CA Unpub Decisions

These are the seventh and eighth appeals by Arthur Tsatryan in this marital dissolution action. On May 21, 2015 the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of Arthur and Polina’s marriage. In the judgment, the trial court found the parties’ former residence, known as the Santa Clarita property, was community property. The judgment provided that the property was to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly, subject to the equalization payments set forth elsewhere in the judgment. We affirmed the judgment. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. opn.].)
Arthur now appeals from two postjudgment orders. The first is an order awarding the Santa Clarita property to Polina and ordering Arthur to pay attorney’s fees based on his breach of fiduciary duty and failure to disclose his encumbrances on the property (B270784). The second is an order denying his request to quash a writ of possession (B276299).
We affirm.

This is the sixth appeal by Arthur Tsatryan in this marital dissolution action. His most recent appeal was from the judgment of dissolution, which we affirmed. (In re Marriage of Tsatryan (Feb. 13, 2018, B265467) [nonpub. opn.].) Arthur now appeals from an order denying his request to vacate the judgment, raising numerous challenges on the merits. However, because Arthur failed to serve his former spouse Polina with his request to vacate the judgment, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his request. We affirm.

Plaintiff and cross-defendant James O. Davis appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to compel arbitration. Davis, a registered investment advisor, sued his former client, Mary Jo Olson, to recover compensation for financial services he provided. Olson cross-complained against Davis, alleging, among other things, fraud and negligent misrepresentation in connection with Davis’s financial advice, breach of fiduciary duty, and unfair billing practices. Shortly after Olson filed her cross-complaint, Davis moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied his motion, concluding the claims in Olson’s cross-complaint arose out of the parties’ financial planning agreement, which lacked a covenant to arbitrate. We affirm.

J.P. (Mother) appeals from jurisdictional and dispositional orders in a juvenile dependency case concerning her child, G.E. (minor). Mother asserts neither the jurisdictional findings nor the dispositional order was supported by substantial evidence. We agree and reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2017, an altercation occurred between the minor’s maternal grandmother and the minor’s father (Father), which resulted in the grandmother shooting and killing Father. Mother called the police from outside the home. Upon their arrival, the police requested she go to the police station for questioning. Mother left the minor with neighbors in the adjacent unit, who were family friends. Mother was at the police station from approximately 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. Upon her return home, she discovered Father’s adult son had picked up the minor without Mother’s permission. Mother called the police and was informed the minor was at an address in Stockton. However, the minor was no

Plaintiff Chuen Yang Yang, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a judgment confirming an arbitration award in favor of defendants Jingyi Wang and Linyun Yu. He challenges both the order compelling arbitration and the denial of his motion to vacate the arbitration award. We conclude the trial court properly ordered the matter to arbitration and confirmed the arbitration award. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.

Around 4:30 p.m. on the afternoon of March 20, 2015, Ron Arrasmith left defendant Christopher McNatt at his trailer in Sonoma, telling him to keep an eye on the place. At some point later that evening, Ron Sauvageau arrived at the trailer looking for Arrasmith, and ended up struggling with McNatt. Shortly after 11:00 p.m., McNatt dumped a large barrel containing Sauvageau’s body at Sonoma City Hall. After he
drove away, he was pulled over and arrested for being under the influence of methamphetamine. A jury ultimately found McNatt guilty of second degree murder.
On appeal, he argues that the statement he gave after his arrest was involuntary and thus admitted in violation of his right to due process, and that the prosecution’s late disclosure of a statement Arrasmith gave the police requires reversal of his conviction. We affirm.

Appellant Christopher D. was declared a ward of the court based on a felonious act that was reclassified as a misdemeanor in the wake of Proposition 47. The juvenile court ruled that reclassification did not entitle Christopher to have his collected DNA sample and genetic profile removed from the database maintained by the California Department of Justice, and Christopher appealed, arguing that Proposition 47 requires reclassified offenses to be treated as misdemeanors for all purposes, including DNA expungement.
After briefing in this appeal was completed, we ordered the matter stayed pending our Supreme Court’s decision in cases that raised the identical issue, In re C.B. (S237801) and In re C.H. (S237762). In those cases, our Supreme Court conclusively rejected the arguments that Christopher advanced on appeal and ruled that Proposition 47 does not authorize the relief that he seeks. (In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 122, 129-130 (C.B.).)

Defendant Joe Randel Johnson appeals from the trial court’s denial of his second petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.126. One of defendant’s 2004 convictions was for a nonserious, nonviolent felony offense, and he received a sentence of 25 years to life for that conviction. He contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was not eligible for resentencing. The Attorney General does not defend either of the trial court’s actual reasons for denying defendant’s petition but instead contends that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s petition should be upheld on the ground that the 2017 petition was untimely. Because the trial court has not yet had the opportunity to consider whether there was good cause for the late filing of the petition, we reverse the trial court’s order.

A jury convicted defendant Vincent Tyrone Fowler of assaulting, criminally threatening, and twice raping Jane Doe, a 15-year-old close family friend. The trial court found true various prior conviction allegations, including that defendant had a prior serious felony conviction, and sentenced defendant to 61 years 8 months in prison. Defendant seeks reversal, arguing that the trial court committed prejudicial evidentiary error and erred in denying his mistrial and new trial motions, which were premised on a claim of incurably prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. In a rehearing petition, which we granted, defendant alternatively seeks remand for resentencing in light of new legislation that took effect on January 1, 2019. That legislation, Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), gives trial courts the discretion to strike prior serious felony convictions for purposes of the five-year enhancement for such prior convictions. We reverse and remand the matter for resentencing.

This appeal is from a March 2016 judgment ordering that appellant Mike Ajlouny pay to respondent Nina Grimm $2,945 in monthly child support, plus additional monthly support of $750 for reasonable child care costs, for their child, R. Ajlouny, a self-represented litigant, asserts various claims of error on appeal. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm the judgment.

Respondent Eva Uwanawich was charged with abducting her daughter Mariah from her father Joshua. At the preliminary hearing, Eva attempted to elicit evidence Joshua had been physically abusing her before she fled with Mariah. However, the court ruled that evidence was largely irrelevant because Eva failed to establish the foundational requirements for invoking an affirmative defense based on domestic violence. Eva does not dispute she failed to prove those requirements. However, she contends her proffered evidence was relevant to negate malice, an element of the charged offense. Therefore, by refusing to let her explore the issue of domestic violence, the court rendered her preliminary hearing fundamentally unfair. We agree. Finding this refusal violated Eva’s substantial rights, we conclude she was erroneously ordered to stand trial for unlawfully abducting her daughter.

Damien P. (father), in propria persona, seeks an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s orders issued at a contested 12-month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (f)(1)) terminating his reunification services and setting a
section 366.26 hearing as to his now nine-year-old daughter, D.F. He contends the court gave too much weight to a recent conviction for domestic violence in making its decision and claims financial hardship prevented him from participating in court-ordered services. We deny the petition.

Appellant Suzanne G.’s (mother’s) children, L.D. and S.G., were removed from her custody and placed with maternal relatives in Texas after reunification services were terminated. Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions were filed by mother and heard at the same time as the section 366.26 hearing to terminate parental rights and set a permanent plan of adoption. The juvenile court denied the section 388 petitions, terminated mother’s parental rights, and set a permanent plan of adoption for both girls.
Mother appeals, contending the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her section 388 petitions and erred in failing to find the beneficial parent-child exception set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) applied. We affirm.

Jessica S. Self represented petitioner at trial. In his petition, petitioner stated that after being sentenced on March 23, 2018, he attempted to get in touch with Ms. Self by mail to have her file an appeal. He received no response before his time to appeal expired on May 22, 2018.
On May 30, 2018, petitioner states his pastor, Dean Dodd, called Stanislaus County Superior Court and discovered no appeal was filed. On July 23, 2018, petitioner filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus requesting leave to file a belated appeal. Ms. Self declined this court’s request to respond to the instant petition.
On November 5, 2018, this court issued an order granting the Attorney General leave to file a response.
On November 19, 2018, the Attorney General filed an informal response conceding petitioner appears to have stated a prima facie case for relief from default.