CA Unpub Decisions

Christopher Goree’s sole contention on appeal concerns his life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) sentence, imposed for a murder committed when he was a juvenile. Because of the discrete nature of the issue and because we ultimately conclude that this appeal is moot, a detailed summary of Goree’s crime is unnecessary.
In short, Goree brutally raped and murdered Josephine Tan in 1993, when he was 17 years old. He escaped arrest until 2002, when DNA evidence linked him to the murder. A jury found him guilty of first degree murder and found true the special circumstance allegation that Goree committed the murder while engaged in the commission of rape. (Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(c).) On June 15, 2012, the trial court sentenced Goree to LWOP, which the trial court believed was the presumptive penalty under section 190.5. Goree appealed, and this court remanded the matter to the trial court to reconsider his sentence in light of then recent authority concerning

Plaintiffs Shantall Prado (Prado) and Felecia Scott (Scott) (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal the trial court’s order compelling arbitration of certain wage and hour causes of action against their employer, Sand and Sea, Inc., doing business as Shore Hotel (defendant). Because the trial court’s order does not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate class claims individually, the exception to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable that is embodied in the “death knell doctrine” does not apply. (See In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 754, 759; Franco v. Athens Disposal Co., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1288, abrogated on another ground in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 366.) Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate and grant the petition. (See, e.g., Nelsen v. Legacy Partners Residential, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1123.)

Defendant and appellant Richard Gratton appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion to reduce the sentence in his 2012 conviction due to the post-sentencing reclassification of three prior felony convictions to misdemeanors. Gratton alleges the reclassification of his prior convictions negates the basis for three 1-year enhancements imposed in 2012 pursuant to Penal Code § 667.5, subdivision (b). We affirm the trial court’s order.

After A.B. (Mother) gave birth to O.B. in December 2017, both tested positive for methamphetamine (meth), leading the Contra Costa County Children’s and Family Services Bureau (the bureau) to detain O.B. Since then, O.B. has been diagnosed with a congenital heart condition that requires regular monitoring. Mother now petitions for extraordinary writ review of a November 2018 order terminating her reunification services, reducing her visitation with O.B., and setting a permanency-planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 336.26. Mother contends that no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that she failed to make substantive progress in her treatment plan or its finding that there was no substantial probability she could safely resume custody of O.B. by the 12-month permanency-hearing date of February 8, 2019. Because substantial evidence does support those findings, and Mother has not shown that the court abused its discretion in reducing he

Jesse P. (Father), the father of 13-month-old Daniel E., petitions under California Rules of Court, rule 8.452 to vacate the trial court’s order setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Father contends the evidence fails to support the court’s finding that the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) offered him reasonable reunification services. We deny the petition on its merits.

Defendant Aaron Lee Southern appeals the judgment imposed following his plea of no contest to a charge of possession of methamphetamine with a prior serious or violent felony conviction (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and to a special allegation of one such prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)), and to the imposition of a prison sentence of four years in accordance with his plea agreement. His attorney has submitted a brief in accord with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and has advised defendant of his right to submit a supplemental brief, which he has not done. This court’s review of the record has disclosed no issues warranting further briefing.

Defendant Valentin Arias Jimenez was convicted of crimes in San Francisco County and in San Mateo County. While on mandatory supervision, appellant committed a crime in San Mateo. The San Mateo County trial court resentenced defendant in the San Francisco case and consolidated the sentences for an aggregate term. Appellant’s sole contention is that the San Mateo County trial court erred when it refused to award additional credits for his time in custody and time on supervision in the San Francisco case. We affirm.

Appellant was sentenced to four years in prison following a late amendment to the information. Appellant contends that the trial court applied the wrong law in granting the amendment, that the California Supreme Court decision in People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590 was wrongly decided to the extent it allows the late amendment, and that Valladoli is distinguishable in that the prosecutor here intentionally and purposefully delayed requesting the amendment to the information. We affirm the judgment.

Jose Corado-Merlos was convicted of sexual offenses committed against his then 11-year-old daughter and sentenced to prison for those offenses, as well as for a prior offense for which he had been on probation. He contends his convictions in the later case must be reversed due to the trial court’s refusal to make a preliminary determination as to the victim’s younger brother’s competency to testify and the court’s refusal to strike the brother’s hearsay statement that the victim had been sexually assaulted. As the probation violation in the earlier case was based on the verdicts in the later one, he contends that if his convictions in the later case are reversed, the revocation of probation must also be reversed. We affirm.

Del Norte Senior Center, Inc. (Senior Center) appeals following a nine-day trial in which the jury found in favor of Tracy Stelling, an accountant who had been hired by the Senior Center as an independent contractor to perform bookkeeping services, including for the Senior Center’s energy program, through which it administered various energy contracts funded by government agencies. The Senior Center was forced to return government funds due to accounting irregularities in the energy contracts it administered. The Senior Center sued Stelling and two of its own former employees, seeking damages for, among other things, disallowed costs of its energy program, audit costs, and loss of revenue from suspended contracts. Both Senior Center employees were found to have been negligent, as was the Senior Center itself, but Stelling was found non-negligent in performing her limited accounting duties.

The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) gives Indian tribes the right to intervene in dependency proceedings “where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved,” and foster care placement or termination of parental rights for the Indian child is being sought. (Id., at § 1912(a).) To that end, the party initiating dependency proceedings must provide the Indian child’s tribe with notice of the proceedings and the right to intervene. (Ibid.) In this dependency action, the mother of L.D. belatedly challenges the juvenile court’s finding made at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing regarding compliance with ICWA. We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant Kenneth Hunter Wilder was convicted by a jury of one felony count of attempted possession of child pornography (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 311.11, subd. (a)), one felony count of attempted use of a minor for sex acts (§§ 664, 311.4. subd. (c)) and one misdemeanor count of annoying or molesting of a child (§ 647.6). The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Wilder on formal probation for three years.
On appeal, Wilder raises the following arguments: (1) there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his felony convictions; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to provide a pinpoint instruction to the jury; (3) the trial court erred in not excluding the statements he made to police as they were involuntary and coerced; (4) one of the probation conditions imposed, which prohibits him from possessing “any children’s toys, games, clothing, etc.,” is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (5) the trial court failed to award him conduct

Arnold Applebaum employed Agustina Boktor for several years as a housekeeper and nanny to care for his school-age daughter (Daughter). After Applebaum terminated Boktor’s employment, she filed a complaint with the Labor Commissioner (commissioner), an administrative remedy set forth in Labor Code sections 98 et seq. The commissioner determined Applebaum owed $4,500 for overtime work, not the $400,000 Boktor requested. Unhappy with this ruling, Boktor appealed the decision and pursuant to section 98.2, subdivision (a), was afforded a trial de novo in the superior court. The trial court determined Applebaum owed Boktor $300 for unpaid overtime and imposed several penalties and interest. Boktor then filed a motion for attorney fees first under section 98.2, subdivision (c), and later under section 1194.
The trial court did not resolve the issue of whether Boktor was entitled to attorney fees under either section 98.2 or section 1194. Instead, the trial court presumed attorney

In this declaratory relief action, the trial court ruled the Orange County Department of Education (Employer) must pay approximately $3.3 million in additional contributions to fund pension benefits promised to its employees. Employer argues we must independently review the legal issues raised in its complaint because the judgment arises from an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Applying this standard, we nevertheless reach the same conclusion as the trial court. The requested payment from Employer, which related to an unfunded liability of its employees’ pension benefits, was permissible and did not violate the California constitution.