CA Unpub Decisions

On August 24, 2017, defendant and appellant D.R. (minor; born Aug. 2002) admitted to committing sexual battery on an unlawfully restrained person under Penal Code section 243.4, subdivision (a) (count 5). As part of the plea agreement, the People dismissed counts 1 through 4, which had alleged four counts of committing a forcible lewd act upon a child under section 288, subdivision (b)(1) (counts 1, 2, 3, 4). The parties agreed that the court could consider the dismissed counts for purposes of disposition.
On November 28, 2017, minor was placed on probation with various terms and conditions. On January 25, 2018, minor filed a notice of appeal.

Defendant and appellant Alonzo Bernal is a lawful resident of the United States. In 2000, he pled no contest to possession with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11383, subd. (c)(1)). In exchange, he was placed on formal probation for a period of three years on various terms and conditions of probation. In 2010, upon return to the United States from his native country, Mexico, defendant was apprehended by the federal government and placed in removal proceedings in federal immigration court. Approximately seven years later, in 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate his 2000 plea pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, arguing his conviction was legally invalid because his trial counsel incorrectly advised him about the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and he was prejudiced as a result. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to vacate, and defendant appealed.

Appellant, Scott Marlowe Doss (Scott), appeals from the May 9, 2017, family court order denying his request for an order (RFO) modifying (i.e., reducing) his $2,000 monthly spousal support obligation to his former spouse, respondent, Kathryn M. Doss (Kathryn). The family court denied Scott’s RFO on the ground that Scott did not offer sufficient proof of changed circumstances, since 2013, when Scott agreed to pay Kathryn $2,000 in monthly spousal support pursuant to the parties’ marital settlement agreement (MSA) and judgment dissolving their marriage.

Plaintiff and appellant Michelle McKinnon, acting in propria persona, appeals from an order denying her petition to remove the trustee of the Daniel Robert David Bypass Trust (trust), defendant and respondent Patricia David-Portwood (Portwood).
On May 2, 2017, McKinnon apparently filed a petition to remove Portwood as the trustee for failing to comply with the trust and a settlement agreement. The petition and accompanying trial briefs are not part of the record. The trial court denied the petition. McKinnon filed a timely notice of appeal.

David Earl Schiltz appeals a postjudgment order revoking his probation and removing the stay on execution of the sentence that had been imposed. He also has filed a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus, which petition we have consolidated with his appeal and decide in this opinion.

A jury convicted Nick Rodriguez of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and found true an allegation he personally used a dangerous and deadly weapon (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)). The court found true allegations Rodriguez had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), a prior serious felony conviction (§§ 667, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)), and two prior prison commitment convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The court sentenced Rodriguez to eight years in prison, consisting of the middle term of three years for the assault conviction plus five years for the serious felony prior conviction. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the punishment for the prior strike conviction and the prior prison commitment convictions in the interest of justice (§ 1385).

Defendant Nikolas James Neubauer was granted formal probation after pleading no contest to a domestic violence offense. The court subsequently revoked probation and sentenced defendant to serve three years in state prison after finding he had violated a condition of probation requiring him to successfully complete a batterer’s treatment program and not terminate participation in the program without the court’s or his probation officer’s permission.
On appeal, defendant contends insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that he willfully violated the terms of his probation because he was in custody on two of the four program days he missed, which he argues were excused absences that were not his fault. We conclude sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding defendant willfully violated the terms of his probation. Consequently, it did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation. We affirm.

Defendant Byron Charles Wallace appeals a judgment entered after a jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of oral copulation with a person under the age of 18 (counts one, two); two counts of penetration with a foreign object (counts three, four); annoying a minor (count five); unlawful contact or communication with a minor (count six); dissuading a witness (count seven); and three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor (counts eight, nine, ten). He argues insufficient evidence supports his convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse with M. Doe (the victim), and annoying a minor. He also complains certain testimony that was stricken was so prejudicial that it violated his rights to “due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments and their California counterparts,” requiring reversal. Finally, defendant requests this court independently review subpoenaed school records to determine whether the trial court erred in not releasing

Joanna Kay Duarte pleaded no contest to one count of carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. The trial court suspended imposition of her sentence and placed her on probation for three years. After Duarte admitted violating her probation, the court terminated probation and imposed a sentence of 16 months in county jail. Duarte appealed and her appointed counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.

Manuel Jesus Perez appeals his conviction by jury of first degree murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and arson of an inhabited dwelling (§ 451, subd. (b)). The evidence is uncontradicted. Appellant fatally stabbed his housemate, doused him with lighter fluid, and lit him on fire. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that appellant had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and four prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (d)-(e), 1170.12, subds. (b)-(c)). Appellant was sentenced to 85 years to life state prison. Appellant contends, among other things, that the trial court erred in not modifying a CALCRIM No. 625 instruction on voluntary intoxication to address first degree murder by lying in wait. We affirm the judgment of conviction but remand for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to exercise its discretion on whether to strike the five-year serious felony conviction enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No.

Christopher V. (Father) appeals from orders (1) sustaining the Ventura County Human Services Agency’s (HSA) petition to declare his two-year-old daughter, G.B., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300); and (2) removing G.B. from his custody (§ 361). He contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s orders. We affirm.

Paul A. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, contending there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he posed a substantial risk of serious physical harm to his children because of a mental condition, or that he had neglected the children by leaving them with their paternal grandparents without a plan for their support. Father also asserts the juvenile court improperly removed the children from his custody pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), as the children were not residing with him at the time of the order, and the juvenile court failed to make required findings pursuant to section 361.2. Finally, father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by requiring him to participate in a drug and alcohol treatment program. We affirm.

Brandon S. (father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court (1) granting restraining orders against him protecting the foster parents of his son, Ceasar, and the social worker formerly assigned to the case (the CSW); (2) granting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition filed by the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) and terminating his visitation with Ceasar; and (3) terminating his parental rights as to Ceasar.

Richard Daniel Rhoades (appellant) was convicted of attempted robbery and assault. His sentence included a term imposed under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a), which requires the court to impose a five-year enhancement for his prior conviction. His court-appointed attorney filed a brief in accordance with the procedures outlined in People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). Appellant filed a supplemental brief. He also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He contends the sentence imposed punished him twice for the same behavior in violation of the “Double Jeopardy” Clause of the United States Constitution, and that trial counsel was ineffective for admitting his guilt to the attempted robbery charge and for failing to interview and/or call additional witnesses. We conclude there was no double jeopardy or double punishment violation, and that appellant has failed to establish that his trial counsel was ineffective.