CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant Juan Francisco Gonzalez of eight sexual abuse crimes against multiple child victims, including three counts of lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a); counts 1, 9, and 10) and five counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a); counts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). The jury also found true a multiple-victim allegation for each count of conviction (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)).
Gonzalez contends that we must reverse his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child on counts 3 and 4 because of insufficient evidence. In addition, he argues that the judgment should be reversed because child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) evidence should not have been admitted, and the trial court

This appeal is from a February 2017 postjudgment order denying the request by appellant Ghassan Hage (father) to modify a prior custody and visitation order. Father and respondent Fida Mhanna (mother) have two girls, M. and C., who were seven and five years old, respectively, at the time of the hearing. Mother and father had previously stipulated in 2014 to joint legal and physical custody of the children; father sought a modification order under which he would have been awarded sole legal and physical custody.
Father contends the trial court erred. Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we will affirm the order.

K.F. (child), the child of defendants and respondents E.H. (mother) and A.F. (father), appeals from the grant of mother’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) to provide reunification services to her after they had initially been denied. Child argues the court abused its discretion in granting the petition because mother did not prove the required changed circumstances or that it is in child’s best interest for services to be provided to her.
Mother and father contend there was no abuse of discretion because mother proved changed circumstances and services to her were in child’s best interest. Mother also maintains neither child nor the de facto parent have standing to appeal. Plaintiff and respondent Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) filed a letter brief supporting mother and father.

Appellant F.G., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s dispositional order declaring him a ward of the court. Following a contested hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant was found to have committed the crimes of theft and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)) and knowingly obtaining, concealing, selling or withholding from the owner, a vehicle known to be stolen (Pen. Code, § 496d(a)). Appellant alleges several alternative forms of error, which initially turn on whether appellant was found to have stolen a vehicle or unlawfully driven a vehicle under section 10851. Depending on the outcome of that position, appellant contends either that the finding he obtained a stolen vehicle must be dismissed and his theft offense reduced to a misdemeanor or that both of his offenses must be reduced to misdemeanors under Proposition 47. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Appellant Stevie Janene Rankin was convicted following a jury trial of unlawfully driving or taking a motor vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851; count 1); unlawfully buying or receiving a stolen motor vehicle (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a); count 2); unlawfully displaying a license plate with the intent to avoid compliance with vehicle registration requirements (Veh. Code, § 4462.5; count 3); misdemeanor possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 4); misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia used for injecting a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364; count 5); and unlawfully attempting to conceal evidence (§§ 664 & 135; count 6).

Angel Mike Chapa was convicted of attempted murder, assault with a firearm, attempted second degree robbery, and possession of a firearm by a felon. He challenges his convictions for assault with a firearm and attempted murder for insufficiency of the underlying evidence. We will reverse his conviction for assault with a firearm and affirm his conviction for attempted murder. Chapa also challenges the imposition of a $10 fine by the trial court. The People concede the point. We will strike the fine. Finally, Chapa requests remand for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 620, which made the imposition of certain firearm enhancements discretionary rather than mandatory, and Senate Bill No. 1393, which similarly made imposition of prior serious felony enhancements discretionary rather than mandatory. We will remand for resentencing with respect to the firearm enhancements imposed in connection with the attempted murder and attempted robbery convictions, as well as with respect

Appellant/Defendant Angel Meza Madueno was charged and convicted of count I, using false documents to conceal his true citizenship or resident alien status (Pen. Code, § 114); and count II, failing to annually update his registration as a convicted sex offender (§ 290.012, subd. (a)). The court found he had three prior strike convictions: two convictions for murder in 1980 (§ 187, subd. (a)); and a conviction in 2002 for commission of a forcible lewd act on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), which had resulted in the lifetime registration order. He was sentenced to the third strike term of 25 years to life for count I and a concurrent third strike term for count II.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to suppress evidence and asserts he was subject to an illegal search and seizure. Defendant was charged in this case after he was contacted in the backyard of someone else’s residence by a deputy sheriff. The deputy had responded to a

Defendant Desirae Perry was charged with five counts of perjury (Pen. Code, § 118 [counts 1-5]) and one count of welfare fraud (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2) [count 6]). Following a trial, the jury acquitted her on count 1 and convicted her on the remaining counts. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on formal probation for three years, and permanently disqualified her from receiving cash aid and food stamps pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11486, subdivision (b)(3). In addition, the court ordered defendant to report to the Revenue Recovery Division for an evaluation of her ability to pay the cost of legal assistance.
On appeal, defendant makes several contentions. First, the trial court should have admitted evidence she returned the welfare benefit overpayments. Second, in contravention of Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 (Apprendi), her permanent disqualification from receiving cash aid and food sta

Appellant Verndell Raymone Hicks appealed his 2015 sentence, arguing it improperly included a one-year enhancement for a prior prison term under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b) (section 667.5(b)). That enhancement was based on a 2013 felony drug possession conviction, which was designated a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act (Act), one year after he was sentenced in 2015, while the appeal was pending. In our unpublished opinion filed August 24, 2017, we held that Proposition 47 applied to section 667.5(b) enhancements in judgments that were not yet final. We remanded the matter for the trial court to strike the sentence enhancement unless it determined Hicks posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.18, subds. (b) & (c); Harris v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 984, 992.)
Hicks petitioned for review to the California Supreme Court, which was granted. On September 26, 2018, the Supreme Court transferr

J. was three when this dependency was filed; he is now five.
D. is the mother’s daughter by a different father. Her age is not in the record; however, from a mention of incidents involving her in 2007, she was evidently at least eight when the dependency was filed in 2016. She lived in Chicago with her legal guardian D.E., who was her aunt on her father’s side.
In July 2016, while the mother and the child were riding on public transit, the child was “very fussy and cranky.” The mother “smacked” him in the mouth and then “yanked” his leg, causing him to fall backward and to hit his head on a chair. When a bystander tried to intervene, the mother pulled out a taser. Someone called 911. The police responded; they found that the child had no visible injuries. Nevertheless, the mother was arrested, leaving the child temporarily without care.

Thelma Barnett appeals from a judgment quieting title to a piece of property held as security for a loan, in favor of Michelle Heier, as trustee of the Michelle Anne Heier Family Trust, and awarding damages to Heier for overpayment of that loan obligation. The parties’ dispute over whether the loan had been fully paid, as Heier claimed, centered on: (1) whether Heier had been obligated to pay contractual fees and interest triggered by late or insufficient payments, in addition to the loan’s regular principal and interest, and (2) whether all the claimed payments had actually been made or if some claimed payments had been falsified. The trial court resolved those issues in favor of Heier, concluding she had fully paid the loan in April 2011, and that she was entitled to be reimbursed $40,153 for the additional payments she had mistakenly made to Barnett through February 2012.

A jury convicted defendant Dustin Sean Ross McDonald of one count of premeditated murder and two counts of attempted premeditated murder. The jury also found true three firearm sentencing enhancements. McDonald was 23 years old when he committed the crimes. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 114 years to life.
On appeal, McDonald asserts three instructional errors (mental impairment, involuntary manslaughter, and provocation). McDonald also asserts prosecutorial misconduct, abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion, ineffective assistance of counsel, cumulative error, and the imposition of an improper fine. We agree there is one instructional error, but we find it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
McDonald further asks for a remand based on three recent statutory changes. We grant that request, in part.

Thom Baker (Baker) sued his current employer, the County of Orange, claiming he was entitled to be reclassified from engineering technician III to senior project manager. Baker alleged that he was assigned the duties of a senior project manager in the parks and recreation department in a 2009 reorganization. He asserted proper classification according to his actual duties would entitle him to a retroactive pay increase as well as an increase in current pay. The County successfully demurred on the theory Baker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by not submitting a request to his union, the OCEA. Baker, said the County, was required under a memorandum of understanding (the contract) between the County and the OCEA to first approach the union for reclassification.
We reverse. The doctrine of administrative remedies does not apply unless there is an adequate remedy. That is not the case here. Here, there are two major gaps in the contract:

Appellant Kaitlyn Mello appeals the trial court’s denial of her request to appoint an elisor to execute documents in order to effectuate the terms of a final judgment of dissolution. For the reasons we shall explain, we reverse and remand with instructions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kaitlyn Mello (Mello) and Reginald Dennis Moore (Moore) were married on July 19, 2008. By the summer of 2012, the couple had contemplated divorce and, on August 8, 2012, entered into a written agreement for the division of the marital assets. The agreement signed by Moore provided that in the event of divorce, their marital residence in Visalia, California was to be given to Mello as her sole and separate property.