CA Unpub Decisions

Richard M. Chaskin (Chaskin) appeals the denial of two motions he filed below: (1) a motion seeking an order either dismissing a June 17, 2008 judgment (2008 Judgment), owned by Mark Brajnikoff (Brajnikoff) or declaring it unenforceable; and (2) a motion against Brajnikoff for comparative indemnification or statutory contribution.
We find no error and affirm.

Ravanna Mohamed Bey (appellant) was charged with the murder of Jason Randle (Randle). (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) It was alleged that appellant used a firearm in the commission of the crime for purposes of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b), (c), and (d), respectively. The jury found him guilty of murder in the first degree, and it found the firearm allegations to be true. He was sentenced to state prison as follows: 25 years to life, plus an additional 25 years to life under section 12022.53, subdivision (d), for a total prison sentence of 50 years to life.
On appeal, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to prove he was the perpetrator of the murder; the trial court erred by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial; the trial court erred by admitting text messages found on appellant’s phone; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and, due to cumulative errors, he was deprived of a fair trial.
We find no error and affirm.

In 2014, we began our opinion in Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 125, 128 (Moriarty) with this observation: “Another appeal in an anti-SLAPP case. Another appeal by a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion failed below. Another appeal that, assuming it has no merit, will result in an inordinate delay of the plaintiff’s case and cause him to incur more unnecessary attorney fees. (See Grewal v. Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 1002–1003.) And no merit it has.” Here is yet another such appeal. And we again affirm.

David Anthony Brooks appeals from a post judgment order amending his abstract of judgment to indicate which statute provided authority for his presentence custody credits. Appellate counsel for Brooks filed an opening brief identifying no potentially arguable issues and asking this court to independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. In addition, Brooks has had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court but has not done so. We have reviewed the entire record and conclude no issue warrants further briefing, but we remand to the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the correct number of presentence conduct credits.

Defendant Jaime Torres Garcia appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction pursuant to section 1473.7 of the Penal Code. Garcia contends the trial court erred by finding his motion was not ripe under section 1473.7, subdivision (b), misinterpreting his claims, and rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the denial of his motion.

The Court has considered the petitions for rehearing filed by appellant Rodney L. Mitchell on January 17, 2019, and by appellant Raymond L. Bradford on January 23, 2019. Rehearing is denied.

Plaintiff Brian McVeigh sued Recology, Inc. and one of its subsidiaries (Recology) under the California False Claims Act, alleging numerous false claims presented to the state and the City and County of San Francisco (the City). Following a 3-week trial, the court granted a new trial on the one claim on which McVeigh prevailed and denied McVeigh’s motion for partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on 25 other claims. McVeigh contends both rulings were erroneous and that the court erred when it declined to award treble damages. Recology contends the court should have granted a JNOV, rather than new trial, on the verdict in favor of McVeigh. The rulings are supported by the law and the record, so we affirm.

Defendant Alex Alfredo Castro pleaded guilty to vehicle burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459. Appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), setting forth the facts of the case and requesting we review the entire record. Pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), appointed counsel identified a potential issue to assist us in our independent review. We provided Castro 30 days to file written argument on his own behalf; he did not do so.
We have examined the entire record and appointed counsel’s Wende/Anders brief; we have found no reasonably arguable issue. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) We therefore affirm.

After the law firm of Pivo, Halbreich, Martin & Wilson LLP (PHMW) sought a restraining order against Paula Letherblaire to protect one of its employees, Letherblaire stipulated to a restraining order against her. The trial court granted the requested stipulated restraining order. Letherblaire now challenges the stipulated order. However, the general rule is that a stipulated order is not appealable, and Letherblaire has not demonstrated that an exception to this rule applies in the instant case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We also deny her concurrently filed request for judicial notice.

A jury convicted defendant Amador Estrada of three counts of committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14. It also found true an allegation defendant committed these offenses against more than one victim. The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of 30-years-to-life in prison, comprising two consecutive 15 years to life sentences on counts 1 and 3, and a concurrent 15 years to life on count 2.

Appellant Jose Luis Valenzuela pled no contest to second degree robbery and assault with a semiautomatic firearm. Appellant also admitted that he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (b), with regard to the count of second degree robbery and that he personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), with regard to the assault count. In exchange for his plea, appellant accepted a sentence of no more than 12 years. At sentencing, the trial court denied appellant’s request to strike the firearm enhancements and sentenced appellant to a total of 12 years in state prison. The sentence was based on the lower term of two years for second degree robbery with an additional 10 years for the firearm enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b).

Following a contested violation of probation hearing the trial court found appellant willfully violated probation by failing to self-surrender to serve her county jail sentence. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court’s finding was not supported by sufficient evidence. We conclude the evidence produced at the hearing was sufficient to support the finding of a violation, and affirm.

A jury convicted appellant George Luis Maldonado of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), possession of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350; count 4), possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377; count 5), a misdemeanor, hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a); count 6), and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subdivision (a)(1); counts 2 & 3). In a separate proceeding, the jury found true a personal use of a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5) in count 1, a prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), a serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and allegations that Maldonado had a prior conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subds. (b)-(c)).
On appeal, Maldonado contends the matter should be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion whether to strike his firearm enhancement and his serious felony enhancement.

Cheryl Lynn Lucero was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm enhancement. She appeals the trial court’s denial, during the jury selection proceeding, of several of her for-cause challenges to prospective jurors. She also challenges the trial court’s admission of a number of hearsay statements made by the decedent victim. Finally, she raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and cumulative error. We reject all her contentions.
In light of Senate Bill No. 620, which took effect on January 1, 2018, after the sentencing in this matter, we will vacate Lucero’s sentence and remand for resentencing under the amendments to applicable firearm enhancement statutes effected by this bill. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.