CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Jose Arturo Gonzalez was charged in an eight-count information with several felony offenses—stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a); count 1), making criminal threats (§ 422; counts 2, 3, 4, 5), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 6), and resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 7)—and one misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct by distributing a private intimate image (§ 647, subd. (j)(4); count 8). After a five-day jury trial, defendant was convicted of stalking, one count of making a criminal threat (count 5), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, and disorderly conduct by distributing a private intimate image.
Defendant now appeals, limiting his challenge to his conviction of count 5, making a criminal threat. He contends that his conviction of this count must be reversed because the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of his intent to threaten the victim, Jane Doe, with death or great bodily i

This is an appeal from judgment after a jury convicted defendant Jim Manuel of 24 counts of committing a lewd act on a 15-year-old child when defendant was at least 10 years older than the child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)). According to defendant, the trial court committed reversible error because its instruction to the jury on consideration of other, uncharged sexual acts against a minor lessened the prosecution’s burden of proof, and because its exclusion of key evidence relevant to the victim’s credibility deprived him of the opportunity to mount a full defense. We affirm.

After a jury trial, appellant Alfredo M. Vasquez (Vasquez) was found guilty of 68 felonies arising out of the repeated sexual abuse of his daughter, Jane Doe, from the time she was 11 years old until his arrest when she was 15. On appeal, Vasquez argues the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence Jane had sexual intercourse with her boyfriend on the day she disclosed her father’s abuse. He further claims the trial court committed evidentiary error in admitting the entirety of Jane’s videotaped statement to the police. Finally, Vasquez takes issue with the modified unanimity instruction given in this case. Finding all of Vasquez’s arguments unpersuasive, we affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Shane Moroni Martinez of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1) and driving with a 0.08% or higher blood alcohol level (§ 23152, subd. (b); count 2). The jury also found true for each count an allegation that Martinez had a prior DUI conviction (§ 23550.5).
Martinez contends on appeal that his convictions should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Martinez’s prior DUI conviction and failed to bifurcate the trial on the prior conviction allegations. Relatedly, Martinez contends that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to argue for exclusion of the prior DUI conviction and a bifurcated trial on the ground that the prior conviction was not an element of the charged offenses. In addition, Martinez contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct when cross-examining Martinez, and that defense counsel provided inef

Defendant David Lopez pleaded no contest to first degree robbery and admitted he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b).) The trial court imposed a total term of eight years in state prison, including four years for the firearm enhancement.
Lopez contends we must remand to the trial court for resentencing because, after the trial court imposed the above sentence, the Legislature amended section 12022.53 to grant trial courts the discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements. He argues that the amendment applies retroactively to his case under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada). The Attorney General contends this claim is not cognizable because the trial court did not grant a certificate of probable cause under section 1237.5.
As set forth below, we conclude Lopez is entitled to retroactive application of the newly amended section 12022.53. We further conclude this claim is cogni

This case concerns a $25,000 fine imposed by defendant County of Monterey against plaintiffs William R. Lewis and Duncan B. Lewis for using a large house next door to their primary residence as a short term rental property and wedding venue without obtaining permits for those uses. The county sent notices over multiple years informing plaintiffs their short term rental and wedding venue uses were not allowed without a permit. The county eventually imposed the fine at issue here when plaintiffs continued the uses without applying for a permit. Plaintiffs seek to use their appeal of that fine as a vehicle to challenge what they allege is a pattern of discrimination against coastal landowners in favor of inland landowners for whom short term rentals are authorized with a permit. As we will explain, plaintiffs’ failure to apply for or obtain a permit to use their property for short term rentals and weddings provided an adequate basis for the fine they challenge. We will therefore af

An arbitrator awarded Devan Shockley $450,000 for breach of fiduciary duty and $6,798 for diversion of business based on findings that George Sano had set up a competing business in violation of their partnership agreement. Sano appeals from the judgment confirming the arbitrator’s award. He argues the arbitrator exceeded his powers because the award of $450,000 in damages for breach of fiduciary duty bore no rational relationship to the conduct constituting the breach.
Although we reject Shockley’s assertion that Sano waived his right to appeal, we affirm the judgment. There is no question the arbitrator had the power to award money damages. Sano’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in awarding $450,000 in damages for breach of fiduciary duty is tantamount to arguing the arbitrator committed an error of fact or law, which does not come within our limited scope of review.

After the law firm of Pivo, Halbreich, Martin & Wilson LLP (PHMW) sought a restraining order against Paula Letherblaire to protect one of its employees, Letherblaire stipulated to a restraining order against her. The trial court granted the requested stipulated restraining order. Letherblaire now challenges the stipulated order. However, the general rule is that a stipulated order is not appealable, and Letherblaire has not demonstrated that an exception to this rule applies in the instant case. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We also deny her concurrently filed request for judicial notice.

Thee Aguila Inc. (TAI) appeals from the trial court’s postjudgment order granting respondents David M. Morales (the son) and his father, David Morales, Sr., their request for contractual attorney fees totaling $331,385. The fee award is based on the attorney fee provision in a two-page handwritten contract (Contract II) between TAI and the respondents. Because the factual background and applicable legal principles are straightforward, we turn to them immediately to resolve the appeal with appropriate brevity.
TAI’s sole challenge to the fee award rests on an attorney fee provision in a different contract (Contract I) as to which neither TAI nor Morales, Sr. was a party. That contract was a purchase agreement for the sale in the son’s chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding of his real property interest in a location used as a food truck commissary in Santa Ana (the city). The seller and buyer in that real property contract were, respectively, the son’s bankruptcy estate and an

A jury convicted defendant Richard Michael Neuhart of one count of first degree residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate state prison term of 22 years, which included two consecutive five-year terms for two serious felony priors pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1). Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on criminal trespass as a lesser included offense of burglary. Second, he claims the court erred by failing to instruct the jury on when a house is not inhabited. For the reasons stated below, we disagree with defendant’s contentions and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment. However, we remand the matter for resentencing pursuant to Senate Bill No. 1393 that took effect January 1, 2019, which amended sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385, subdivision (b), Statutes 2018, chapter 1013, sections 1-2, and provides trial courts with discr

Thee Aguila, Inc. (TAI) appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court based on the jury’s verdict against TAI in favor of respondents, David M. Morales and his father, David Morales, Sr., on their contract claim against TAI. Respondents prevailed on their argument that the handwritten agreement drawn up by TAI’s principal, Henry Aguila, an attorney, required Aguila to pay respondents’ attorney for his legal services as part of a personal guarantee that respondents made to TAI to ensure TAI’s food truck commissary would pass all necessary inspections and obtain a business license.

A jury convicted Ruben Rene Manzo of committing sex offenses against two children. In this appeal, Manzo contends that the trial court improperly admitted statements he made to the police in violation of the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda), and Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 (Seibert).
We find no errors and affirm the judgment.

In these five consolidated appeals, appellant Brian Malliet seeks to modify or overturn various judgments and orders issued by the trial court in favor of respondent Robert Voit. Voit and Malliet were members of a limited liability real estate company with multiple operations. They had a falling out, Voit fired Malliet, and a wide-ranging lawsuit ensued, precipitated by Malliet’s refusal to complete a contractually mandated appraisal process to determine the value of his interest in the limited liability company. Voit sued Malliet, and Malliet cross-complained. Voit ultimately dismissed his complaint, and the case went to trial on the Malliet cross-complaint. After a six-day court trial, the court found in Voit’s favor on all issues.
Malliet’s appeal encompasses two major issues. First, did the court err when it held that the appraisal process to determine the value of Malliet’s interest was no longer viable? Second, did the court err when it held that Malliet was not

Appellant A.M. appeals an order finding he lacks the capacity to refuse treatment and compelling him to undergo the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications from respondent, the Department of State Hospitals, over the course of a year. He contends the determination regarding his capacity to consent was made under the wrong standard of proof. To the extent this issue has been forfeited, he alleges ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.