CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted petitioner Jose Gonzalez of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1). As to count 1, the jury found true the special circumstance that petitioner committed the murder while engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). The trial court sentenced petitioner on count 1 to a term of life without the possibility of parole.
In 2019, petitioner filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95. The trial court summarily denied the petition based on “the DA’s response” and without providing a further statement of reasons.
On appeal, petitioner contends the trial court erred in denying the petition without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial court denied the petition without specifically stating its reasons, petitioner attacks possible rationales the court may have relied upon.

Defendant Abel Rodriguez, Jr., and his cousin, Pedro Alvarez, were charged with one murder and two attempted murders in connection with a drive-by shooting committed in Modesto in 2009. In 2019, Alvarez testified for the prosecution in exchange for a plea offer of voluntary manslaughter with a gang enhancement. (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
The jury convicted defendant on count I of the murder of Guillermo Gomez, with findings that the murder was premeditated and committed by discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) On counts II and III, the jury convicted defendant of the premeditated attempted murders of Gabriel N. and Luis C. (§§ 664/187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) On all three counts, the jury found the firearm enhancement and the gang enhancement allegations true. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d), (e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)(1).)

In 1996, appellant Alejandro Gomez was convicted by jury of first degree murder with special circumstances, among other offenses. He was 17 years old at the time of the offense. Gomez was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). In 2019, following proceedings initiated by the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus by Gomez, the trial court vacated his sentence and then resentenced him to LWOP.
On appeal from his resentencing hearing, Gomez contends the trial court abused its discretion when it elected to reimpose a sentence of LWOP. The Attorney General contends Gomez’s claim has been rendered moot by the enactment of Senate Bill No. 394 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 394), which guarantees all juvenile offenders sentenced under Penal Code section 190.5 an opportunity to receive parole consideration at a youth offender parole hearing after no more than 25 years of incarceration.

The family came to the attention of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) in April 2020, when Lilianna was four months old and her half-sister A.G. was seven years old. (A.G. is not a subject of this appeal.) Mother and both children lived with mother’s parents. Lilianna had lived with her maternal grandparents since birth.
CFS received a referral based on an incident of domestic violence between father and mother. Mother and both children were visiting father at a motel when parents got into some sort of quarrel and altercation. Mother called 911. Father, whose breath smelled of alcohol, told a law enforcement officer that mother threw a can of powdered baby formula at him, hitting him in the face. Father had no visible injuries. Mother was arrested for spousal battery.
Later that day, father spoke with a social worker and recanted. He said that he had falsely reported what happened and that he and mother did not have an argument.

Defendant graduated from high school in Corona in 2010 or 2011. After high school, defendant played minor league baseball in Florida. Under his contract, defendant was to receive approximately $860,000 for playing baseball. Defendant played baseball for approximately three seasons from 2011 to 2013. Defendant tested positive for marijuana three times. The baseball team required that defendant attend a substance abuse treatment program, but defendant “didn’t come in time,” so the baseball team released him. Defendant spent all the money he was given.
In 2015, defendant was living at his parents’ home in Corona (the House), and he changed “from a nice presentable person to someone that you could tell there was evil on his face, in his eyes.” Defendant was prescribed medication for anger issues, but it is unclear if he was taking the medication. Defendant had verbal and physical altercations with his relatives. Defendant “tried to kill [his mother] a couple of times.”

Tamara Corvese and Anthony Pytel were married for 19 years and raised two children together—a son and a daughter, who are now adults. During the marriage, Tamara took care of the children and managed the household while Anthony, the sole income-earner, managed all the financial decisions for the family.
Among the many issues the couple disputed during their divorce was the status of the family residence, which occupies two lots on Lingo Lane in Palm Desert (one lot contains the residence; the other a swimming pool). Tamara listed the residence as community property in her divorce petition; Anthony listed it as his separate property in his response.
The Lingo Lane residence has been in Anthony’s family since the late 1960s, when his father purchased it after returning home from the Vietnam War. Tamara and Anthony were married in 1997. The following year, Anthony’s parents helped the couple purchase their first home by obtaining a veteran’s loan.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.
Darryl Dunsmore, in pro. per.; and Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2010, Darry Dunsmore was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter while personally inflicting great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 664, and 12022.7, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon while inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1) and 12022.7, subd. (a)), and a second count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court found true a serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Dunsmore was ultimately sentenced to a determinate term of 21 years in prison.
Dunsmore appealed and this court affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Garry G. Haehnle, Judge. Affirmed.
Darryl Dunsmore, in pro. per.; and Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2010, Darry Dunsmore was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter while personally inflicting great bodily injury (Pen. Code, §§ 192, subd. (a), 664, and 12022.7, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon while inflicting great bodily injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1) and 12022.7, subd. (a)), and a second count of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The court found true a serious felony prior conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), a prison prior (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and a strike prior (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)).
Dunsmore was ultimately sentenced to a determinate term of 21 years in prison.
Dunsmore appealed and this court affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion.

During a heated exchange with a stranger in a parking lot, Sparrow pulled out a box cutter and threatened to kill the victim. Rejecting his claim of self-defense, a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 2). Sparrow also admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and strike prior (§ 667, subd. (b)−(i)). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate 12-year term consisting of a three-year middle term on the assault count, doubled for the strike, five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and one year in a separate probation revocation case (SCD277002). The seven-year sentence imposed on the criminal threat conviction in count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654.

During a heated exchange with a stranger in a parking lot, Sparrow pulled out a box cutter and threatened to kill the victim. Rejecting his claim of self-defense, a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 2). Sparrow also admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and strike prior (§ 667, subd. (b)−(i)). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate 12-year term consisting of a three-year middle term on the assault count, doubled for the strike, five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and one year in a separate probation revocation case (SCD277002). The seven-year sentence imposed on the criminal threat conviction in count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654.

During a heated exchange with a stranger in a parking lot, Sparrow pulled out a box cutter and threatened to kill the victim. Rejecting his claim of self-defense, a jury convicted him of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 2). Sparrow also admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and strike prior (§ 667, subd. (b)−(i)). At sentencing, the trial court imposed an aggregate 12-year term consisting of a three-year middle term on the assault count, doubled for the strike, five years for the prior serious felony conviction, and one year in a separate probation revocation case (SCD277002). The seven-year sentence imposed on the criminal threat conviction in count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2018, Solorio pled no contest to corporal injury upon a spouse after a prior conviction in violation of Penal Code section 237.5, subdivision (a). The court imposed a suspended sentence of four years in state prison and placed him on probation with one year of credit for time served.
In September 2018, December 2018, July 2019, and January 2020, prosecutors filed four separate petitions to revoke Solorio’s probation. Solorio admitted to each violation, and the court reinstated his probation each time.
In October 2020, prosecutors filed a fifth revocation petition and later amended the petition to include an allegation that Solorio failed to report a November 2020 arrest for possessing unlawful ammunition. Prosecutors separately charged Solorio for the unlawful possession of ammunition in violation of section 30305, subdivision (a)(1).

S.S. met P.M. in mid-2002 in San Diego, a few months before S.S. was deployed overseas as a member of the U.S. Navy Medical Service Corps. The pair dated casually at that time. P.M., who is a citizen of India, moved back to India between 2006 and 2008 due to visa issues. After P.M. returned to the United States, the parties again dated for a few months. The parties remained friends over a period of many years. However, they provided conflicting testimony as to their level of romantic involvement at various points in time. P.M. indicated that although the pair were friends upon his return to the United States, they “started getting back together” in 2009 and discussed having a child together. S.S. indicated that although she maintained a friendship with P.M. and that their relationship was intimate at times, in her view, “it wasn’t a committed relationship.”
S.S. testified that she became interested in having a child in approximately 2010.

K. T.’s mother (mother) met appellant when she was 17 years old; they began dating. In 2013, mother learned she was pregnant with K. T. Mother was still living with her own parents and when they learned about the pregnancy, mother’s parents were “very upset” with her. Mother and appellant thus decided to live with appellant’s mother, “Lynn.”
K. T. was born in 2014. Mother and appellant were never married but appellant’s name is listed on the birth certificate. Following K. T.’s birth, appellant never executed a voluntary declaration of paternity and the court never issued an order establishing paternity.
In 2015, after realizing the extent of appellant’s heroin addiction, mother moved out of Lynn’s home and moved back in with her parents; she took K. T. with her. Lynn also moved out but appellant remained in their mobile home as a squatter until he was evicted. Over the next two years, appellant would contact mother, often for money.