CA Unpub Decisions

Christopher L. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders denying his request for presumed father status with respect to his girlfriend’s daughter, K.F. (daughter), who is not his biological child. Christopher argues he qualifies as a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) , and a third parent under section 7612, subdivision (c). We affirm.

After a jury found appellant Juan Carlos Estrada guilty of possession of a weapon while in prison, in a bifurcated trial the court found appellant suffered a prior Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1) conviction, and that the conviction constitutes a strike. In a previous appeal, we held the trial court’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence and remanded the matter for retrial and/or resentencing in accordance with People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 239, 241-242. (People v. Estrada (Mar. 17, 2017, F070063) [nonpub. opn.].) Following remand, the trial court retried the issue of the truth of appellant’s prior conviction and based on additional documentary evidence presented by the People, the trial court again found appellant’s prior conviction constitutes a prior strike.
Appellant contends the trial court’s finding on the retrial of the truth of his prior conviction was not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude the additional evidence

Kim Adams claims her probation officer, Reyes Soberon, Jr., physically and sexually assaulted her, and threatened her. Adams, in propria persona, presented a claim to the County of Kern (County) pursuant to the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) (Claims Act), based on the alleged assaults and threats. The claim, which was presented more than six months after Soberon’s last alleged act, was denied as untimely. Adams retained an attorney, who applied to the County for leave to present a late claim. The application, which was presented more than one year after the alleged assault and threats, was also denied. Adams petitioned the trial court for relief from the Claims Act’s requirements, asserting she failed to present a timely claim due to excusable neglect and mental incapacity. The trial court denied the petition.
On appeal, Adams contends the trial court erred in failing to consider her claim of excusable neglect. Respondents counter the trial court did no

Defendants, cross-complainants and appellants Patterson Hotel Associates, LLC (“PHA”) and Dominic Speno seek review of the trial court’s order awarding attorney’s fees to plaintiff, cross-defendant and respondent, the City of Patterson.
Briefly stated, the City prevailed on its complaint against PHA and Speno, as well as on all claims alleged in Speno’s cross-complaint against the City. The trial court awarded the City attorney’s fees for work performed on the cross-complaint pursuant to contract and Civil Code section 1717, without apportioning fees between Speno’s contractual and non-contractual claims. On appeal, Speno contends the court erred in awarding any fees because all the claims alleged in the cross-complaint are related by inextricable overlap to his inverse condemnation claim, which is subject to a unilateral fee-shifting provision favoring only prevailing plaintiffs. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1036.) According to Speno, this unilateral fee-shifting provisio

Following consolidation of five separate cases arising out of events on five different dates, a jury convicted Sergio Novela (defendant) as follows:
Count 1: First degree murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a firearm, proximately causing great bodily injury or death. (Pen. Code, §§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(e)(1).)
Count 2: Discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B), 26100, subd. (c).)
Count 3: Premeditated attempted murder, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, during the commission of which a principal personally used and discharged a firearm. (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 187, subd. (a), 664, 12022.53, subds. (b), (c) & (e)(1).)
Count 4: Assault with a firearm, committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§§

Plaintiff Madhu Sameer (Madhu) appeals from an order granting the anti-SLAPP motions of three attorneys and a law firm. Madhu sued the lawyers based on alleged misconduct in connection with their representation of her ex-husband in a marriage dissolution proceeding. That bitterly contested proceeding involved disputes over community assets, spousal support, and child support, and included allegations by the couple’s two minor sons that their father sexually abused them.
The trial court granted the attorneys’ anti-SLAPP motions on the ground that section 425.16 protected actions commenced, statements made, and pleadings submitted by the attorneys while representing their client in litigation. The trial court also determined Madhu had not met her burden of establishing a reasonable probability that she would prevail on one or more of her claims. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)

An amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition filed against defendant and appellant A.V. (minor) alleged that he committed one count of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a), count 1), and two counts of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4), counts 2 & 3). Minor admitted count 2, and a juvenile court found the allegation true. The court then dismissed counts 1 and 3, pursuant to the People’s motion. The court committed minor to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for a maximum term of four years.
On appeal, minor argues that the court abused its discretion in committing him to DJJ. We affirm.

Defendant and appellant Daniel Patrick Klunk was convicted of making a criminal threat and found to have suffered six prison priors. (Pen. Code, §§ 422, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (b); all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) The prison priors were bifurcated from the trial on his substantive crime. Defendant waived jury trial on the prison priors, which were tried to the court. Defendant challenges his waiver, contending that the court “committed a structural error” in accepting the waiver because it failed to “sufficiently advise [him] as to the nature of the right he was waiving, and/or the possible consequences of waiving it.” We conclude his failure to object in the trial court forfeited this claim. We further determine that the record shows defendant was sufficiently advised of the consequences of waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he understood them. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment in its entirety.

At an ex parte hearing, the trial court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) and set a hearing. The petition, the TRO, and the notice of hearing were personally served on Fielding while she was in the courtroom.
In June 2017, the trial court held the hearing on the petition. According to the minute order, “[Fielding] checked in and abruptly left[,] stating she had dogs in her car. [The c]ourt noted [Fielding’s] agitated state and that [Fielding] did not return to the courtroom.” (Capitalization altered, spelling corrected.) After hearing testimony from Maris-Negron, the trial court issued a restraining order.
Fielding appeals. However, the skimpy appellate record that she has provided to us does not include either the petition or a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. On this record, we must affirm.

Minor M.F. appeals from orders at the 12-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f) directing the Agency to extend the reunification period for an additional six-month period and setting the 18-month review hearing more than 23 months from the date he first entered foster care. M.F. challenges the juvenile court's finding the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) did not provide reasonable services to his father. He also contends the juvenile court lacks authority to order continued services beyond the 18-month review date absent special circumstances not present here.

Plaintiffs Jeffrey Schermer, David Moravee, Tom Fisher, Janice Wenhold, Karen Vielma, Gloria Carruthers, and George Rivera (collectively, plaintiffs) appeal from an order awarding attorney fees to defendants Upland Cascade, L.P., Carbon Canyon, Ltd., Park Contempo, Ltd., RF Group, L.P., Beaumont Investments, Ltd., Indio Investments, Inc., Tokay Manor, Ltd., MHP-Bolsa, L.P., Hamner Park Associates, Brookside Investments, Ltd., Del Prado Mobilehome Park, L.P., Orangewood Investments, L.P., and Hermosa Investments, L.P. (collectively, dismissed defendants).

Plaintiff William Doan appeals from the judgment dismissing his action for unfair business practices entered after the trial court sustained defendant Thomas J. Doyle’s demurrer without leave to amend. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) Doan argues the trial court erred in: (1) denying leave to amend his complaint; (2) asserting the applicability of the litigation privilege on Doyle’s behalf; (3) ruling that refusing to agree to electronic service cannot be construed as an unfair business practice; and (4) refusing to consider Doyle’s duty as an attorney to be fair to an unrepresented party.
We affirm.

In April 2017, a jury convicted defendant Jamar Stevens of two counts of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); counts five and six), two counts of evading a peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); counts two and seven), discharging a firearm into an inhabited dwelling house (§ 246; count four), discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3; count eight), and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a); count nine). With respect to the carjacking counts, the jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) but found not true that defendant personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)). In separate proceedings, the trial court found true that defendant had two prior prison terms. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).)

Social Vocational Services, Inc. (Social Vocational) appeals the denial of a petition for writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. The trial court denied the writ petition on grounds that (1) Social Vocational had not exhausted its administrative remedies with the Department of Developmental Services (Department), and (2) the Department properly rejected Social Vocational’s claim that it is entitled to a rate increase due to increased employee healthcare costs resulting from enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (ACA)).