CA Unpub Decisions

Mark S. Holmes appeals from a judgment affirming a decision of the San Mateo County Assessment Appeals Board (AAB), which allocated the assessed value of his real property to $2.4 million for land and $200,000 for improvements. He contends the method for allocating the assessed value was arbitrary, capricious, and unconstitutional, because the allocation ratio it yielded for his property was different than the average allocation ratio for properties in other cities in San Mateo County, and because of the disparity in allocation ratios among those cities. We will affirm the judgment.

This is the fifth appeal in this seemingly unending dispute between plaintiff Kristine L. Adams and defendant Newport Crest Homeowners Association (Newport Crest), which has been ongoing since 2005. In this particular iteration, a trial took place, and the jury awarded Adams $142,599 in damages. Adams thereafter filed a motion seeking a new trial, which was denied. Adams now appeals on various grounds, many of which are waived due to inadequate briefing. With respect to the remaining issues, we find no error and affirm the judgment.
On our own motion, we served Adams with an order to show cause (OSC) regarding sanctions under the California Rules of Court. After briefing and argument, we exercise our discretion not to impose sanctions.

Appellant Christine Marie Rocco was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in violation of Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), for the death of her infant daughter, A.J. The trial court sentenced Rocco to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison.
On appeal, Rocco argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law during closing argument. Specifically, she contends that the prosecutor committed prejudicial error by inaccurately stating the elements of implied malice as it applies to second degree murder. Additionally, Rocco filed supplemental briefing to address whether she should be eligible for mental health diversion under the newly enacted section 1001.36. Upon review, we affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Dejon Dominique Daniels was charged by information with four counts of lewd acts upon a child (Pen. Code , § 288, subd. (a), counts 1-4), two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child 10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (a), counts 5-6), and two counts of oral copulation or sexual penetration with a child 10 years or older. The People moved to add another count of committing a lewd act upon a child. (§ 288, subd. (a), count 9.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to counts 1 through 4 and 9. The parties stipulated that the police report contained a factual basis for the plea. In exchange, a trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 16 years in state prison and dismissed the remaining counts. The court awarded a total of 1,496 days of custody credit, consisting of 1,301 actual days and 195 conduct days’ credits.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.

Defendant and respondent Tropicale Foods, Inc. (Tropicale) appeals the denial of its motion to compel arbitration against plaintiff and respondent Ana Garcia. The trial court found that Tropicale failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Garcia signed an arbitration agreement. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant James D. Cuzzolina sued defendant and respondent Protection One, Inc. (Protection One) for violations of the Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA) (Civ. Code, § 1785.1 et seq.) and the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.). Cuzzolina alleges that Protection One violated Civil Code section 1785.25, subdivision (a), which provides that “‘[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.’” The trial court granted Protection One’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Cuzzolina failed to establish that Protection One provided information to a credit reporting agency. We affirm.

A jury found defendant and appellant Julio Chavez, Jr., guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) It further found that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1197, subd. (c)(8).) In a bifurcated trial, a trial court found true the allegations that defendant suffered a conviction out of Texas on April 15, 2011, for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which qualified as a serious prior felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and a prior strike conviction (§§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). Defendant unsuccessfully moved to strike the prior conviction pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). The court sentenced defendant to a total term of 16 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of four years, doubled pursuant to the prior strike conviction, plus three years on the great bodily injury enhancement and five years on the prior serio

Real party in interest and appellant Danielle Warren (Mother) appeals from the family court’s order modifying the existing custody order between her and Andre Robinson, Jr. (Father) over their child (Daughter). We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant Prestige Autotech Corporation (Prestige) appeals from the trial court’s order setting aside the default judgment entered against defendant and respondent Wuxi Chenhwat Almatech Co. (Wuxi). Prestige contends that the trial court exceeded the scope of its equitable power to set aside the default because Wuxi failed to make the showing required to justify such relief. We disagree, and affirm the trial court’s order.

Jenna T. (Mother) appeals a judgment freeing her minor daughter, J.R., from parental custody or control under Family Code section 7822. J.R.'s paternal grandmother and aunt, respondents Irene R. and S.R., filed the section 7822 petition in connection with a request to adopt J.R. Mother contends insufficient evidence supports the findings on the section 7822 petition, and that it was not in J.R.'s best interests to terminate her parental rights. We reject these arguments and affirm.

Defendant Edward Terrell appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition on his conviction for receiving stolen property (§ 496). He contends the trial court erred in finding his offense ineligible for resentencing. We shall reverse and remand for additional proceedings on the petition.

Defendant Darrin Bernard Reid appeals from a judgment entered after his no contest plea to inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition on a cohabitant (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count one); assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count two); assault with a caustic chemical with the intent to injure and disfigure (§ 244; count three); and admission of the special allegation that count one was committed under circumstances involving domestic violence (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)), in exchange for a sentence lid of seven years. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years for count one and four years for the special circumstance. Additionally, defendant was sentenced to a concurrent three-year term for count two. The trial court also imposed, but stayed pursuant to section 654, a three-year sentence for count three.

A jury found defendant Ernest Lane Morales guilty of arson of an inhabited structure and acquitted him of five counts of attempted murder. The court found defendant had been convicted of two prior strike offenses and a prior serious felony and had also served two prior prison terms. In his original appeal, defendant contended the court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial, admitting evidence of his drug use, and incorrectly instructing the jury regarding the intent required for arson. He further argued the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible evidence and that cumulative error resulted. On September 5, 2018, we affirmed the judgment.

Father James B. appeals from the jurisdictional findings and dispositional order of the juvenile court concerning his sons Jesse B. and Dalton B. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the court’s jurisdictional findings and affirm.