CA Unpub Decisions

J.G. appeals from the judgment entered after the juvenile court sustained a juvenile petition (Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 602) for second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code,
§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court declared the offenses felonies and placed appellant home on probation. Appellant contends that the field identification of appellant and his cohorts, conducted minutes after the strong-arm robbery, was unduly suggestive and violated his due process rights. We affirm.

A jury convicted Enrique Gonzalez of the 2004 first degree murder of Gregory Gabriel, who was shot by Gonzalez’s friend, Carlos Argueta. We affirmed Gonzalez’s conviction, but remanded to the trial court for resentencing as to the firearm enhancements. In 2008 the Supreme Court denied review
On June 2, 2014 the Supreme Court held in People v. Chiu that the natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and abetting a crime cannot be the basis for convicting a defendant of first degree murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 167 (Chiu).) On October 20, 2017 Gonzalez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking relief from his first degree murder conviction under Chiu. Although we summarily denied the petition, the Supreme Court granted Gonzalez’s petition for review, directing this court to vacate our order denying the petition pursuant to Chiu and In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216 (Martinez). We now grant the petition.

On January 6, 2017, appellant Graciela E. Ortiz filed her complaint in propia persona, alleging a single cause of action for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code section 12900 et. seq. (FEHA) against respondent American Companion and Caregivers (ACC). The complaint stated that appellant is “a female of Latino descent who was 55 at the time of the employment practices complained of.” It alleged that “Defendants” (collectively, respondent ACC and two other entities who are not parties to this appeal) wrongfully terminated her employment, illegally searched her property, wrongfully evicted her, took her personal belongings, and unlawfully discriminated against her. Appellant attached as exhibits a 1099 form showing earnings from respondent in 2015, and a medical form identifying herself as a “[r]etired [e]mployee” as of June 2015.

Eddie Goodwin (Goodwin) appeals a family court order declaring him a vexatious litigant and requiring him to obtain permission before filing future litigation in propria persona. We consider whether the order must be reversed because it was not preceded by a noticed motion.

ASAP Copy and Print filed the initial complaint in this action a decade ago. The complaint alleged misrepresentations and breach of contract concerning services provided in connection with the lease of a photocopier. Respondent Canon Solutions America, Inc. (CSA) is the successor in interest to Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (CBS), a defendant in the underlying action.
Including the three appeals at issue here, ASAP has pursued nine appeals in this case. The first two appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of ASAP’s claims following successful demurrers. (ASAP Copy & Print v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc. (June 4, 2012) Nos. B224295 & B225702, 2012

Following a bench trial, defendant and appellant Gulnora Djama was convicted of allowing a mischievous animal to cause serious bodily injury to another person, criminal threats, and misdemeanor assault, and she pled no contest to misdemeanor unlawful transportation of marijuana. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Djama on probation for three years. On appeal, Djama contends there is insufficient evidence to support her conviction for criminal threats. We affirm.

Fong Yu Liu obtained a judgment against Xiao Cheng Liu for his conversion of proceeds from the sale of “Little Chicken Seeking Food,” a painting by the noted Chinese artist Qi Baishi. Xiao Cheng appeals, contending the judgment is unsupported by substantial evidence because his testimony was credible whereas Fong Yu’s was not. (We use the parties’ given names for clarity.) We conclude that under the applicable standard of review we may not reweigh the evidence, and therefore affirm.

When appellant Wesley Sinnathamby and respondent Tanya Flint divorced by consent order in Hong Kong, they agreed to relocate to Los Angeles with their children, register their consent order in a Los Angeles court, and “use their best endeavors” to secure (separate) employment. Tanya did not obtain a job once in Los Angeles, and she eventually sought an order compelling Wesley to pay child support. We are asked to decide (a) whether the family court abused its discretion when it calculated a child support award without imputing any income to Tanya on the basis of her earning capacity, and (b) whether the family court improperly restricted Wesley’s right to present evidence in support of his position.

A jury convicted defendant Shumonte White of second degree murder after he stabbed and killed Carlos Gamboa. The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of 15 years to life in prison. On appeal, defendant argues insufficient evidence supports his conviction for second degree murder and the court erroneously denied his Batson/Wheeler motion alleging the People exercised a peremptory challenge to a prospective juror based on the prospective juror’s race. Defendant also raises numerous claims of evidentiary error and ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm with directions to correct an error in the abstract of judgment.

We reconsider this case on remand from the California Supreme Court, which vacated our prior decision and directed us to reconsider in light of People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). We remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing with directions to strike the prior prison term enhancement based on a felony conviction that was reduced to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47. The trial court must also determine on remand whether appellant’s two serious felony enhancements should be stricken pursuant to the court’s newly-granted discretion under Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2) (SB 1393).

Appellant Julie K. (Mother) appeals from an order denying her petition to have her son placed in her care after an extended, unsupervised visit following this court’s reversal of the termination of her parental rights. Although mother shares a close relationship with her son and has made impressive strides by remaining sober and improving her life, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied the petition. We therefore affirm.

Wayne, Katherine, Matthew, and Nicole Stark (collectively plaintiffs) and Norma Ortiz own adjoining parcels of agricultural land in Humboldt County. Ortiz has an exclusive easement over a portion of plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Ortiz to, among other things, void the easement. The trial court entered judgment for Ortiz. Plaintiffs appeal. Their principal contentions are the exclusive easement amounts to an ownership conveyance, and that it violates the Subdivision Map Act (Gov. Code, § 66410 et seq., Map Act). We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Edward Cagle appeals from an order extending his period of commitment to a state mental hospital as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code section 2972, subdivision (c). Appellant contends his recommitment hearing was fundamentally unfair due to the improper admission of substantial amounts of case-specific hearsay through an expert witness, in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Mark S. Holmes appeals from a judgment affirming a decision of the San Mateo County Assessment Appeals Board (AAB), which allocated the assessed value of his real property to $2.4 million for land and $200,000 for improvements. He contends the method for allocating the assessed value was arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional, because the allocation ratio it yielded for his property was different than the average allocation ratio for properties in other cities in San Mateo County, and because of the disparity in allocation ratios among those cities. We will affirm the judgment.