CA Unpub Decisions

The trial court denied Jean de Saint Andrieu’s (Husband) March 2017 motion to set aside support orders entered between 2010 and 2016. Husband appeals in propria persona. We affirm.

Gerald Lee Farrell, currently the special administrator of the estate of Patricia Goodwin, appeals from an order of the probate court granting the motion of Elizabeth Smith to vacate various prior orders. These vacated orders include a prior order striking Smith’s objection to Farrell’s petition to commence probate and for appointment as administrator. We affirm the order vacating the prior orders.

Susan Steele (Steele) cracked her tooth while eating an olive that contained a pit or pit fragment. The olive came from a can processed and distributed by Bell-Carter Foods, Inc. et al. (Bell-Carter). In the underlying personal injury action, the trial court granted Bell-Carter summary judgment, finding that a person injured by the natural part of a food item may not recover damages based on theories of strict liability or breach of warranty. (Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court (1992) 1 Cal.4th 617 (Mexicali Rose).) On appeal, Steele contends that Mexicali Rose should not be applied to bar her claims against Bell-Carter. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.

Golden Gate Petroleum Co., Bay Area/Diablo Petroleum Company, Dennis O’Keefe, and Westgate Petroleum Company, Inc. (collectively, the Golden Gate Parties) appeal from an order imposing $3 million in penalties for violating the terms of a consent judgment. They contend: (1) respondent failed to comply with the notice requirements for enforcing the consent judgment; (2) the court did not make a valid finding of any violation of the consent judgment; and (3) O’Keefe should not be held personally responsible for the penalties. We will affirm the order.

Appellant Dante Taylor (appellant) borrowed over $50,000 to finance his education at the University of Washington. Respondents National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2006-4 and National Collegiate Student Loan Trust 2007-3 (respondents) are two securitized Delaware trusts that claim they were assigned the loans at the time of origination. Respondents brought suit against appellant on the loans after he failed to make payments, and the trial court entered judgment in their favor following a bench trial. We affirm.

During deliberations on 12 counts stemming from defendant’s molestation of his minor daughter, the jury reported it was deadlocked on three of the counts. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3551, the instruction on further deliberations when a jury is deadlocked. After further deliberations, the jury returned guilty verdicts on 10 counts, including two of the three on which the jurors had previously been deadlocked. Defendant claims the court committed instructional error because CALCRIM No. 3551 is impermissibly coercive. We disagree and affirm.

Defendant Rakesh Paul Singh was convicted of aggravated mayhem and sentenced to life in prison for having hired men to commit an attack on his ex-wife. On appeal, defendant argues the court improperly dissuaded the jury from requesting a readback of testimony by certain witnesses and erred in failing to conduct a Marsden hearing in response to a post-trial letter from defendant.

In September 2016, the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) relative to an infant boy, D.L. (the minor). The Department alleged that the mother, R.K. (mother), and the father, D.L. (father), had a history of substance abuse. Mother had used methamphetamine, marijuana, and nonprescribed valium during her pregnancy, and the minor was born with controlled substances in his system. The toxicology report indicated that the minor had tested positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and diazepam (valium). The minor was cared for in the neonatal intensive care unit of the hospital for 15 days until his discharge. The Department reported that “[a]s a newborn, [the minor] required oxygen, medication, and a feeding tube in order to survive.”

In this appeal, D.G. (Mother) asks us to reverse a juvenile court order issued by the court pursuant to section 361.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code denying her reunification services with respect to her daughter, I.C.. At the March 2018 dispositional hearing in this matter, the trial court bypassed Mother for reunification services in accordance with subdivision of section 361.5. Under those provisions, the court is not required to offer reunification services to a parent if the court has previously terminated reunification services or parental rights with respect to a sibling or half sibling of the child and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling . . . .” Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that she had not made reasonable efforts to treat her long-standing substance abuse issues.

Aurora L., born in early October 2017, tested positive for both methamphetamine and morphine. During the initial six-month reunification period, her father, Andrew L. missed 51 of 51 random drug tests and relapsed into heroin use. Then he became homeless. Even so, the juvenile dependency court did not terminate reunification services, but ordered the existing reunification plan continued for another six months, optimistically projecting Andrew’s reunification with Aurora by November 2018. In the process, the court made a formal finding that Andrew had been offered reasonable reunification services. Despite the absence of any immediate adverse consequences flowing from the finding at the six-month review that reasonable services had been offered, Andrew now appeals the order.

M.B. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to her nine-year-old daughter K.R., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She raises the following contentions: (1) the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA); (2) the court violated Mother’s constitutional rights by failing to transfer the case to Nevada; (3) Mother did not receive reasonable reunification services; and (4) the court should have granted her section 388 modification petition. We conclude all of these contentions lack merit, and we affirm the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of possession of a short-barreled shotgun (Pen. Code, § 33215; count 1), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school (§ 626.9, subd. (b); count 3), possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count 4), and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 5). As to counts 1 through 4, the jury found the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The court sentenced defendant to four years eight months in prison, computed as follows: two years on count 3, with an additional two years for the gang enhancement; a consecutive eight months (one-third of the midterm) on count 4; and concurrent sentences of two years on each of counts 1, 2, and 5.

Generally, prosecutors cannot introduce character evidence as part of the proof that a defendant committed a crime. However, if a defendant introduces evidence of an alleged victim’s character for violence, the prosecution can then introduce evidence of the defendant’s character for violence. (Evid. Code, § 1103, subd. (b).)
Here, defendant Richard Arnold Parker II hit his girlfriend Miesha D. over the head with a drinking glass, causing an injury; thereafter, Miesha stabbed Parker in the chest with a knife. At trial, Parker introduced evidence regarding Miesha’s character for violence. The prosecution introduced evidence regarding Parker’s character for violence. A jury found Parker guilty of an aggravated battery and related crimes.

A jury convicted appellant Woodrow Raymond Sexton of possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), and possessing heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). In a bifurcated bench trial, the court found Sexton had suffered a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d) & (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b), (c)(1)).