CA Unpub Decisions

The parties to this appeal previously shared a landlord tenant relationship. The landlord retook possession of commercial property following an unlawful detainer action. In the current litigation, the former tenant sought to recover alleged trade fixtures and equipment remaining on the previously-leased premises. The trial court found the litigation frivolous and imposed monetary and terminating sanctions. We reverse the sanctions and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Diane Albertoni sued Green Hills Memorial Park for breach of contract, alleging Green Hills fraudulently entered into and “tortiously breached” two contracts for the sale of family burial crypts and negligently caused the family emotional distress by failing to provide a suitable resting place for the remains of Albertoni’s father, Richard Albertoni (Richard). After several rounds of demurrer the trial court ultimately dismissed the complaint after finding its allegations were vague and failed to state any cause of action.
We conclude that Albertoni failed to allege her standing to sue under a contract entered into by Richard, and failed to allege any compensable damages arising from breach of the contract entered into by her. We therefore affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Lloyd Carr of first degree residential robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1), first degree burglary (§ 459; count 2), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3). In a bifurcated trial, the court found true allegations that Carr had certain prior convictions, including two strike priors. The court sentenced him under the “Three Strikes” law to a total term of 36 years to life.
On appeal, Carr challenges several aspects of his sentence and the associated proceedings.

Cardiodiagnostic Imaging Inc. (Cardio) sued Anthony G. Bledin, M.D. (Bledin), and others for causes of action arising from an alleged contract among the parties. In May 2015, the court sustained a demurrer against Cardio on its cause of action for specific performance. Cardio’s remaining claims for breach of contract and conversion were tried to the court.
After Cardio presented its case in chief, the court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment. Cardio, the court found, failed to prove the existence of an enforceable contract, that if a contract did exist, Cardio was not a party to it, and Cardio failed to establish any of the elements of conversion. After the entry of judgment in April 2017, Cardio appealed. For the reasons discussed below, we reject Cardio’s arguments and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Jimmie L. Roberson was convicted, pursuant to a plea agreement, of possession of a firearm by a felon. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence because his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated when a police officer reached inside his backpack without a warrant, under the guise of a Terry patsearch. We shall affirm the judgment.

Melanie Garcia appeals a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) entered after an evidentiary hearing in September 2016. The DVRO, which was of two years’ duration, required Garcia not to contact her ex-girlfriend Lauren Sublett and to move out of Sublett’s apartment. Sublett had previously secured a temporary DVRO based on a declaration alleging extensive physical and verbal abuse. At the hearing, she relied mainly on that declaration. Neither party requested a statement of decision or of reasons, and the court modified and signed a Judicial Council form DVRO submitted by Sublett.
Garcia argues that no substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that she had engaged in abuse as defined by the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (§ 6200 et seq.). While acknowledging that this court cannot reweigh the evidence, Garcia nonetheless devotes most of her brief to challenging the credibility of Sublett’s evidence.

The four consolidated appeals before us constitute one of four groups of consolidated cases, involving 19 total cases, that are or were before four divisions of this court. All arise out of orders by the same judge granting motions of Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (Fireman’s Fund) to set aside default judgments that had been entered in favor of 19 individual plaintiffs alleging asbestos-related claims against Fireman’s Fund’s insured, Associated Insulation of California, Inc. (Associated). Associated had gone out of business many years before service of the complaints in these 19 cases and never appeared in any of the actions. The defaults in the four cases before us were all entered in 2012 and the default judgments were all entered on December 8, 2015. Fireman’s Fund did not retain counsel until February 2016. On June 8, 2016, Fireman’s Fund filed its motions to set aside the defaults and default judgments in the four cases under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, su

Defendant Julian Castro Diaz Nava argues that the trial court engaged in unlawful plea bargaining when, pursuant to a plea agreement that promised Nava would not receive a sentence longer than six years in prison, the trial court gave Nava the option of either receiving a prison sentence or serving a probationary sentence if he waived a number of custody credits. The Attorney General counters that Nava’s appeal must be dismissed because he failed to get a certificate of probable cause and because he expressly waived his appellate rights as part of his plea agreement. We agree with the Attorney General that, under the circumstances of his case, Nava was required to—but did not—obtain a certificate of probable cause in order to appeal.

After a court trial, defendant Andre Combs was found guilty of second degree murder. (Pen. Code § 187, subd. (a).) The trial court also found true the allegation that defendant had suffered a prior strike. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of 30 years to life.
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder. Specifically, he argues that his claim that he killed in self-defense was “a plausible one” and supported by ample evidence. We find there was substantial evidence to support his conviction, and affirm the judgment.

Defendant Vincent Lewis Gallegos was convicted by jury trial of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187), and the jury found true that he had personally used a knife in the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). He was sentenced to 16 years to life in prison.
At trial, defendant testified and admitted that he had killed the victim. He claimed that he had acted in self defense. The defense presented evidence that the victim had been involved in three physical confrontations with third parties. A prosecution witness, who was the victim’s boyfriend and had been granted immunity, testified on rebuttal about one of those incidents and asserted that he was responsible for one of the blows during that incident.

Timogen Anthony Simpson contends the sentencing court erred in determining his 2009 Washington robbery conviction was a serious or violent felony under California law. He argues that under Descamps v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 254 (Descamps) and People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120 (Gallardo), the court could do no more than compare the legal elements of robbery under Washington law to the legal elements of robbery in Penal Code section 211. Simpson asserts the court erred when it considered the additional facts Simpson expressly admitted in entering his Washington plea. Contrary to Simpson’s assertion, Gallardo authorized the sentencing court to rely upon facts admitted by a defendant as the basis for a guilty plea. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

T.T. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her reunification services at a contested six- and 12-month review hearing in July 2018 as to her then four-year-old daughter, M.P. Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding she was provided reasonable reunification services. We affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Ricardo Solis of failing to update his sex offender registration annually (Pen. Code, § 290.12) and found true two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667) and allegations that Solis had three prior convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Armando Alvarado of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and resisting an executive officer with force or violence (§ 69). On appeal, appellant contends the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) (section 148(a)(1)). We conclude the jury was properly instructed because there was no evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded appellant committed the lesser offense without also committing the greater, and affirm.