CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Lester Eugene Sanders attacked his mother in her bedroom one morning with a broom, a cell phone and broken glass. He was arrested several hours later and charged with willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) (count 1), two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2 (broom) and count 3 (broken glass)), assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (GBI) (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)) (count 4 (cell phone)), dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1)) (count 5), and mayhem (§ 203) (count 6). Prior to trial, the court dismissed the mayhem charge and, following the prosecution’s case-in-chief at trial, it also dismissed the charge of dissuading a witness. The jury convicted defendant of attempted murder, the lesser offense of simple assault on count 2, assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means of force likely to produce GBI. The jury found the special allegation that the atte

Appointed counsel for defendant Danon Corey Davidson asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed and we received no communication from defendant. We grant counsel’s request that we exercise our discretion to deem defendant’s motion below as a petition for writ of mandate and review its denial. (See People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340 [“Assuming the pleading that has been filed meets or can be amended to meet the prerequisites for a petition for writ of mandate, a court in its discretion may treat a motion or a petition for a different writ as a mislabeled petition for writ of mandate.”].) Finding no arguable error, we affirm.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case.

M.B. appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 300 and 360. She contends the trial court did not properly comply with notice requirements pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), title 25 United States Code section 1901 et seq., and California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224 et seq. She contends the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not follow required procedures for ICWA notice. She asks this court to reverse the jurisdictional and dispositional orders and remand for compliance with ICWA.
The Agency submits a letter to this court conceding error and stating a limited remand is appropriate to ensure compliance with ICWA notice provisions.
The parties have filed a joint stipulation for immediate reversal of judgment, limited remand of action to the juvenile court for ICWA notice, and issuance of immediate remittitur in the appeal.

The Motiva Group, Inc. (Motiva) appeals from an order granting, on reconsideration, a motion to set aside the default judgments previously entered against Global Impact Group, Inc. (Global) and National Small Business Alliance (NSBA) (collectively, Defendants) and vacating the default and default judgments previously entered against them. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473, subd. (b), 1008.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Plaintiffs Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers, and George Rivera (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from an order awarding attorney fees to defendants Upland Cascade, L.P., Carbon Canyon, Ltd., Park Contempo, Ltd., RF Group, L.P., Beaumont Investments, Ltd., Indio Investments, Inc., Tokay Manor, Ltd., MHP-Bolsa, L.P., Hamner Park Associates, Brookside Investments, Ltd., Del Prado Mobilehome Park, L.P., Orangewood Investments, L.P., and Hermosa Investments, L.P. (collectively, dismissed defendants).

Appointed counsel for defendant Cecil Marcel Ortega has asked this court to review the record to determine whether there exist any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) Based on our review of the record, we will modify the judgment to reflect 890 days of custody credit, strike the probation revocation fine, and impose, but suspend a mandatory parole revocation fine. Finding no other arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we will affirm the judgment as modified.

Plaintiff Julie Stothers Horner’s mother received retirement benefits from 1985 when her husband, an active trial judge, died until 2000 when she too passed away. Thirteen years later plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant Judges’ Retirement System (JRS) for underpayment of the benefits paid to her mother. Plaintiff lost both the judicial and administrative proceedings. In the underlying lawsuit, she again seeks payment for the increased benefits she still insists her mother should have received, albeit on a different legal theory. The trial court held her claim was barred by the statute of limitations and res judicata. The court also imposed sanctions on plaintiff’s lawyer because he knew or should have known that the complaint and his pleadings defending the complaint were not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (

Father I.V. appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his son, S.W. He contends the juvenile court erred when it did not apply the relative caregiver exception to the termination of parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) and identify legal guardianship by S.W.’s maternal grandmother in Washington state as S.W.’s permanent plan. Substantial evidence that the maternal grandmother―the relative caregiver―was willing to adopt S.W. supports the court’s finding that the relative caregiver exception did not apply. We therefore affirm the judgment.

In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of defendant James Kelly Norton (defendant’s) petition for recall of sentence pursuant to Proposition 36, defendant advances an argument that has been unanimously rejected by various published Court of Appeal decisions: that “armed” “during the commission of the current offense,” as used in a statutory provision that makes a petitioning defendant ineligible for Proposition 36 relief, means the firearm must have been used to facilitate a crime rather than being available for offensive or defensive use at the time the crime is committed. Following published authority, we reject defendant’s argument.

Mike R. (father) appeals from a single jurisdictional finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (d), that he should have known his son, Luke R. (child), was being sexually abused or was in danger of being sexually abused. Father contends there is insufficient evidence to support the finding. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) contends father’s appeal should be dismissed, because other jurisdictional findings under section 300, subdivision (b) remain in effect, making the question raised in father’s appeal nonjusticiable. We agree with the Department, and we dismiss father’s appeal.

A juvenile court exerted dependency jurisdiction over an 18-month-old and a three-month-old after their parents admitted that they had engaged in domestic violence and the court concluded that father had a history of substance abuse. Father challenges the court’s jurisdictional finding regarding substance abuse, its order removing the children from his care, and its dispositional orders requiring him to drug test and attend counseling regarding substance abuse. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding father attacks, the court’s removal order, and its case plan-related orders. We accordingly affirm.

A jury convicted Mario Welch (defendant) of operating a chop shop and receiving stolen property. During sentencing, neither the trial court nor defense counsel recognized that defendant was eligible for a “split sentence” (that is, a sentence that is part jail and part community release). Although defendant has forfeited this claim of error by not requesting a split sentence during his sentencing hearing, and although the record reveals no possible tactical reason for not doing so, we ultimately conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the trial court would have imposed a split sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Eric Deshawn Holliday appeals from a judgment sentencing him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison, plus a determinate term of 44 years and four months, following a bifurcated jury and court trial. The jury convicted him of attempted first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and found gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and firearm allegations (§§ 12022.5, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)) as to certain counts to be true. The trial court found that defendant had suffered prior felony convictions and served prior prison terms. (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 667.5, subd. (b).)
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the true finding on the gang allegations is not supported by sufficient evidence; (2) reversal of the gang enhancement is required under People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) due to the admissi

Several weeks after William Littlejohn (defendant) and his girlfriend broke up, he approached her at a recycling center, put a gun in her face, told her, “Bitch, I’ve got you,” and then pistol whipped her. Defendant then drew the same gun at police trying to stop him for questioning a few days later. A jury convicted him of several crimes related to each incident, and the court sentenced him to 20 years in prison. On appeal, defendant raises one evidentiary issue, several sentencing issues and asks us to review the transcript from the in camera Pitchess hearing. None of these arguments calls into question the validity of defendant’s convictions, but the trial court did commit several sentencing errors. Accordingly, we affirm defendant’s convictions but modify his sentence.