CA Unpub Decisions

Daniel Curtis Colegrove appeals a judgment following conviction of lewd acts upon a child (five counts), and oral copulation of a person younger than 18 years old (three counts). (Pen. Code, §§ 288, subd. (c)(1), former 288a, subd. (b)(1), 801.1, subd. (a) [statute of limitations].) We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the judgment and affirm. This appeal concerns sexual offenses that Colegrove committed against his teenage stepdaughter T. The sexual activity occurred over a period of six years, until T. graduated from high school and moved to Sacramento. Following her complaints to law enforcement many years later, T. made a pretext telephone call to Colegrove. During the call, Colegrove made incriminating statements, including describing the sexual acts as a recommended treatment for T.’s alleged sexsomnia. The telephone call was recorded and played at trial.

Graciela Elizabeth Lemus appeals an order revoking her outpatient status and placing her at the Department of State Hospitals-Patton (Patton). She contends (1) the trial court erred in placing her at Patton; (2) defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; and (3) Penal Code section 1608 is unconstitutional. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Bhuvandeep Singh Sethi was on probation and subject to search conditions when, on two separate occasions, police officers discovered drugs and incriminating evidence during investigatory searches. Although the officers did not initially detain defendant for the purpose of conducting a probation search, defendant informed them during the course of both investigations that he was on probation. The trial court found defendant violated the terms of his probation—which prohibited him from possessing or selling narcotics—and executed a previously suspended seven-year, eight-month sentence.

Saiffuddin Tariwala, Fnu Husaina and Shabbir Saifee (collectively “plaintiffs”) are the owners of a single-family residence located on Los Robles Road in Thousand Oaks (“Tariwala Property”). Defendant Keith Martin Mack is the owner of a neighboring property on Los Robles Road (“Mack Property”). Plaintiffs claim an easement over Mack’s driveway for ingress and egress to their property.
Plaintiffs brought this action against Mack after he blocked the driveway easement. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction preventing Mack from interfering with plaintiffs’ use of the easement. Mack, who is self-represented, contends the driveway easement was extinguished through the doctrine of merger and that the court erred by enforcing the easement pending resolution of this litigation. Based on the limited record presented, we conclude Mack has not met his burden of demonstrating an abuse of judicial discretion. We affirm.

In September 2006, Jesse Plasola and Sila Plasola ended their 13-year marriage. A decade later Jesse attempts to appeal the trial court’s orders awarding Sila half of the funds in his Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) and an interest in his Federal Employment Retirement System (FERS) pension. We lack appellate jurisdiction to review those orders.
In October 2016, Jesse, appearing in propria persona, filed motions to vacate Sila’s renewal of the TSP money judgment and to terminate spousal support. We affirm the trial court’s order denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the money judgment. We reverse the order denying Jesse’s motion to terminate spousal support and direct the court on remand to consider the factors in Family Code section 4320 in ruling on the motion.

Respondent Harbour Island Condominium Homeowners Association (COA) requested a preliminary injunction against appellant Susan Alexander seeking to mitigate noise; keep her dogs out of common areas in which pets are not allowed, and abstain from photographing the COA president at the community swimming pool. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction. We affirm.

A jury found defendant Robert Reagan guilty of second degree murder, finding that he intentionally stabbed his girlfriend to death in their bedroom while their five-year-old son slept in the next room. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred: (1) by refusing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) when it admitted evidence of defendant’s motive; (3) when it allowed the prosecutor to ask a hypothetical question based on speculation; and (4) by instructing the jury on the relevance of defendant’s failure to explain or deny adverse evidence. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct by failing to introduce certain evidence until rebuttal.

A jury convicted defendants and appellants Michael Castiblanco and Juan Cortez of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§ 211). The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder was committed while the defendants were engaged in the commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)) and the allegation that a principal was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendants to terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for their murder convictions plus one year for the firearm enhancements. Sentences on the robbery convictions were stayed under section 654.

Plaintiff Richard Howard appeals from a judgment following the entry of an order sustaining the demurrer of defendant the County of Los Angeles (the County) to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff challenges each of the alternative grounds upon which the trial court based its order, including the trial court’s conclusion that his complaint was barred by the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) (section 47(b)). He also contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (section 1983).

Luke Davies (Davies) sued Los Angeles Checker Cab Cooperative, Inc. (Checker Cab) for injuries he suffered in an accident caused by one its cabs. The jury returned a special verdict in Davies’s favor, finding that the driver of the cab was a Checker Cab’s agent. On appeal, Checker Cab contends there was insufficient evidence of agency, and therefore its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) should have been granted. We disagree and affirm the judgment and order denying JNOV.

J.C. appeals from the juvenile court’s disposition order, arguing certain requirements violate constitutional separation of powers and due process provisions. We affirm.

J.C. was declared a ward of the court and placed on probation after being found to have committed the offenses of resisting an officer and battery on an officer. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support findings that he committed these offenses because the officer used excessive force in arresting him. He also challenges as unreasonable and overbroad a condition of probation requiring him to provide passwords for and submit to searches of electronic devices under his control. We will find the challenged probation condition invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and otherwise affirm.

J.G. (minor) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders sustaining a charge of felony vandalism and placing him on formal probation for six months without wardship. Evidence showed that minor and two other boys threw rocks at passing cars, and the victim’s car was damaged. Minor contends he was entitled to dismissal of the wardship petition at the close of the prosecution’s evidence because there was insufficient evidence establishing either that he was the one who threw the rock that damaged the victim’s car or that he was responsible for the damage as an aider and abettor. We disagree and affirm.

This is the third appeal generated by this dispute. Here is what we said at the beginning of our last opinion:
“This is the second appeal arising from an alleged employment relationship between appellant Patrick Kelly and Thomas White, now deceased. Appellant’s first case against White resulted in a judgment in favor of White’s estate, which this court recently affirmed. The present case arises from the same underlying facts and asserts some of the same and some different causes of action. The trial court sustained demurrers to all causes of action without leave to amend and entered judgment for respondents. Appellant contends the court abused its discretion. We affirm the judgment as to six of the eight causes of action alleged in the complaint. As to two causes of action [i.e., for breach of a 2005 contract and quantum meruit], however, we agree with appellant that the trial court erred.