shetty has a demonstrated practice of acquiring property after foreclosure proceedings have been initiated and then challenging the foreclosures as a self-represented plaintiff based on alleged irregularities in the funding, securitization, assignment and servicing of the loans and deeds of trust. On April 5, 2016 he brought such an action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, seeking to quiet title to a property he had purchased three weeks earlier. On August 26, 2016 the trial court declared Shetty a vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b)(1), ordered him to furnish security in the amount of $9,000 to Deutsche Bank as a condition to proceeding with this litigation (§ 391.3) and prohibited him from filing in propria persona any new litigation in the courts of this state without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge or justice of the court where the litigation was proposed to be filed (§ 391.7).

Before us are six consolidated identical appeals in which plaintiffs asserting asbestos-related claims appeal from orders setting aside default judgments entered against Williams & Burrows, Inc., the insured of respondents Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford) and Nationwide Insurance Co. (Nationwide). Although the precise relevant dates in the six cases vary somewhat, in each case they follow the pattern of dates in the case filed on behalf of plaintiff Robert Ross: Williams & Burrows, Inc., a former corporation that had been dissolved in 2001, was served with the summons and complaint on March 10, 2009, a request for entry of default was filed on June 22, 2009, and a default judgment was entered on December 10, 2015. On April 17, 2017, counsel for Hartford filed motions in each of the cases on behalf of Williams & Burrows, Inc. to set aside the defaults and default judgments.

Todd Henry Jarvis (Todd or plaintiffs) sued the law firm Wendel, Rosen, Black & Dean, LLP (Wendel Rosen) and attorney Les Hausrath (together defendants) for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and other claims based on allegations that Todd hired Wendel Rosen to represent him in various capacities and that defendants later breached duties owed to him by, among other things, “taking adverse actions to [his] detriment,” “failing to withdraw from a conflicted representation,” and “disclosing confidential information.”

While using his pickup truck to “spin doughnuts” in a residential neighborhood of Antioch, defendant Fredy Castaneda-Longoria hit Timothy Hudson, dragged him about 50 feet, and ran over him while fleeing the scene. Hudson died from his injuries. A jury convicted Castaneda-Longoria of felony counts of gross vehicular manslaughter and hit-and-run driving resulting in death and found true the allegations that he fled the scene of the first crime and caused great bodily injury during the second crime. The trial court sentenced him to 11 years in prison.
On appeal, Castaneda-Longoria makes numerous claims of evidentiary, instructional, and sentencing error, including cumulative error. We conclude that an order of victim restitution to Hudson’s parents must be reversed for lack of evidence. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment.

Marci Patera appeals from a judgment and post-judgment order entered in ongoing litigation with her former partner, Roy Bartlett. She argues that the trial court wrongly stopped her from continuing to receive a monthly social security disability “derivative benefit” intended to aid one of their children. She also argues that the court wrongly entered an order allowing her to refile a request for attorney fees under Family Code section 2030. We reject these arguments and affirm.

In 2010, a jury convicted petitioner and defendant Christopher Lee, along with codefendant Kosal Khek, of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, count 1.) Lee was not present at the scene of the killing, so the jury was instructed that he could be guilty of first degree murder under one of two derivative liability theories, either as a direct aider and abettor, or under the natural and probable consequences theory of liability. Lee, who was a juvenile at the time he committed the offenses, was sentenced to a total term of 32 years to life in prison, including a sentence of 25 years to life on the charge of first degree murder.