CA Unpub Decisions

In this petition, the mother contends substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s order to set this case for a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, and that she was deprived of reasonable services. (All further undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Petition denied.

The juvenile court found true a robbery allegation in a juvenile delinquency petition filed against Alexander M. The court therefore sustained the petition and declared Alexander a ward of the court. The court placed Alexander on probation subject to various conditions, including that he obey all laws and submit to an electronic search condition.
Subsequently, a notice of violation of probation was filed against Alexander in the same matter, alleging that he violated the “obey all laws” probation condition by committing an attempted robbery. The juvenile court found Alexander had indeed violated the conditions of his probation. The court continued Alexander on probation, renewing the existing terms and conditions of probation, including the electronic search condition. This appeal followed. The sole issue on appeal is the validity of the electronic search condition.

Defendant Kristopher Williams Lawless was charged with and convicted of child endangerment (and other counts unrelated to this appeal) in violation of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a) after driving recklessly while fleeing from officers with an improperly restrained child in his car. The child’s mother was a passenger in the car.
Defendant had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law and the court found true the section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement. The court sentenced defendant to a 12-year term (upper term of six years, doubled under the three strikes law) on the child endangerment conviction. The trial court further imposed a consecutive five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, for a total consecutive term of 17 years in prison.

Carlos Alvarado appeals from numerous convictions under Penal Code sections 288, subdivision (b)(1) and 288.7, subdivision (a), for sexually molesting his minor daughter, K.A.
Alvarado asks for independent review of the trial court’s Pitchess inquiry regarding specific personnel records of the police officer who investigated the instant matter. We detect no Pitchess error. He also argues the trial court prejudicially erred in excluding evidence of a misdemeanor vandalism conviction suffered by this police officer. We reject this contention.
Alvarado also contends the trial court improperly permitted the prosecutor to amend counts 7, 8, and 9 of the operative information. We agree and reverse his convictions on these counts.

A jury convicted appellant Amanda Marie Reese of willful cruelty to a child, a felony. (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a).) She was sentenced to prison for four years.
The child in question was appellant’s 15-month-old daughter, Sophia Lynn Taylor (the baby). It is undisputed that appellant’s boyfriend, Jared Ramirez, killed the baby. Prior to appellant’s trial, Ramirez pleaded no contest to committing second degree murder, and he was sentenced to prison for 15 years to life. The trial court informed appellant’s jury about Ramirez’s plea and sentence.
The primary issue in appellant’s trial was whether she was criminally negligent for causing or permitting the baby to suffer, be injured, or be endangered. The prosecutor argued to the jury that appellant’s negligent act was leaving the baby with Ramirez on the fatal night knowing he had been abusing the baby.

Plaintiff and respondent Daniel Guzman (Father) and defendant and appellant Marissa Bonilla (Mother) share legal and physical custody of their daughter, K.G. (Daughter). Father requested a domestic violence restraining order against Mother. (Fam. Code, § 6300 et seq.) The family court granted the restraining order. The family court also granted Mother’s request for a restraining order against Father. (§ 6300 et seq.) Further, the family court issued child custody and visitation orders.
Mother raises three issues on appeal. First, Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the family court’s findings. Second, Mother asserts the family court did not make some of the required findings. (Fam. Code, § 6305, subd. (a)(2).) Third, Mother contends she did not receive adequate notice of the hearing concerning Father’s request for a restraining order. We affirm.

Muhammad Mohsin (Mohsin) sued Mohamad Saiful Hassan (Hassan), Ruhi Fatema Hassan (Ruhi) , and others (the underlying lawsuit). The Republic of Bangladesh (the Republic) intervened in the underlying lawsuit. The trial court bifurcated and stayed the Republic’s portion of the lawsuit. The underlying lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice due to a failure to prosecute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581, subd. (d).) Hassan and Ruhi (collectively, the Hassans) demurred to the Republic’s first amended complaint in intervention (FAC). The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend only as to the Hassans. The Republic contends the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer and denying leave to amend. We affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff and appellant Steve Jones (Jones) was employed by defendant and respondent City of Loma Linda (the City) as a firefighter. The City terminated Jones’s employment. In an administrative appeal, the City Council affirmed the termination of Jones’s employment. Jones petitioned the trial court for an administrative writ of mandate directing the City to reinstate his employment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) The trial court denied Jones’s writ petition.
Jones contends the trial court erred by denying his petition. First, Jones asserts the Loma Linda City Council (City Council) applied an incorrect standard of review. Second, Jones contends the findings against him are not supported by substantial evidence. Third, Jones asserts the record does not support selecting termination as the form of discipline. We reverse the judgment with directions.

Plaintiffs Jasper and Brenda Stevens are in pro. per. They assert claims — primarily for nondisclosure — arising out of their purchase of a house in 2006. Defendant Lennar Homes of California, Inc. (Lennar) built and sold the house. Defendant Harveston Homeowners Association (Harveston) is the homeowners’ association for the development that the house is in.
Lennar and Harveston demurred to the operative complaint. The Stevenses never filed oppositions. They were granted one continuance of the hearing, so they could obtain counsel. They then sought a second continuance, again so they could obtain counsel, and also so they could add a new party. The trial court denied a second continuance and sustained the demurrers.
The Stevenses appeal, contending that the trial court erred by denying them a second continuance. We will hold that the trial court could reasonably find that there was no good cause.

Defendant and appellant Roger Adrian Hernandez contacted his live-in girlfriend Jennifer Clark via telephone advising her that he had discovered God’s plan for their family. He told her he was going to sacrifice himself and his daughter I.H. (Daughter) to show God how true defendant was to him. Defendant was going to give Clark a gun so that she could shoot him and then Daughter. Defendant was arrested when he arrived at Daughter’s school to pick her up.

Brenda Yajaira Garcia entered a guilty plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health and Saf. Code, § 11351) as part of a plea agreement. The parties stipulated to a split sentence of four years, with two years to be served under mandatory supervision. One of the conditions of mandatory supervision imposed at the original sentencing was that Garcia not knowingly use or possess alcohol while under supervision. At the prerelease hearing, Garcia objected to the prohibition on the use or possession of alcohol. The trial court overruled the objection and continued the condition in force.

A jury convicted Cameron Matthew Parker of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)) and found that he personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Parker to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life imprisonment.
On appeal, Parker contends (1) the trial court erred in its response to a jury question during deliberations and (2) the evidence does not support his first degree murder conviction. We disagree with these contentions and affirm.

Appellant J.C., father of the minors, E.C. and Em.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) His sole contention on appeal is that the notice and inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were not met. (25 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq.) We find no error and affirm.

Defendant Tony Ramon Gerolaga appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 resentencing petition. He contends the trial court erred in finding the crime of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851) ineligible for relief. Finding defendant’s attempted murder conviction renders him ineligible for relief, we shall affirm.