CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant and appellant Carlos Vasquez challenged the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of 45 years to life for his third-strike conviction for armed robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.) He argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to strike one of his prior felony conviction allegations for purposes of sentencing. He also contended that, following the passage of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017 2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620), we must remand the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion regarding whether to impose a handgun enhancement. We agreed with Vasquez’s argument on Senate Bill No. 620, and remanded the case for the trial court’s reconsideration of the firearm enhancement. We otherwise affirmed.

Defendant-siblings Destiny, Donald, and Daven Trotter appeal their convictions for attempted burglary. Defendants argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their Romero motions. Destiny and Donald assert that the trial court violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in sentencing them to 40 and 35 years, respectively. Daven argues his 9-year sentence should be reversed because the trial court improperly admitted prior bad act evidence regarding a similar attempted burglary. Destiny and Donald also assert that the abstracts of judgment should be amended to reflect 154 days of presentence conduct credit.
In our original opinion in this case, we agreed the trial court erred in calculating Destiny’s and Donald’s presentence credit and directed the superior court to modify the abstracts of judgment so that each receives 154 days total presentence conduct credit. We affirmed on all other grounds.

Jerry Pikover was injured when the sports utility vehicle in which he was a passenger was struck by a second vehicle that had just collided with a big rig truck on the eastbound Interstate 210 freeway. The truck driver failed to stop at the scene.
After the SUV owner’s insurance carrier, United Financial Casualty Company (UFCC), and Pikover’s automobile insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, denied his claims, Pikover sued both insurers for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendant Raymond Miller struck David Simington with a wooden pole during an argument. Subsequently, defendant, who was accompanied by another man, threatened to take Simington to the desert to kill him to prevent him from testifying at an anticipated trial of the criminal charges against defendant arising from the earlier assault. At the later encounter, Simington was separated from his car keys when defendant tripped and tackled him in the alley behind his apartment building. Simington involved one of his roommates, Marc Lawson, in the encounter, and Lawson persuaded defendant and the other man to return Simington’s keys.

Attorney James Li represented Michael Chui in a quiet title action and extended to Chui a line of credit to finance the litigation. Chui secured the credit line by giving Li five deeds of trust encumbering the subject property.
The October 2010 Judgment
On September 17, 2010, the trial court issued a statement of decision in which it found Chui owned only an undivided 50 percent interest in the subject property. The court ordered “partition of the property by sale,” specified how proceeds were to be distributed, and stated that if the parties could not agree on a real estate agent to market and sell the property they could apply to the court to have one appointed. The court ordered that these “executory provisions [be] made a part of th[e] Judgment,” and on October 6, 2010, entered judgment accordingly. The judgment contained no further reservation of jurisdiction.

Cheryl Morris appeals from the trial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on her employment discrimination claim against the City of Los Angeles (the City). The trial court concluded that Morris had failed to present substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that the City denied Morris a promotion because of her gender, rather than, as the City contends, because of her comparatively low ratings in the application process. Morris points to evidence reflecting a disparity in the way the City rated Morris as an applicant and the way it rated the successful male applicants, arguing such disparity reveals the ratings to be pretextual. Morris contends that this evidence of pretext, particularly when combined with other evidence suggesting a gender bias on the part of one of the reviewers, constitutes sufficient evidence of intentional discrimination to support the jury’s verdict.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Steven Hoff of two counts of attempted premeditated murder of a peace officer and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and found true multiple firearm use allegations. Defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of 140 years to life, plus 53 years. In challenging the judgment, defendant contends the trial court committed instructional and sentencing errors, and also prejudicially erred in denying pretrial motions pursuant to Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) and Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady), as well as postverdict, presentencing motions pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden) and Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). Defendant also contends his trial counsel was ineffective.
We reverse the sentence on count 3 (possession of a firearm by a felon) and remand for a new sentencing hearing. We otherwise affirm the judgment of conviction in its entirety.

Appellant Danielle Matko, a teacher, was convicted after a jury trial of five counts arising from her sexual contact with two 15-year-old male students. She contends: (1) the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by excluding evidence that her primary victim had once made a threat to commit a school shooting that was determined to be not credible; and (2) the conviction on one of the counts must be reversed because it was obtained after a readback of testimony that did not include the cross-examination of the relevant witness and was conducted outside appellant’s presence. We affirm.

Thomas Fair (Fair), Bronco RE Corporation (Bronco), BRE Boulevard LLC (Boulevard), and BRE Cameron Creek LLC (Cameron; collectively defendants) appeal from the trial court’s order in favor of J.B.B. Investment Partners, Ltd. (JBB) and Silvester Rabic (Rabic; collectively plaintiffs), granting plaintiffs’ special motion to strike defendants’ cross-complaint, pursuant to the provisions of California’s anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Defendants contend the court erred in granting the motion because (1) certain claims in the cross-complaint did not arise from protected activity, and (2) defendants showed a probability of prevailing on the merits. We shall affirm the trial court’s order granting the special motion to strike.

Defendant Travell Brown was convicted by a jury of one count of robbery, one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and one count of battery with serious bodily injury. On appeal, he contends he was denied his constitutional right of self-representation and asserts the trial court erred by not sua sponte giving a “unanimity” instruction. We conclude defendant’s constitutional right to represent himself was not abridged, reject his argument on unanimity, and affirm the convictions. However, we remand the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion on two sentencing enhancements under recently amended Penal Code sections 667, subdivision (a), and 1385.

A jury found defendant Timothy A. Guerra guilty of second degree murder in the stabbing death of Denis Meshchyshyn. He contends the trial court erred in not sua sponte instructing the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. Guerra also seeks remand to allow him to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the Attorney General agrees a limited remand for this purpose is appropriate.
We will order a limited remand and affirm the judgment.

B.B. (born February 2013), T.B. (born September 2014), and N.B. (born December 2016) (collectively the Children) were taken into protective custody in April 2017. They appeal from the juvenile court’s order, made at a combined six month review/12 month review hearing, returning them to the custody of their mother, Lauren B. (Mother). The issue presented is whether substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding, made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivisions (e)(1) and (f)(1), of no substantial detriment to the Children if returned to Mother. We conclude substantial evidence supported that finding and therefore affirm.

S.P. (Mother) has a history of abusing drugs, failing to provide for her children’s needs, and leaving the children unattended that led to the San Bernardino County Department of Children and Family Services (CFS) removing her five children from her home. Mother’s reunification services were terminated and a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing was set. About five months later, Mother filed a section 388 petition, which was summarily denied. Subsequently, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to three of her youngest children.

Plaintiff and respondent Tina Wilcox (Wilcox) requested a domestic violence restraining order against her brother, defendant and appellant David Ray Owen (Owen) to protect Wilcox and her husband (Husband). (Fam. Code, § 6300 et seq.) On October 24, 2017, the trial court granted the restraining order for a period of 18 months. Owen contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion by granting the restraining order; and (2) the trial court erred by not having a criminal background check for Owen conducted prior to the hearing (§ 6306). We affirm the order.