CA Unpub Decisions

Plaintiff and appellant Sandy Sung Uhm appeals from a summary judgment in favor of defendants and respondents Amy Hume and Direct Chassislink Inc. (DCI) in this action for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). On appeal, Uhm contends triable issues of fact exist as to whether: (1) DCI’s reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual; (2) DCI was required to, and failed to, engage in a good faith interactive process to accommodate her disability; and (3) DCI failed to prevent harassment and discrimination on the basis of Uhm’s gender. We conclude that DCI submitted evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Uhm’s employment. In response, Uhm failed to raise a triable issue of fact that the reasons were a pretext for discrimination on the basis of disability.

Plaintiff and appellant Leslie Levine appeals from a post-judgment order awarding attorney fees to defendant and appellant Larry Levine after the denial of her motion to enforce a settlement and appoint a receiver. On appeal, Leslie contends the probate court abused its discretion by finding Larry was the prevailing party. We find no abuse of discretion.
In his cross-appeal, Larry contends that the probate court abused its discretion by denying his motion for reconsideration of the amount of fees awarded. We find no abuse of discretion as to the probate court’s ruling on the motion for reconsideration. We affirm the order awarding attorney fees.

The jury found defendant and appellant Paul Randolf Brumfield, Jr. guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) [count 1]), driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) [count 2]), gross vehicular manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (c)(1) [count 3]), and hit-and-run driving resulting in death (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2) [count 4]). The jury found true the allegation that Brumfield fled the scene of the collision in count 3. (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c).)

Appellants Michael Mosby and Mariah Jiles were jointly charged with the attempted premeditated murder of Leon Merritt (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subdivision (a)) , shooting into an occupied vehicle (§ 246), and felony child endangerment (§ 2273a, subd. (a)). The information alleged that during the commission of the attempted murder and shooting at an occupied vehicle, Jiles personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that Mosby committed a crime in which a principal was armed with a firearm. (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022, subd. (a)(1).)

D.C. (Minor) appeals from his commitment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (the DJF). He argues there was no evidence a DJF commitment would likely benefit him and the juvenile court failed to consider less restrictive alternatives. We disagree and affirm.

Idris Bilal Jamerson was convicted of one count of pimping and one count of pandering. He seeks reversal of the pandering conviction due to alleged evidentiary and instructional errors by the court and ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Cliff Feldman (Father) sought to reduce his child support payments after losing his job and receiving unemployment benefits, which lowered his monthly income from about $11,500 to $1,950. The trial court, unable to discern how he was maintaining his lifestyle given his reduced income, denied the motion. We reverse and direct the trial court to hold a new hearing and to reconsider its award of attorney fees to Father’s former spouse, Margaret Dubin (Mother).
The trial court also declined Father’s request to enforce prior seek work and discovery orders. We affirm those rulings.

N.T. (defendant), born in March 2000, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order finding he committed misdemeanor disorderly conduct (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (j)(1)) and placing him on probation with various conditions. Defendant challenges the following probation conditions on appeal: (1) a condition prohibiting him from possessing a smart phone; (2) conditions requiring his assessment for—and if appropriate, participation in—sex offender counseling; and (3) a condition prohibiting him from entering into “a position of trust or authority” with a minor “unless under the authority and auspices of his school.” We conclude the third challenged condition is vague and therefore remand the matter for the court to modify or strike the condition in light of the principles set forth in this opinion. We affirm the order in all other respects.

Anthony L. Durant appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of second degree murder and unlawful possession of a firearm, and further found that he personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of the murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187; 29820, subd. (b); 12022.53, subds. (b), (d).)
We will remand for the trial court to decide whether to exercise its discretion to strike the sentence enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, to allow Durant to make a record for a future youth offender parole hearing, and to stay the sentence as to Durant’s conviction for unlawful firearm possession.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

Jane Feng, in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained David Yang’s (Yang) demurrer to Feng and her son Zhen Zhou’s (Zhou) complaint without leave to amend. Feng contends the trial court erred because her claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations. We reject her contention and affirm the judgment.

Steven Sherwood was convicted of 16 sex crimes against 11 children under the age of 14 and possession of child pornography. He was sentenced to 239 years eight months in prison. He argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the lesser offense of attempted oral copulation as to one count. We reject the argument because there was no substantial evidence Sherwood committed an attempt rather than the completed act. He also argues his sentence is unconstitutionally disproportionate to his offenses. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

J.G. appeals from the judgment declaring him to be a ward of the court and sentencing him to probation. He contends only that the condition of probation requiring that he “[c]omplete any program of counseling if directed” by probation is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it improperly delegates judicial authority over the condition to the probation department.
We agree, and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to either strike the condition or modify it to more specifically declare what, if any, counseling J.G. is required to complete.

A jury convicted defendant Richard Yrigoyen of two counts of lewd act on a child. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) His conviction on count 1 was based on a touching that occurred inside a Walmart store. The information alleged the other count occurred between July 1, 2013 and September 3, 2015. Defendant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in admitting the testimony of two coworkers who heard him make lewd comments about his girlfriend’s daughter, the victim. His second claim involves the superior court’s review of the school records of the victim. The court reviewed the subpoenaed records in camera and found nothing discoverable in the records. Defendant asks that we independently review the records to determine whether information therein should have been disclosed to him. We find the trial court did not err in admitting the complained of evidence and the records did not contain any discoverable information.

Appellant Geronimo Marin was convicted of one count corporal injury to a spouse in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), one count of battery with infliction of serious bodily injury in violation of section 243, subdivision (d), a great bodily injury enhancement pursuant to section 12022.7, subdivision (e), one lesser included count of misdemeanor false imprisonment in violation of section 236, and one count of resisting a peace officer in violation of section 148, subdivision (a)(1). Appellant was sentenced to four years each for the section 273.5 and section 243 violations, with the section 243 sentence stayed. Appellant was further sentenced to five years for the section 12022.7 enhancement, and one year for each of the four section 667.5 prison priors, for a total of 13 years.