CA Unpub Decisions

Renee B. (mother) and Richard H. (father) appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to Jesse H. (born November 2013) and Isaac H. (born September 2015). They contend that the juvenile court erred by denying mother’s petition for modification (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388), by declining to place the children with their maternal grandmother (MGM) under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA)), and by failing to apply the parental relationship, sibling relationship, or Indian child exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)). We discern no juvenile court error and so we affirm the order.

Darryl S. Gentry appeals from a postjudgment order executing a 90-day suspended sentence in the county jail, to be served consecutively to a 180-day county jail sentence for violating the terms of his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) in a subsequent violation proceeding. Gentry contends he completed 90 days of residential drug treatment and, accordingly, the execution of the suspended sentence was error. We affirm.

Caroline S. Lee and The Nu-Life, Inc. (collectively, defendants) appeal from a judgment enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement under section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure between defendants and respondent Armando Oliveros on his complaint alleging defendants committed various wage and hour violations and engaged in unlawful business practices. Defendants contend substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the settlement agreement was not a product of duress or undue influence. We disagree and affirm.

Several years after entry of the December 18, 2012 bifurcated judgment dissolving their marriage, former spouses Laura R. Borys and David A. Borys stipulated to shared legal and equal physical custody of their minor daughter and proceeded to trial on reserved issues. After a three-day trial, posttrial briefing, and closing arguments, the trial court ordered David to pay child and spousal support arrearages and permanent child and spousal support, denied Laura’s request for attorney fees pursuant to Family Code section 2030, denied both parties’ requests for attorney fees as section 271 sanctions, and determined debt incurred by David’s consulting business, incorporated shortly before the parties’ marriage, was a community obligation for which wife was fifty percent responsible.

Defendant Manuel Cadenas pleaded no contest to driving under the influence of alcohol with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more with a felony prior conviction within 10 years (Veh. Code, §§ 23152; 23550.5, subd. (a)). Cadenas also admitted he had been convicted of two prior convictions under Penal Code sections 667, subdivisions (b)-(i) and 1170.12 (strike priors). The court sentenced Cadenas to four years in state prison.
On appeal, Cadenas’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that raises no issue. We notified Cadenas of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. On October 29, 2018, we received a letter from Cadenas asserting that his attorney misinformed him of the amount of time he would serve while in prison, and that his strike priors could not be used to enhance his sentence.

Defendant Stanley Jones pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, a felony (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer in the performance of his/her duties, a misdemeanor (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He also admitted that he had been previously convicted of two strike offenses (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)). On October 27, 2017, the court imposed a sentence of 32 months in state prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appointed counsel has filed an opening brief that states the case and facts but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. The 30-day period has elapsed and we have received no response from defendant.

After a jury trial, defendant Alonso Ruiz was found guilty of making criminal threats and actively participating in a criminal street gang. In an earlier appeal, we held that the trial court violated the Sixth Amendment by admitting testimonial hearsay statements offered by the prosecution’s gang expert, contrary to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez). We found the error nonprejudicial, however, and therefore affirmed the judgment.
After our opinion was filed on September 14, 2018, the Governor signed Senate Bill 1393, which removed a restriction on a trial court’s ability to strike Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) prior serious felony enhancements. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2.) The bill became effective on January 1, 2019. Defendant petitioned for review of our decision and sought a remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion to strike the serious felony enhancement previously imposed. The Supreme Court granted review and transferred th

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Margaret R. Anderson, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Margaret R. Anderson, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Melissa Hill, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

This is an unusual case. Appellant has already been to this court once in his fight to have his sentence reduced under the rubrics of Proposition 47 (codified as it applies to this case as Penal Code Section 1170.18 (Section 1170.18)). He was successful on that occasion, but it was only a battle, and we must today hold that he has lost the war.
Twenty years ago, appellant pleaded guilty to a violation of possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351). He was placed on probation, but later offenses ultimately resulted in his incarceration in a federal facility. In 2015, he petitioned for resentencing under Section 1170.18; his request was denied, and he appealed. Through a series of misadventures ultimately attributable to administrative error in the superior court and the fact he was in federal custody, his appeal was not timely filed. He sought a writ in this court, and it was granted. We ordered his appeal filed.

Defendant Jarin A. Gonzalez appeals after a jury found him guilty of committing an assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4) , and found the allegations that he inflicted great bodily injury during the assault to be true (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Based on his admission of certain prior convictions and prison sentences, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of seven years in prison.
The primary issue Gonzalez raises on appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of his motion challenging the prosecutor’s use of preemptory challenges during the jury selection process. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler); Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 (Batson).) He claims the court erred in concluding the prosecutor offered credible race-neutral reasons for excusing four specified jurors. He also asserts the court erred in imposing sentencing enhancements for both a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)

Appellant challenges his conviction for indecent exposure on the basis there is insufficient evidence he willfully intended to direct public attention to his genitals. He also contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of lewd conduct, and the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct in closing argument. Finding no grounds to reverse, we affirm the judgment.

In October 2018, the juvenile court denied Kimberly M. (mother) reunification services as to her then 31-month-old son Maximiliano under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) and set a section 366.26 hearing for January 29, 2019. Subdivision (b)(5) of section 361.5 allows the juvenile court to deny services to a parent whose conduct resulted in the severe physical abuse of his or her child. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence Maximiliano suffered severe physical abuse and seeks reversal of the court’s orders by extraordinary writ. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.450 & 8.452.) We deny the writ petition.

Miguel C. (father) appeals from orders after a combined Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 and section 388 hearing at which the juvenile court denied father’s section 388 petition seeking reunification services, terminated his parental rights to X.R. and E.R., and selected adoption as the children’s permanent plan.
On appeal, father challenges an earlier disposition order denying him reunification services and visitation. He also challenges the juvenile court’s denial of his section 388 petition. We affirm.
Previous Dependency
In August 2015, 14-month-old X.R. came to the attention of the Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) when he was found sleeping with mother in the bed of a pickup truck. Mother was in possession of methamphetamine. X.R. was coughing and spitting up green matter. He was suffering from bronchitis and had poor hygiene. A section 300 petition was filed alleging mother, who was pregnant, had an extensive substance abus