CA Unpub Decisions

In this matter, we have reviewed the petition, its exhibits, and the opposition filed by real party in interest (hereafter real party). We have determined that resolution of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that the equities favor petitioners. We conclude that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is therefore appropriate. (Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)

A.O. (mother) appeals the order terminating her parental rights and finding her two-year-old son, S., likely to be adopted. She argues there is insufficient evidence S. was adoptable and, had she been given adequate notice the court was considering adoption, she could have attended the permanency planning hearing and argued against it. As we explain post, mother received notice on multiple occasions and the record supports the finding S. is adoptable. We will therefore affirm.

This is a divorce proceeding between wife Julie Price and husband Anthony Price. They have four children. Julie claims to be opposed to immunization on religious grounds. In 2014 and 2015, she exempted the children from otherwise state-mandated immunization by filing personal belief exemption forms. Effective January 1, 2016, the Legislature eliminated the personal belief exemption, going forward; however, it allowed children for whom a personal belief exemption had previously been filed to remain exempt during a phase-out period (of variable length, depending on the child’s grade level).

In this appeal, defendants and appellants Freedom Won LLC, Desert Cann Wellness Center, and David Saccullo challenge the trial court’s order granting plaintiff and respondent County of Riverside’s request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting them from operating their cannabis dispensary within the county. Appellants argue it was error to issue the injunction because (1) Riverside’s ordinance banning cannabis businesses is invalid for failure to obtain voter approval and (2) Riverside could not demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its underlying public nuisance lawsuit against appellants because it had recently voted to repeal its countywide ban. We conclude appellants are wrong on both points and the trial court properly issued the injunction. We will therefore affirm.

This is an appeal from an order of the San Diego County Superior Court which denied a petition filed by Robert Anthony McLusker to restore his ability to possess firearms under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 8103, subdivision (f).
In February 2018, McLusker was involuntarily committed for mental health review pursuant to section 5150. Following his release from the hospital, McLusker's firearms were seized, and he was prohibited from possessing any firearm. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that McLusker could not possess or use a firearm in a safe and lawful manner. The court denied McLusker's petition for relief from the firearm restriction.
McLusker filed a timely notice of appeal.

Defendant and appellant Juan Fuentes shot Roy Craddock in the head six times at close range. The crime was captured on surveillance video. Fuentes was convicted of first degree murder with personal use of a handgun, which he personally discharged, causing death. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (d).) The jury found true that Fuentes had one prior serious or violent felony conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) The trial court sentenced Fuentes to an indeterminate term of 80 years to life.
Fuentes raises issues of sufficiency of the evidence, admission of gang evidence, failure to bifurcate the trial on his prior conviction, instructional error on intimidating a witness, prosecutorial error at closing argument, a five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and cumulative error. We remand with directions and otherwise affirm the judgment.

Beverly Wilson Gledhill (Beverly) appeals from a postjudgment order awarding $17,120 in attorney fees and $1,114.93 in costs to Fred Gledhill (Fred) after the court granted Fred's anti-SLAPP motion. In the parties' related case, Selter, as Successor Trustee, etc. v. Gledhill (Feb. 6, 2019, D073372) [nonpub. opn.], we affirmed the order granting the anti-SLAPP motion.
In this appeal, appellant concedes that if the order granting Fred's SLAPP motion is affirmed then the order awarding attorney fees and costs should also be affirmed.

Beverly Wilson Gledhill (Beverly) appeals from an order and judgment dismissing her complaint against Fred Gledhill (Fred) under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting Fred's anti-SLAPP motion because (1) Beverly's claims do not arise from protected activity and (2) even if they did, appellant demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. We affirm because Beverly's causes of action arise out of protected activity—the settlement of a prior lawsuit between the parties—and her claims are barred by the litigation privilege.

In 2016, the City of Chula Vista (City) approved a development by real party in interest Niki Properties LLC (Niki) of a five-story, 71-unit housing project on the northeast corner of Third Avenue and K Street (Project). Earl Jentz and Gloria Gonzales (collectively, Jentz) opposed the project at each stage of the City's approval process. After Jentz's appeal of the City's approval to the City Council failed, Jentz brought a petition for writ of mandate in San Diego Superior Court seeking to overturn the City's decision. The court denied Jentz's requested relief and entered judgment in favor of the City and Niki.

Appellant Alvaro N., incarcerated since January 2016, brings this appeal following the termination of parental rights over his biological daughter A.O. (A.). A. was born in October 2016 with a positive toxicology screen for methamphetamine. She was removed from her mother Nancy O. (Mother) at birth, and has been in the care of her prospective adoptive parents, Mr. and Mrs. P., since she was a few days old. Mother identified another man, Edgar R., as A.’s father, and his name appeared on the birth certificate. Appellant did not come forward to suggest that he could be the girl’s father until July 2017, after Edgar had been found to be the presumed father, reunification services had been terminated, and a hearing had been set under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights.

Respondents Boostz, Inc., Saleh Hasbun, Baypoint Mortgage, Inc., Westar Financial Group, Inc., Valley Trust Deed Services, Inc., Amber Hasbun, Melissa Hasbun, and Ammec Investments, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the appeal filed by Greta Sedeal Curtis. They also request sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal.
Curtis filed a motion for relief from default for failure to file a final judgment on appeal.
We grant respondents’ motion to dismiss the appeal, deny respondents’ request for sanctions, and deny appellant’s motion for relief from default for failure to file a final judgment on appeal.

Alberto Casillas was convicted by jury of kidnapping, injuring a spouse, and criminal threats, arising from an incident with his former girlfriend, Susie R. He raises several challenges on appeal. First, he contends there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find he threatened Susie. Second, he argues that the court erred in admitting expert testimony regarding the cycle of domestic violence, particularly testimony regarding typical behaviors of a batterer. Third, he challenges his consecutive sentence on the criminal threat count, arguing that the court should have stayed that sentence under Penal Code section 654. The parties also submitted supplemental briefing regarding appellant’s request that we remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement.

Michael Leon Watts appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. We affirm the postjudgment order.

A jury found Ronnie Dave Lewis (Lewis) guilty of pimping and of the human trafficking of minors. On appeal, Lewis contends that the trial court erred by finding a victim/witness unavailable and permitting her preliminary hearing testimony to be introduced, that there was insufficient evidence of pimping, that there were prejudicial instructional errors, and that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.