CA Unpub Decisions

Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, appointed counsel for defendant William Franklin Veaver has asked us to review the record for arguable issues in defendant’s appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate judgment pursuant to Penal Code section 1473.7, which allows a noncustodial defendant to move to vacate a judgment of conviction due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand adverse immigration consequences and if newly discovered evidence of actual innocence exists (appeal No. C086270), and from the denial of his motion for release of client files from his defense counsel in the underlying criminal action (appeal No. C084121). Because we find that defendant is not entitled to Wende review, we dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

We must decide whether plaintiff June LaMarr has demonstrated that she can amend her first amended complaint to assert a denial of due process cause of action against her employer. We conclude that she has. Accordingly, we will reverse the portion of the judgment sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to LaMarr's denial of due process cause of action.

M.L. and R.L. appeal the juvenile court’s order denying a petition to allow unsupervised visits with their daughter, L.L. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 388.) We affirm.

This case is before the court of appeal for the second time. In the prior appeal (case No. B250269), our colleagues in Division 8 affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and orders. In this appeal, Michael B., Jr. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order that he participate in a 52-week parenting class. We affirm.

Juan Guillermo Cazares appeals from a postjudgment order denying his motion under Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his 2004 guilty plea conviction for possessing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, former § 11383, subd. (c)(1)). Appellant contends the motion should have been granted on the ground that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance counsel by misadvising him regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea. We affirm.

Rafael M. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (d), and (j), and disposition order removing his children, Angela M. and Alexander M., from his custody. Rafael M. argues that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding and that the court therefore did not have jurisdiction to make the disposition order. We affirm.

Appellant Mister Pukka appeals from a civil harassment restraining order issued under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 in favor of respondent Susan Lall-Yepez. On appeal, Pukka contends the order is not supported by substantial evidence of a credible threat of violence or a course of conduct constituting harassment. We conclude that there is no substantial evidence to support the restraining order. Although the restraining order expired by its own terms on December 20, 2017, the appeal is not moot because the propriety of the ruling affects the eligibility of the prevailing party for an award of attorney fees. Therefore, we reverse.

Jerry Pikover was injured when the sports utility vehicle in which he was a passenger was struck by a second vehicle that had just collided with a big rig truck on the eastbound Interstate 210 freeway. The truck driver failed to stop at the scene.
After the SUV owner’s insurance carrier, United Financial Casualty Company (UFCC), and Pikover’s automobile insurer, Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, denied his claims, Pikover sued both insurers for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted UFCC’s and Liberty Mutual’s motions for summary judgment and entered judgments in their favor, ruling the undisputed facts established that Pikover had failed to comply with Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i), which sets forth three alternative prerequisites for bringing an action under the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy, and Pikover’s arguments as to why section 11580.2, subdivision (

Lizette Padilla-Lee was crossing an intersection while pushing her infant daughter in a stroller. While in the intersection, she was struck by a pickup truck driven by Debbie Lux. Padilla-Lee, Timothy Lee, and their daughter, Lauren Lee, sued Richard and Beverly Mester (the Mesters) and the City of Santa Barbara (City) for premises liability and dangerous condition of public property. Padilla-Lee and her daughter (the Lees) appeal from judgment after orders granting motions for summary judgment in favor of the Mesters and the City. We affirm.
Undisputed evidence establishes that the condition of the City’s roadway and visual obstructions on the Mesters’ property near the intersection did not prevent Lux from seeing the pedestrians who were straight ahead of her in the crossing area.
We conclude the undisputed evidence does not support the opinions of the Lees’ experts. They opined that conditions to Lux’s right would have distracted her, caused her to accelerate at

Fred Tucker (“Tucker”), individually and as trustee of the Zula Tucker Living Trust, filed this action on April 17, 2015 for breach of written contract against PNC Bank, N.A. He appeals from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining PNC’s demurrer without leave to amend.
Tucker argues the trial court erred in ruling he did not state a claim for breach of contract because (1) Tucker did not allege the existence of a contractual relationship with PNC, (2) Tucker did not allege he performed under the contract, and (3) the four-year statute of limitations barred his breach of contract cause of action. We agree with Tucker on (1), (2), and, in part, (3). We reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to give Tucker leave to amend to allege, if he can, a breach of contract cause of action based on breaches within four years of the commencement of this action.

This is the 10th appeal by Arthur Tsatryan in this marital dissolution action. On May 21, 2015 the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of Arthur and Polina’s marriage. Among the issues resolved by the judgment were the custody, visitation, and support of the parties’ minor son, Alexander. We affirmed the judgment. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. opn.].)
Arthur now appeals from a postjudgment order denying his request for modification of custody. We affirm.

This is the ninth appeal by Arthur Tsatryan in this marital dissolution action. On May 21, 2015 the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of Arthur and Polina’s marriage. In the judgment, the trial court found the parties’ former residence, known as the Santa Clarita property, was community property. The judgment provided that the property was to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly, subject to the equalization payments set forth elsewhere in the judgment. We affirmed the judgment. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. opn.].)
In a separate opinion we affirm the trial court’s order awarding the Santa Clarita property to Polina and ordering Arthur to pay attorney’s fees based on his breach of fiduciary duty and failure to disclose his encumbrances on the property (B270784). We also affirm the trial court’s order denying Arthur’s request to quash a writ of possession (B276299). In this appeal, Arthur contends the trial court erred

Ronald Kim appeals the judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of Donald Kim, Jean Kim, Jisoo Suh, Sam Chang, Suzie Cho and The Mercury Property Owners Association (MPOA) to Kim’s third amended complaint for fraud, defamation, negligent misrepresentation and negligence. On appeal Kim argues the trial court erred in ruling he had failed to allege either an enforceable promise or other facts with sufficient specificity to support his causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and had also failed to allege breach of a cognizable duty owed to him by MPOA in support of his negligence claim. In addition, Kim contends the court erred in denying leave to amend the pleading. We affirm.

Benjamin Jahanbani sued Alec Sugar (Sugar) and Carole Sugar for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The jury found in favor of Jahanbani and awarded him $348,900. The trial court granted the Sugars’ motion for a new trial. Because the Sugars’ motion for a new trial was timely, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion, we affirm.