CA Unpub Decisions

Respondent Feridoun Dardashti filed this action for quiet title against his son, appellant Mehardad Dardashti, alleging that appellant had forged his signature on a grant deed transferring ownership of his home to appellant. Following a bench trial, the court agreed and found the deed void. On appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mental examination of respondent, admitting certain hearsay testimony, and curtailing his testimony about the parties’ mutual check-writing authority. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Westminster Park is a public park located in the Venice neighborhood of respondent City of Los Angeles (the City). In 2016, at the request of the city council, the City’s Board of Recreation and Park Commissioners (Board) voted to convert a defunct senior citizens’ center at Westminster Park to a facility that would provide storage and other services to the homeless population. Petitioners Venice Kids Count, Heidi Roberts, and Katrina Glusac (collectively, petitioners) sought a writ of mandate to set aside the Board’s approval of the project because it allegedly violates the City’s zoning ordinance. We consider whether the Board, to which the city charter grants authority to “operate and control” park property, had authority to approve the converted use notwithstanding the City’s zoning ordinance.

Following a contested jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found true the allegations in a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging that the minor, G.V., committed two counts of felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court declared G.V. a ward of the court and returned her to the custody of her guardian on probation, with conditions including that she report any “police contacts” to her probation officer and that she not move out of Monterey County or leave the State of California without the permission of the court or her probation officer.
On appeal, G.V. contends the juvenile court erred in its ruling at the jurisdictional hearing because it misunderstood the legal elements of section 245, subdivision (a)(4). G.V. also argues that the juvenile court erred at the dispositional hearing by imposing the two probation conditions described above.

Defendant Frank Stephenson pleaded no contest to transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years, with the concluding 1,095 days of the term to be served on mandatory supervision. His conditions of mandatory supervision included that he not possess “any weapons,” that he not be “adjacent to any school campus,” and that he pay a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8) and a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). (Capitalization omitted.)

Defendant Eva Symone Christian pleaded no contest to possessing a loaded firearm while under the influence of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (e)) and carrying a loaded firearm in public (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)). After the trial court denied her motion to withdraw her pleas, the court placed defendant on probation with various terms and conditions, including that she serve 180 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred, in connection with her motion to withdraw her pleas, by refusing to allow expert testimony regarding human trafficking and its effects on her. She argues that the expert testimony was relevant to her claim that she was unduly coerced into pleading no contest. Defendant seeks a remand for a new hearing on her motion to withdraw her pleas, with the opportunity to present expert testimony at the hearing.
For reasons that we will explain, we will affirm the order of probation.

A jury found defendant Theodore Anthony Quezada guilty of assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm (a knife) (Pen. Code § 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 1) and attempted criminal threats (§§ 422, 664) (a lesser included offense of count 2). The jury found true that defendant had personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing the assault within the meaning of sections 667 and 1192.7. The trial court found the allegations of three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i); 1170.12) and two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) to be true. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 25 years to life under the Three Strikes law and two consecutive five-year enhancement terms as to each conviction.

Defendant Justin Cerrone Skannal challenges the indeterminate third strike sentence imposed following his convictions by jury for attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and making criminal threats. All charges arose from an incident where defendant kicked down the door of an apartment and repeatedly stabbed the mother of his estranged wife. Defendant argues his convictions must be reversed because the trial court erred by denying his motion to represent himself and by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte regarding unanimity, expert testimony, and a lesser included offense. As we will explain, the lack of instructions on unanimity and the lesser included offense of attempted criminal threats prejudiced defendant, but only as to the criminal threats conviction. We will therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter for possible retrial on that count.

Defendant Armando Garza Canchola appeals after a jury found him guilty of two counts of assault (Pen. Code, § 240), one count of assault on a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c)), and one count of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). The jury found true allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 122022.7, subd. (a)) and allegations that he committed the assault on a peace officer to benefit a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court found true an allegation that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and an allegation that defendant had two prior “strike” convictions (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)). The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 40 years to life.

Defendant Anthony Michael Alvarez appealed from an order denying his request to strike a prior prison term enhancement imposed under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). Defendant contended that the trial court was required to strike the enhancement, because the offense underlying the conviction had been redesignated a misdemeanor pursuant to section 1170.18 after the passage of Proposition 47. We affirmed the order. The California Supreme Court granted review, deferred briefing, and then transferred the case back to this court to vacate its decision and to reconsider the cause in light of People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). We vacate our original opinion and reverse the order.

Plaintiffs Chia-Chieh Chen and Sherry Chen (the Chens) own a home in the Summitpointe development in Milpitas, California. In 2012, the Chens sued the Summitpointe Homeowners Association (HOA), its property management company, and nine individuals who represented the HOA in various capacities. The suit arose out of disputes over the Chens’ efforts to remodel their home and landscape their yard and their interactions with the HOA and its representatives.

In 1989, defendant Felipe Vasquez Limon pled guilty to one count of sale of a controlled substance (cocaine). He was sentenced to three years’ probation. In 2001, defendant filed a petition for relief seeking to set aside and vacate his guilty plea and dismiss the criminal complaint. (Pen. Code, § 1203.4; all further statutory references are to the Penal Code). The petition was granted, and his case was dismissed. The dismissal apparently did not affect the immigration consequences of his drug conviction.
On March 20, 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7. That statute permits a person who is not in custody to challenge a conviction on the basis that he did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea. The prosecution opposed the motion. On August 7, 2017, the superior court denied the motion.

In this wage and hour action, CCS Orange County Janitorial, Inc. (CCS Orange County) filed a motion to compel plaintiff Mireya Castrejon to submit her claims to arbitration based on evidence Castrejon signed a binding arbitration agreement at the commencement of her employment with CCS Orange County. The trial court denied the motion. CCS Orange County contends the court erred by concluding CCS Orange County was not a party to the arbitration agreement and could not enforce that agreement against Castrejon.
We affirm. The general rule is that one must be a party to an arbitration agreement to invoke it. The arbitration agreement provides that Castrejon agreed to submit any claims she had against CCS Orange County’s parent company to binding arbitration. CCS Orange County is not a party to the arbitration agreement and failed to show the applicability of any exception to the general rule. The motion to compel was properly denied.

A jury convicted Davis Salary of assault with a deadly weapon and battery causing serious injury, and found great bodily injury, deadly weapon and prior conviction allegations to be true. Salary appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). Salary filed a supplemental brief. Because our review of the record disclosed no arguable issues, we affirmed the judgment.

Appellant was convicted by jury of two counts of drunk driving. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found appellant had suffered two prior felony convictions for drunk driving, a finding that elevated his current offenses to felonies. Appellant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s true findings on the prior felony conviction allegations, and respondent agrees, albeit for different reasons. We therefore reverse those findings, vacate appellant’s sentence and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.