CA Unpub Decisions

After a trial in which he represented himself, defendant Rajon Akeemlee Alexander was convicted of attempted murder and several related counts based on a 2015 shooting. He was sentenced to 41 years eight months in prison.
In pretrial, when Alexander was represented by counsel and his jury trial set, Alexander requested to represent himself stating he did not want his counsel to do so. His request was granted.

Defendant Jesus Padilla was convicted on 20 counts, all arising out of his sexual abuse of a child. He was sentenced to a total indeterminate term of 60 years to life plus a total determinate term of 18 years four months.
In his previous appeal, we affirmed with respect to the conviction; however, we reversed with respect to the sentence and remanded for resentencing. On remand, the trial court corrected the errors that we had identified and imposed the same total sentence.
Defendant appeals again, contending:
1. On three counts, the trial court intended to sentence defendant to six years (the midterm) but mistakenly sentenced him to eight years (the upper term) instead.
2. The trial court erred by failing to recalculate defendant’s actual custody credits.
We agree with both contentions. We will modify the judgment accordingly.

Plaintiff, Jorge Rojas, defaulted on a real estate loan from defendants Bank of America, NA (BA), Bank of New York Mellon, NA (BNYM), resulting in foreclosure and a trustee’s sale of the property, which was purchased by defendant Duke Partners II, LLC (Duke). Plaintiff’s second amended complaint (SAC) against defendants for violation of “AB 278/SB 900,” unfair business practice (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.), and quiet title/injunctive relief, was dismissed without leave to amend following the trial court’s ruling sustaining BA and BNYM’s (collectively the Banks) demurrer, and Duke’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court found that the SAC included new causes of action without leave of court, and that Duke was a bona fide purchaser. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s orders sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend and the motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

Orchard Estate Homes, Inc., is a 93-unit planned residential development, governed by covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R’s), supplemented by rules and regulations prohibiting short term rentals of units for durations of less than 30 days. When Orchard’s homeowners association attempted to enforce this rule against an owner who used a unit for such purpose, a lower court ruled the rule was unenforceable because it was not contained in the CC&R’s. Orchard put the issue to a vote to amend the CC&R’s. After balloting was completed, approximately 62 percent of the owner-members of the homeowners association voted to prohibit short term rentals, but the percentage was less than the super-majority required to accomplish the amendment.

Cesar Pena pleaded no contest to a felony count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse, cohabitant, or dating partner (Pen. Code, § 273.5). He was granted three years of formal probation with imposed conditions, including a criminal protective order, barring him from contacting the victim. Pena's sole contention on appeal is that the no contact order violates his First Amendment right of association. He requests modification of the order to expressly allow the victim to initiate contact. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

As part of a plea bargain, defendant Michael Williams pleaded guilty to one felony count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310); in exchange, the prosecutor dismissed a strike-prior allegation and stipulated to a probationary sentence that included only 180 days in custody (rather than the applicable 16-month/2-year/3-year felony sentencing triad). (See §§ 21310, 1170, subd. (h).) In his guilty plea form, Williams acknowledged the trial court could impose reasonable probation conditions, and he agreed to waive his "right to appeal . . . any sentence stipulated herein." At sentencing, the trial court imposed the agreed-upon sentence—probation, subject to 180 days in custody. The court also imposed various probation conditions, including that Williams submit his electronic devices and social media accounts to warrantless, suspicionless searches. Although Williams initially objected to this condition, he ultimately accepted probation on the court&#3

In this appeal, defendant Tony Salvadore Jimenez, Jr., contends his conviction should be reversed and the matter remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings under Proposition 57. He also contends Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 620) is applicable to his case. The People agree. We will conditionally reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence and remand to the juvenile court to determine defendant’s fitness for treatment within the juvenile system. Should he remain in the adult system, the trial court shall reinstate his conviction and sentence after considering exercising its discretion under Senate Bill 620.

Appellant John Dumas Rochelle appeals from an order directing him to pay $10,000 in attorney fees and costs along with a $500 penalty. The order was included as part of an order relieving his former client from default judgment under the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473. We will affirm.

Plaintiffs, Flag and Paula Billings, appeal from the trial court’s dismissal of their third amended complaint without leave to amend. They challenge the trial court’s rulings as to each cause of action it dismissed in addition to two causes of action dismissed without leave to amend from their second amended complaint. Defendants, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) and Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America) (collectively defendants), contend the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ causes of action on the merits and, alternatively, those causes of action are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. We agree with plaintiffs that they stated causes of action for negligence and unfair competition. In all other respects, we disagree. The judgment is reversed

Defendant Troy Barton Wallers appeals from the trial court’s order revoking probation and imposing a previously suspended 12-year state prison term. He contends the trial court abused its discretion because it erroneously believed he was presumptively ineligible for probation; he also contends the court abused its discretion on the facts even aside from the presumption. Finally, he contends he is entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit. Agreeing with the last contention but finding any other error harmless, we will direct the abstract of judgment to be corrected to award defendant an additional day of custody credit. We otherwise affirm the judgment.

Steven Allgoewer sued his sister, Karen Waldear, for conversion of bank accounts that had been owned by their deceased mother, Madeline Allgoewer. Karen responded with a cross-action against Steven for financial elder abuse, abuse, conversion, and common counts. A bench trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Steven for $9,822.05 plus costs of suit. The trial court awarded nothing to Karen on her causes of action against Steven. Karen appeals from the judgment, but without including a reporter’s transcript of any part of the trial. Karen presents eleven arguments on appeal in which she seeks a reversal and retrial. We reject Karen’s arguments even though Steven has not filed a respondent’s brief. Even in the absence of a respondent’s brief or any opposition to an appellant’s opening brief, we may “reverse only if prejudicial error is found.” (Walker v. Porter (1974) 44 Cal.App.3d 174, 177.)

E.S. (Mother) appeals from the order terminating her parental rights over her three-year-old daughter K.H. She contends her right to due process was violated by the juvenile court’s denial of her request for a contested Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing to challenge whether K.H. was adoptable. Mother also contends the juvenile court’s finding K.H. was likely to be adopted was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

Jose S. (father) is a nonoffending, noncustodial parent. He appeals the denial of his petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 seeking either custody of A.Z. (minor) or reunification services, and he also appeals the termination of his parental rights. Joanna Z. (mother) joins father’s appeal of the termination of parental rights. Upon review, we affirm the denial of father’s section 388 petition. We conditionally reverse the termination of parental rights and direct the trial court to comply with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).

In this juvenile dependency case, defendant and appellant R.M. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and orders declaring his three children dependents of the court. In particular, father argues neither his alcohol use nor his domestic disputes with his wife and mother of the children (mother) placed the children at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. As explained below, we conclude substantial evidence supports one ground for the juvenile court’s exercise of dependency jurisdiction and, therefore, we affirm.