CA Unpub Decisions

This is an appeal from final judgment after the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, summary adjudication in favor of defendants Burger King Corporation, Inc. (BK Corporation) and Strategic Restaurants Acquisition Company II, LLC (SRAC). The trial court rendered this decision after finding the personal injury/product liability lawsuit brought on behalf of plaintiff Edgar Reyes Trejo by and through his wife and guardian ad litum, Patricia Lopez Reyes, was time-barred as a matter of law. The trial court further found, inter alia, that no triable issues of fact exist as to any legal duty owed by defendants, or any act or omission by defendants that proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries.

Petitioners S.T. (Mother) and G.R. (Father) are the parents of A.R., who was four months old at the time of removal and 14 months old on the date of the challenged orders. By separate petition, each parent seeks extraordinary relief from the court’s orders of August 30, 2018, sustaining the petition filed under Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, denying reunification services, and setting a hearing under section 366.26 to consider terminating parental rights and setting a permanent plan for A.R. The parents argue the jurisdictional findings are not supported by substantial evidence and the court abused its discretion when it denied reunification services. For the reasons described post, we deny both petitions.

Defendant and appellant, L.C. (Mother), is the mother of O.R., a child born in April 2013. Objectors and appellants, K.R. and T.R. (born in 2010), are Mother’s older children and O.R.’s half siblings. Mother, K.R., and T.R. appeal from the August 16, 2018, order terminating parental rights to O.R.
Mother claims the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 order must be reversed because the juvenile court and plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), failed to give adequate notice of the proceedings pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California law (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 224.2, 224.3). T.R. and K.R. join this claim, and CFS and we agree it has merit. The ICWA notices did not include known identifying information concerning O.R.’s maternal great-grandmother (the MGGM), including her names, approximate dates of birth and death, and a partial address.

Evading a traffic stop by City of Ontario police, Ulises Ortega lapped a residential block in gang territory several times before fleeing his vehicle on foot and discarding a firearm in someone's backyard. A jury convicted Ortega of evading a police officer with wanton disregard for public safety and being a felon in possession of a firearm. It found the gang enhancement allegations attached to both counts true.
Ortega challenges only his gang enhancements on appeal. He argues there was insufficient evidence he fled from the police or possessed a firearm "with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members," as the statute requires. He also contends the gang expert related case-specific hearsay to the jury, in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). Because we agree with his first claim, we do not reach the second. We order the trial court to strike the gang enhancements and remand for resentenci

In this dispute between a putative class of home-seller plaintiffs and a real estate broker, its agents, and several real estate service providers, defendants appeal from an order denying their petition to compel arbitration. The trial court found that while defendants who were signatories or agents of signatories had a valid basis for compelling arbitration, the nonsignatory defendants did not. And in the face of potentially inconsistent results, the court invoked Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 1281.2(c)) to deny arbitration as to all defendants.
We reverse. Because plaintiffs' claims against the nonsignatory defendants are dependent on and inextricably intertwined with the terms and obligations of the agreement containing the relevant arbitration provision, equitable estoppel allows the nonsignatory defendants to compel arbitration.

Henry Nilson (Henry) appeals from a judgment that determined ownership of Skona, Inc. (Skona) and excluded him from the ownership. After Henry's brother Dan filed a complaint seeking determination of the stock ownership of Skona, the court held a bench trial and found, on the basis of waiver and estoppel, that Henry relinquished his ownership in Skona nearly two decades ago. Although Henry had held one-quarter ownership in Skona at incorporation in 1982 (along with Dan, their father Charles, and their then-brother-in-law Joe Rothfleisch), he relinquished it in 1998 when he sent a letter separating himself from the family business, after which he took no action to involve himself in Skona's business. Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we find that substantial evidence supports the court's judgment.

On August 29, 2018, the Supreme Court transferred this case to us with directions to consider whether the matter is rendered moot in light of Senate Bill No. 394, signed into law October 11, 2017. The Attorney General contends it is, because the statutory amendments put into effect by Senate Bill No. 394 remedy any constitutional violations alleged by defendant Khary Watson. Watson contends none of the eight issues he identified in his petition to the Supreme Court is made moot by Senate Bill No. 394. We disagree with Watson and dismiss the matter as moot.

Appointed counsel for defendant Ramon Sisneros Connolly has filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment.

Mother of the minors, J.B. and I.B., appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights and adopting a permanent plan of adoption. Mother contends the court erred in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption. Mother further contends the court improperly received and considered evidence and denied her the opportunity to fully address that evidence, and any failure to object was the result of ineffective assistance of her counsel.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply. As to the second contention, we conclude the juvenile court properly considered all the evidence and did not deny mother’s counsel the opportunity to address the evidence. Finally, her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because she has not demonstrated prejudice from any failure to object. The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

Defendant Jessie James Rayburn was convicted of vehicle theft, receipt of a stolen vehicle, and delaying a peace officer, with enhancements for a prior strike and a prior prison term. Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding it had suspended criminal proceedings for a determination of defendant’s mental competency to stand trial and refusing to hear his motion for new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden). Defendant also contends the trial court erroneously refused his request for a pinpoint jury instruction on delaying a peace officer. Defendant further contends the abstract of judgment contains errors.

Following a jury trial, defendant Walter Kotko was convicted of two counts of sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)), three counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child under the age of 10 (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), and 13 counts of lewd and lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The jury found true allegations that defendant committed the offenses against more than one victim (Pen. Code, § 667.61), and the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 290 years to life in prison.

The juvenile court terminated family reunification services for T.H., father of Anthony B. One year later, T.H. filed a petition pursuant to section 388 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to reinstate those services. The juvenile court denied the petition, finding there was no change of circumstances or new evidence to warrant reinstatement. The court also concluded it was not in the best interest of then two-year-old Anthony B. to reinstate reunification services for T.H. T.H. appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A jury convicted Hayden Othello John of one count of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and he was sentenced to four years in state prison. On appeal, John contends the trial court erred in excluding a 911 call, and that the trial court’s error rose to the level of a due process violation.
We discern no error in the trial court’s ruling, and affirm.

Defendant and appellant Hector Ramon Godinez contends that the trial court abused its discretion when, following the dismissal of gang enhancement allegations that initially accompanied the robbery, assault, and Vehicle Code violation charges against him, the court denied a motion to strike gang related testimony and exclude gang-related exhibits. Godinez contends that the gang-related evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, and that its admission rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Godinez also contends that defense counsel’s failure to make additional efforts to exclude this evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree.