CA Unpub Decisions

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition filed against defendant and appellant C.T. (minor) alleged that he was in possession of a weapon on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and that he was carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (Pen. Code, § 21310, count 2). Minor admitted the allegation in count 1, and a juvenile court dismissed count 2. The court granted him deferred entry of judgment (DEJ). The court subsequently found minor in violation of his DEJ terms and ordered the DEJ lifted. It then declared him a ward of the court and placed him on probation, on specified terms. The court later held a review hearing, at which defense counsel requested minor’s case be dismissed and his records sealed. However, the court ordered minor’s wardship terminated as unsuccessful.

The juvenile court sustained a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 that alleged 17-year-old defendant and appellant A.H. (minor) made a criminal threat against Mr. H in violation of Penal Code section 422. On appeal, minor contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he made a threat, or that he intended his statement to be taken as a threat, or that he intended his statement to be transmitted to the victim, the assistant principal of his former high school, Mr. H. We reject these contentions and affirm the judgment.

A jury found defendant and appellant John Figueroa guilty of first degree burglary. Defendant admitted the allegations that he had suffered one prior prison term, had two prior serious felony convictions, and had two prior strike convictions. A trial court subsequently struck the prior prison conviction, which was for a conviction that is now a misdemeanor. At sentencing, the court dismissed one of the prior strike convictions, pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. It then sentenced defendant to four years, doubled pursuant to the remaining prior strike, plus five years on both of the prior serious felony enhancements, for a total term of 18 years in state prison.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant and appellant James Robert Blankenship pled guilty to unlawful driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had one prior conviction under Penal Code section 666.5 and one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)). In return, a trial court sentenced him to three years in state prison. At a subsequent restitution hearing, the court ordered defendant to pay $2,788.40 in victim restitution for items that were missing from the victim’s car, a damaged transmission, mileage, and lost wages.
On appeal, defendant argues that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay restitution, since he pled guilty to unlawful driving of a vehicle and not the taking of the vehicle. We affirm.

Following an attack on the victim, defendant and appellant Wayne Phillip Crump was convicted of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, misdemeanor battery, and three “prison priors” arising out of felony convictions in other cases for which he served prior prison terms. He was sentenced to the upper term of four years for the assault, 365 days as to the misdemeanor battery to be served concurrently, and three years for the prison priors to run consecutively.
On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction he used sufficient force to come within section 245. He also urges that the trial court erred with respect to sentencing on the misdemeanor battery count and in calculating the number of days of presentence and conduct credits to which he is entitled. We affirm the conviction on the section 245 count.

A jury convicted Anthony Martinez of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and six counts of vandalism (§ 594, subds. (a), (b)(2)(A)); and the jury found all the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(A), (d)). The trial court sentenced Martinez to 12 years in state prison.

Mendieta contends that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and committed prejudicial evidentiary error by precluding defense counsel from questioning a central prosecution witness about the witness's immigration status to show the witness had a motive to testify in a manner favorable to law enforcement. We conclude that Mendieta's argument lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.

Plaintiff Jonathan Asselin-Normand brought several causes of action against defendants America’s Best Value Inn, et al. arising out of the defendants’ alleged policy of requiring a minimum guest check-in age of 21. Asselin-Normand appeals following the trial court’s order of dismissal. He challenges the dismissal on several grounds. He also contends remand is required in light of Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594 at page 623, because the trial court granted him a fee waiver, but failed to make an official court reporter available to him at the hearing that led to the dismissal. That contention has merit. We will reverse the order of dismissal and remand for a new hearing.

Minor, C. B. challenges a judgment entered after the juvenile court, following a contested jurisdictional hearing, found that he had committed robbery and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, and found true that he had personally used a firearm in the robbery. The minor makes two related arguments, which he claims require reversal. First, he asserts the juvenile court committed misconduct when it secretly conducted an experiment on the minor’s gun by manipulating the lighting in the judge’s chambers. Second, he argues the prosecution committed misconduct when it manipulated the minor’s gun in a photograph admitted into evidence, which encouraged the juvenile court’s illicit independent investigation. Finally, he argues given the passage of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amending Penal Code section 12022.53, remand is required in order to allow the juvenile court to exercise its sentencing discretion. The People concur remand is required for t

Defendant Bub Tahchahlah Bamford pleaded no contest to felony driving under the influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5) with a prior prison term enhancement (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) in case No. 13F2842, felony failure to appear (FTA) (§ 1320, subd. (b)) with an on-bail enhancement (§ 12022.1) in case No. 13F2661, and 12 felony FTA counts in case No. 14F3951. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation. When probation was later revoked, the trial court sentenced defendant to a six-year eight-month state prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends the on-bail enhancement should have been stricken because the underlying felony was subsequently reduced to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18. He also contends that those felony FTA offenses based on felonies that were subsequently reduced to misdemeanors pursuant to section 1170.18, should have been reduced to misdemeanors as well. In our original opinion, we rejected

Defendant Cornelius L. Jones appeals from his conviction of attempted premeditated murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and assault likely to produce great bodily injury. He contends (1) the trial court erred by ruling the prosecution did not unconstitutionally excuse the sole potential African-American juror on the basis of race; (2) insufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding he attempted to kill willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation; (3) the court imposed an unauthorized sentence; and (4) the court committed other sentencing and clerical errors.
The California Supreme Court directed us to vacate our earlier opinion in this matter and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013) (SB 1393). Thus, defendant also contends (5) we should remand to allow the trial court to exercise its new discretion under SB 1393 to strike two five-year enhancements imposed for a serious felony prior.
Except to remand to correct the sentencing and

The juvenile court found that Father and Mother placed their children, E.O. and S.O., at substantial risk of serious harm because they knowingly allowed Robert S., a registered sex offender, to reside in the same house as their children.
Father appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that he knew Robert S. was a registered sex offender. We agree and reverse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and order as to Father only. In all other respects, the order is affirmed.

Defendant Eddie S. Simpson appeals following his jury conviction of attempted robbery of the first degree (Pen. Code, §§ 211 & 664). Defendant admitted a prior residential burglary conviction. The court sentenced defendant to nine years in prison, a term that included a then-mandatory five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, former subd. (a)(1); § 1385, former subd. (b).)
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to show specific intent to commit robbery. He also contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the lesser included offense of attempted theft. And, in supplemental briefing, defendant contends legislation that went into effect on January 1, 2019, ending the statutory prohibition on a trial court’s ability to strike a prior serious felony enhancement, applies and requires a remand for a new sentencing hearing.

Defendant Francis Okyere appeals a judgment in favor of plaintiff Edith Arellano on Arellano’s action for breach of contract. We conclude, among other things, that Okyere has not shown the trial court erred by granting Arellano’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Arellano operated an insurance business known as PTS Insurance. She paid rent to maintain offices in Oxnard and Santa Barbara, California for this business. She owned what is referred to in the insurance sales industry as a “book of business.” Arellano said her book of business generated “approximately one million dollars per year in premiums through Kemper Insurance Company, Safeco Insurance Company and Access General Insurance Company.” Okyere was also in the insurance business and wanted to purchase Arellano’s book to earn commissions.