CA Unpub Decisions

This case comes to us pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Upon our review of the record, we requested that the parties submit supplemental briefing regarding whether the trial court erred in finding that Kevin Jonas Rojano-Nieto—who was convicted of sodomizing and committing lewd acts on a three-year-old girl—owed no restitution to the victim of his crime. We have reviewed the parties' briefs and conclude that the trial court erred in reaching this determination. Further, we note a discrepancy between the trial court's oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment regarding the presentence custody credit to which Rojano-Nieto is entitled.

The trial court issued a terminating sanction dismissing the cross-complaint and striking the answer of Info Tech Corporation (Info Tech) and Andy Kim (Kim, together with Info Tech, defendants) based on its conclusion that defendants had spoliated evidence by sabotaging their electronic e-mail server and storage array (together, the servers) in contravention of plaintiff R Consulting & Sales, Inc.'s (R Consulting) right to this discovery. After a default prove-up hearing, the court entered a default judgment against defendants for over $2.4 million.

A jury convicted Charles Justin Keller of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found true allegations that he committed each assault for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Keller admitted he had suffered a prior prison conviction (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), a serious felony prior conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and three strike prior convictions within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, 1170.12).

"[N]ot every postjudgment order that follows a final appealable judgment is appealable." Among other requirements, California law is clear that to constitute an appealable postjudgment order, the order at issue must not be prefatory to a later judgment. (See, e.g., Lakin, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 652 [reviewing Supreme Court case law "determin[ing] the appealability of a variety of postjudgment orders," and stating that orders that were determined not to be appealable include those "although following an earlier judgment, are more accurately understood as being preliminary to a later judgment, at which time they will become ripe for appeal"]; Macaluso v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1050 (Macaluso), quoting Lakin; Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Kintetsu Enterprises of America (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 953, 980 ["postjudgment order is appealable where issue in order is different from issue in

Defendant Jimmy Albert Marino, Jr., had multiple contacts with the victim in violation of a restraining order protecting her from him. Between June and September 2017, defendant tried to ram the victim’s car with another vehicle, followed her home and parked near her house, had dinner with her, watered her plants outside her residence, attempted to contact her, yelled at her, left signs for her in her yard expressing his love, asked someone to give her a hug, and attempted to friend her on social media using a fake name.

K. W., father of the minors, D. S. and E. S. (minors), appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights and adopting a permanent plan of adoption. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.) Father contends the juvenile court erred in denying his motion to grant him reunification services (§ 388) and in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).
Finding the claims lack merit, we affirm.

James Long appeals from postjudgment orders that resolve numerous issues including child custody, child support, attorney fees, and sanctions. Long raises several claims on appeal. Each of his claims fail, either because they lack merit, they are outside the scope of appellate review, or he has failed to provide an adequate record on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s orders.

Defendant Jennifer Renae Cecere was responsible for a traffic collision resulting in the death and serious injury of the drivers of two other vehicles. Defendant pled guilty to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence of alcohol and causing injury, and driving with a blood-alcohol content of .08 percent and causing injury. Defendant also admitted inflicting great bodily injury. On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s finding of factors in aggravation to support imposing the six-year midterm for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. We affirm.

Following a negotiated plea agreement, defendant Gina Elizabeth Hubbard was convicted of possessing methamphetamine and found in violation of a previously imposed probation. Pursuant to the terms of her plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to a split sentence of seven years eight months. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence. She further contends her prior conviction for transporting methamphetamine was void and thus the sentence imposed in this matter is unlawful. She claims in the alternative that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed to challenge the prior conviction and erroneously advised her to admit violating her probation.
As to her search claim, we conclude there was no error. We conclude the remaining claims are not cognizable on appeal given defendant’s failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause; defendant’s redress, if any, is by a petition for writ of hab

P.C. (mother) filed this petition for extraordinary relief in propria persona after the juvenile court terminated reunification services as to her daughter Aida and son Angel. The parties are familiar with the facts, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We accordingly resolve the cause before us, consistent with constitutional requirements, via a written opinion with reasons stated. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1261-1264 [three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in reply to counsel’s arguments”; “[i]n order to state the reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based, [an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)

In 1980, appellant Kenneth Glaude, then 16 years old, was convicted of murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). His sentence of life without parole was modified to 25 years to life, plus a 12-year determinate term. In 1996, while still in prison, he pled nolo contendere to a charge of possession of marijuana in a jail facility in violation of section 4573.6, and was sentenced to an additional four years, to run consecutively.

M.M. (mother) appeals from the disposition order of the juvenile court removing her daughter S.E. (age 12) from her custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361, subd. (c).) She contends that the juvenile court denied her due process because she was not given notice that the court would remove the child. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Eduardo Gonzalez of four felonies: one count of shooting at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 246), two counts of assault with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found appellant personally fired a handgun in the commission of the two assault counts (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). Gang allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) were dismissed before trial on the People’s motion.

In July 2014, children C.D., R.D., and S.D. were detained from C.M. (mother) and R.D. (father). After three years, during which mother and father received 21 months of reunification services, the juvenile court declined to return the children to their parents’ care and terminated reunification services. Mother and father allege the court improperly placed the burden of proof on them under the incorrect statutory framework and that substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding that returning the children to the parents’ care would be detrimental. Mother also alleges the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not make reasonable efforts to provide her with reunification services.