CA Unpub Decisions

In case No. F17904328 (case 1), appellant Oscar Verdugo pled no contest to receiving a stolen vehicle with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a)). In case No. F17904631 (case 2), Verdugo pled no contest to identity theft with a prior conviction (§ 530.5, subd. (c)(2)). Verdugo also admitted two prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Following independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, we affirm.

Appellant Yeng Kong Moua was convicted of multiple sex offenses. He contends there was insufficient evidence to support one of his convictions for violating Penal Code section 220, subdivision (a)(1). Moua also contends the two 25- years-to-life sentences imposed pursuant to section 667.61 must be reversed because the accusatory pleading did not contain any section 667.61 allegations. We affirm the convictions, but remand for resentencing.

Susan Diane Clevenger (petitioner) seeks to have her felony-murder special circumstance vacated, her first degree murder conviction reversed, and her overall sentence reconsidered, based on California Supreme Court authorities decided after her convictions became final. We agree the special circumstance must be vacated.

Defendant Sundeep Dhillon was subjected to a warrantless search of his residence based on the searching officer’s erroneous belief defendant was on “searchable” probation. Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant pled no contest to various offenses. Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We sent a letter to defendant, advising him of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant responded with a supplemental brief in which he contended the magistrate erred in applying the good faith exception to deny defendant’s motion to suppress. Defendant argued that because the motion should have been granted, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to renew the motion in the superior court to preserve the issue for appeal. We ordered appellate counsel

This appeal follows the trial court’s denial of defendant Raymond Ray Robison’s motion to strike three prior prison term enhancements imposed in this case, brought pursuant to Proposition 47. (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 1170.18, subd. (k).) As discussed in further detail below, we issued a decision affirming the trial court on February 24, 2017. (People v. Robison (Feb. 24, 2017, F071955 [2017 Cal.App.Unpub. Lexis 1354] [nonpub. opn.] (Robison III).) The matter is now back before us for reconsideration following the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks).

A jury convicted defendant and appellant, Ariq Andrew Carrigan, of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; count 1) and assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4); count 2). The court sentenced defendant to three years of imprisonment.
After defense counsel filed a notice of appeal, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, setting forth a statement of the facts, a statement of the case, and three potentially arguable issues: (1) whether substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for robbery; (2) whether substantial evidence supports defendant’s conviction for assault; and (3) whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that the force used on the victim was used to accomplish the theft. We affirm.

The juvenile court found true an allegation defendant and appellant, A.S. (Minor), born in April 2002, annoyed or molested his stepsister, the victim. (Pen. Code § 647.6, subd. (a)(1); count 1.) The court declared Minor a ward of the court and placed him on one year of formal probation in the custody of his mother on various terms and conditions. On appeal, defendant contends two of the conditions of his probation must be modified. We affirm.

Plaintiff and appellant, Ronald Austin, brought this action based on his purchase of solar panels from LDK Solar Tech USA, Inc. (LDK). The solar panels allegedly came with a performance warranty. Defendants and respondents, Munich Re America Corporation and Munich Reinsurance America, Inc. (collectively, Munich), allegedly insured LDK’s performance warranties. After Austin’s solar panels failed to perform as guaranteed, Austin sued Munich under a number of contract- and warranty-based theories, as well as under several statutory schemes. (LDK is also a defendant but is not a party to this appeal.) Munich demurred to all 12 causes of action in the first amended complaint (FAC), and the trial court sustained it in part and overruled it in part. Austin then sought a judgment of dismissal so that he could seek immediate review of the court’s ruling.

Appellant Antonio Sison Geluz (Husband) appeals from the denial of his request for order (RFO) filed pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.92 et. seq., in the family court. He and respondent Marilyn Achico Geluz (Wife) were involved in dissolution proceedings. The family court denied Husband’s RFO seeking an order that Wife quitclaim her separate property located on Manitoba Drive in Fontana (Property) to him so he could seek a modification of the loan, which was in Wife’s name only. Wells Fargo Bank was set to foreclose on the Property for nonpayment of the mortgage. In addition to denying the RFO, the family court ordered that Husband, who was the only party living in the Property, vacate within 30 days. In addition, he was ordered to pay Wife $9,536.50, which was half of the rental payments made by a former tenant in the Property to Husband and of which Wife was never given a share.

Defendant and appellant Hector DeLaRocha committed lewd acts on a 14-year-old girl. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to one count of committing a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (c)(1)). In return, the remaining allegations were dismissed, and defendant was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions of probation, including “[n]ot [to] associate with females under the age of eighteen (18); unless in the presence of a responsible adult who is aware of the nature of your background and current offense and who has been approved by the probation officer.”

Defendant and appellant Mercedes Devoney Broughton appeals from a judgment entered against her after trial, where she was ordered to pay damages in excess of three million dollars. The award stemmed from a car accident where Broughton crossed the double yellow center line of the two-lane State Route 62 (SR-62) in Rice, California and hit a minivan driven by Eloisa Madero. Also in the minivan with Eloisa was the Madero’s son JC; the Madero’s 16-year-old daughter DJ; Eloisa’s sister, Angela Baca; and DJ’s boyfriend, Oscar Salas. The minivan rolled over several times until it came to rest on its roof. DJ died instantly and Eloisa suffered major injuries.

Amanda A. (Mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter (Daughter). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother contends the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to fulfill their inquiry and notice obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and the parallel state law (§ 224 et seq.) (collectively ICWA). We determine the Agency's ICWA notice did not satisfy legal requirements because it did not include known information about Daughter's great-grandparents. We conditionally affirm, but remand for the limited purpose of requiring the Agency to provide the correct notice.

INTRODUCTION
Defendants Steven Glen Atwater and Clifford Dewey Elliott appeal from their judgments of conviction after a jury trial. Both men were charged with and convicted of arson of property. On appeal, the defendants jointly argue that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction for arson of property, in violation of Penal Code section 451, subdivision (d).
Atwater separately contends that the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury on the legal principles regarding arson of property, and that, given that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction in this case, the trial court's order revoking Atwater's probation in a separate case must also be reversed and remanded to the trial court to reimpose probation.

This case involves a boundary dispute between adjacent property owners. Decades ago, Daniel Gabino and Stephany Halene Martinez (defendants) agreed with their backyard neighbor, Ruth Johnson, to build a concrete wall at what they believed was the boundary between their two lots. After Ruth passed away, Rodney as executor to her estate tried to sell. When a survey revealed that the wall stood entirely on the Johnson property, Rodney filed an action to quiet title. On cross motions for summary judgment, defendants argued that Ruth had consented to the wall's placement and invoked statute of limitations and unclean hands as affirmative defenses; Rodney urged the court to grant judgment based on the survey. The trial court granted Rodney's motion, denied defendants' motion, and entered judgment in Rodney's favor. Defendants appeal the judgment.