CA Unpub Decisions

It is hereby ordered that the nonpublished opinion filed herein on June 10, 2022, be modified as follows:
1. At the end of the first sentence in the first full paragraph on page 31, after the sentence ending “in Civil Code section 1691,” add as footnote 10 the following footnote:
10 While the District also asserts the trial court erred in sustaining the City’s demurrer and denying the District’s motion to consolidate the Fresno lawsuit with the Kings County action, it does not present any meaningful legal analysis to support its claims of error or raise these issues under separate headings or subheadings, and therefore has forfeited those claims. (Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 442, 464 [an appellant who fails to present argument or legal authority “forfeits appellate consideration of the issue”]

In 2017, Evans pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary. Thereafter, in accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Evans to six years in prison but stayed the execution of the prison term pending successful completion of three years of formal probation. The trial court also imposed a restitution fine of $300 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b).
In 2018, eighteen months after his conviction, Evans’s probation was revoked for two alleged violations of the probation conditions: Evans knowingly used controlled substances, including methamphetamine and amphetamine, and he failed to report to the probation officer as directed. The court held an order to show cause (OSC) hearing, where Evans admitted both violations. The court told Evans that he would be given one “last chance” and reinstated probation.

A jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder in 2012, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison plus one year for a vicarious arming enhancement. The Honorable Richard M. Mallett presided at defendant’s trial. This court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence on appeal in People v. Periman (C071812, Aug. 13, 2014 [nonpub. opn.] (Periman I)).
In 2019, after Senate Bill 1437 took effect (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, eff. Jan. 1, 2019), defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In accordance with section 1170.95, subdivision (b)(1), the petition was assigned to Judge Mallett. Without appointing counsel for defendant as defendant requested, or obtaining briefing from the parties, Judge Mallett summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage under section 1170.95, subdivision (c).

In February 2020, the trial court found defendant violated probation and mandatory supervision in connection with two prior felonies—forcible assault in 2016 (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); statutory section citations that follow are to the Penal Code) and possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell in 2018 (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378)—and issued bench warrants for defendant’s arrest. Officers obtained a warrant to search defendant’s home. Upon seeing defendant leave his home and drive away in his car, officers stopped him and found a loaded, unregistered firearm under the driver’s seat. Passengers in the car stated the gun belonged to defendant. In defendant’s home, officers found soft body armor, ammunition, small quantities of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a digital scale.

On May 28, 2021, plaintiff filed this action against defendant seeking a declaratory judgment on the question of whether an agreement, bearing the signatures of both parties and an effective date of December 18, 2018, was an enforceable written contract. Plaintiff alleged there had been no mutual consent on all material terms of the agreement and also alleged fraud in the execution of the agreement.
In response, defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. Defendant attached a copy of the December 2018 agreement to its motion. The six-page agreement identified defendant as “lender” and plaintiff as “borrower.” The final page bears the signature of Cherry Miyake, president of defendant, and Ronny Hay, manager of plaintiff. The bottom righthand corner of each page also bears the handwritten initials of both Ms. Miyake and Mr. Hay.

These proceedings commenced in 2019 after police found one-month-old A.B. and two-year-old R.T. in the care of an unrelated probationer in a hotel room where narcotics were easily accessible to the Children. The police notified DCFS. Later that evening, Mother told a child social worker (the CSW) that Father B. was the father of A.B. and Father T. was the father of R.T.
DCFS proceeded to investigate the Children’s family situation. In the course of this investigation, the CSW communicated with all three Parents as well as members of their respective extended families. Although the CSW completed ICWA 010(A) forms indicating that each Parent had “denied Native American Heritage,” there is no record that she inquired as to such heritage with any Parent’s extended family members.
Based on its investigation, DCFS filed a failure to protect petition against each of the parents and obtained removal orders.

Following Galloway’s assignment of rights to Ewart, Ewart, as Galloway’s assignee, sued the County, alleging a single claim of “implied indemnity.” Ewart alleged Galloway, acting as a volunteer traffic officer on the day of the accident, was an agent of the County and entitled to indemnification. Ewart did not identify a contract under which a right to indemnity was expressed or implied or a statute authorizing indemnity.
The County demurred. Construing the claim as one for equitable indemnity, the County argued there could be no equitable indemnity without joint liability and it had been found not liable for Ewart’s injuries as a matter of law. The County alternatively argued Galloway had failed to file a timely claim for indemnity as required under the Government Claims Act as a precondition to maintaining an action for indemnity against the County.

Mr. Cassilly is the managing member of Linden Living Project, the owner of real property on Linden Avenue in Venice. In 2015, he filed an application with defendant City of Los Angeles for a coastal development permit to demolish and rebuild the single-family home on his property, asserting a categorical exemption from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA, Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). (Further statutory references, except for section 1021.5, are to the Public Resources Code.) The city decided the categorical exemption did not apply because the property was a historical resource, and required an environmental impact report (EIR). Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate, as further described, post.
2. CEQA and Historical Resources
Ordinarily, the construction of a single-family residence is a categorical exemption from CEQA. (See § 21084, subd. (a); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15303, subd.

On January 21, 2018, victims Daniel Duarte and D.G. lived near each other in a homeless encampment in “The Wash,” an area at Avenue 52 and Figueroa Street near the 110 Freeway corridor in Los Angeles. Around 2:00 a.m., Duarte went to D.G.’s makeshift shelter/tent so the two of them could smoke methamphetamine together. Duarte was on his knees with his back to the door, rooting around in his backpack for his lighter, when two men came into the shelter. One of the men (appellant Palacios) stood about one foot from Duarte as Duarte continued to look for his lighter. Palacios was the first person to enter the tent with appellant Perez following behind him. Palacios entered with gun drawn; Perez was openly armed with his gun pointed at the ground.
Palacios asked the victims where they were from, that is, what was their gang. Still on his knees, unarmed, and with his back to Palacios, Duarte said he was from “la Pasadena.” D.G. said he was “paisa,” meaning he had no gang affilia

On January 21, 2018, victims Daniel Duarte and D.G. lived near each other in a homeless encampment in “The Wash,” an area at Avenue 52 and Figueroa Street near the 110 Freeway corridor in Los Angeles. Around 2:00 a.m., Duarte went to D.G.’s makeshift shelter/tent so the two of them could smoke methamphetamine together. Duarte was on his knees with his back to the door, rooting around in his backpack for his lighter, when two men came into the shelter. One of the men (appellant Palacios) stood about one foot from Duarte as Duarte continued to look for his lighter. Palacios was the first person to enter the tent with appellant Perez following behind him. Palacios entered with gun drawn; Perez was openly armed with his gun pointed at the ground.
Palacios asked the victims where they were from, that is, what was their gang. Still on his knees, unarmed, and with his back to Palacios, Duarte said he was from “la Pasadena.” D.G. said he was “paisa,” meaning he had no gang affilia

On September 17, 2015, plaintiff and defendant’s employee were involved in an automobile accident. Defendant’s employee was parked on the side of the road, and as he pulled his van into traffic, plaintiff’s Mercedes crashed into him. At the time of the collision, plaintiff was traveling approximately 20 to 25 miles per hour, and defendant was slowly accelerating, moving less than 10 miles per hour.
Neurosurgeon Dr. Andrew Fox was plaintiff’s treating physician and was also retained as an expert who reviewed all of plaintiff’s medical records. Dr. Fox started treating plaintiff in June 2019, almost four years after the accident. When plaintiff first met with Dr. Fox, he complained about back and neck pain, and weakness and tingling in his left arm and left leg. Plaintiff reported that he developed symptoms soon after the accident and he did not have a history of back or neck problems.

On February 11, 2020, following a court trial, Castillo was convicted of violating a protective order by violence or threats with prior convictions (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(4); count 1), two counts of misdemeanor battery (§ 242; counts 2 & 3), and misdemeanor vandalism with a prior conviction (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(B); count 4).
On June 10, 2020, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Castillo on formal probation for three years with various conditions. The probation conditions included direction to pay (among other fines, fees, and assessments) a $350 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and “in accordance with his/her ability to pay,” a criminal justice administration fee (former Gov. Code, §§ 29550.1, 29550.2). In addition, the court made further orders for payment of fines, fees, and assessments that were “not conditions of probation.”

In 2013, respondent Michael Mills initiated the underlying divorce case. Litigation generated over half a million dollars in attorney fees as well as fees for retained experts. The accounting for some of those fees, as reflected in the judgment, are at issue in this appeal.
In 2017, the family residence was sold and the proceeds placed in a trust account. Relevant to this appeal, an expert was paid $9,600 from the trust account. The trial court also ordered two payments of $75,000 disbursed from the escrow account of the family residence sale, to pay for Patricia and Michael’s respective attorney fees (i.e., $150,000 combined). In 2018, additional attorney fees were paid with disbursements of $35,000 (for Patricia) and $25,000 (for Michael) from the trust account.
Trial proceedings concluded at a January 2019 hearing where the trial court entered a minute order incorporating a 74-page reporter’s transcript of the hearing, to serve as a statement of decision.

Around 3:30 p.m. on January 1, 2021, J.H. was driving his car and was almost hit by a white work truck. He sped up to try to see who was driving, but the truck was swerving a lot, so he slowed down and got behind it to avoid being hit. J.H. followed about two car lengths behind the truck and saw it strike the curb on the right side of the road and then swerve into the left-hand lane, almost hitting another car. He called 911 to report the truck. J.H. continued to follow the truck and saw it bounce off the curb as the road curved left, swerve between lanes, and take a wide right turn and drive into oncoming traffic. J.H. followed the truck into the parking lot of an apartment complex. The truck stopped near a driveway by the pool. A few minutes later, a red sedan pulled up next to the truck. J.H. observed defendant step out of the driver’s seat of the truck.