CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant Stefan Franz Sullivan guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury using CALCRIM No. 250, which instructs on the required union of act and intent for general intent crimes. The People concede error but maintain it was harmless. We agree with the People.
Defendant also contends the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect that his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) is not an enumerated “violent felony” under section 667.5, subdivision (c). The People agree and so do we. We will order a corrected abstract and otherwise affirm.

After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5), defendant Joyce Mignon Garrett pleaded no contest to misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). Under the terms of the plea agreement, defendant was given three years’ probation and was ordered to serve 120 days in jail.
Defendant contends that the court erred in denying her motion to suppress. She also asks us to independently review the sealed record of the hearing on her Pitchess motion to confirm that no discoverable evidence existed concerning the searching deputy’s propensity for dishonesty, acts of moral turpitude, excessive force or false reporting. We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, and, having reviewed the sealed transcript of the Pitchess hearing, we conclude that no additional information was discoverable under Pitchess and its progeny. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant Domenick Lacurt Bryant pleaded no contest to possession of precursors for manufacture of methamphetamine with intent to sell, conspiracy to commit that offense, and commercial burglary. He also admitted a prior strike conviction and three prior prison terms. The trial court originally sentenced defendant to 11 years 8 months in prison, but subsequently resentenced him to 10 years 4 months in prison.
In his appellant’s opening brief, defendant argued he was entitled to an additional reduction of his sentence because one of his prior prison terms was for petty theft with a prior, a conviction that has since been reduced to a misdemeanor. We affirmed the judgment in a 2017 unpublished opinion (People v. Bryant (May 5, 2017, C078629) [nonpub. opn.]), but the California Supreme Court granted review and deferred the matter pending disposition of a related issue in People v. Valenzuela, S232900, or pending further order of the court.

We issued our original decision in this case on March 14, 2016, pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant and affirming the judgment. The California Supreme Court subsequently granted review and transferred the matter back to us with directions to vacate our original decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857 (Buycks). Having vacated our original decision and having considered the additional briefs from the parties, we will modify the judgment to strike two prior prison term enhancements imposed on defendant in case No. 14F4595 and affirm the judgment as modified.

A jury convicted Michael Andrew Jace of the second-degree murder of his wife April, and found true that he discharged a firearm causing her death. He appeals, arguing the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the law of voluntary manslaughter. We affirm Jace’s conviction but remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to strike the imposed firearm enhancement.

Jesse Silva committed a first-degree murder in 2007. In 2008, when Silva was sixteen years old, he committed another first-degree murder and attempted, with premeditation and deliberation, to commit a third murder. In committing the two murders and the attempted murder, Silva used firearms, and he acted for the benefit of a criminal street gang when he committed the offenses. For the 2008 murder Silva committed when he was sixteen, he received a prison sentence of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
This is our fourth opinion in Silva’s appeal. Silva contends his LWOP sentence is unconstitutional, and Proposition 57 entitles him to a transfer hearing. Senate Bill (SB) No. 394, passed after Silva filed his notice of appeal, will afford him a parole hearing after 25 years of incarceration, and his constitutional challenges to his LWOP sentence therefore are moot. Because Proposition 57 became effective while Silva’s appeal was pending, we conditionally reverse an

This case is before us a second time. After a remand for a reduction of one charge and resentencing on the other counts, the court imposed on appellant Francis Taylor an aggregate prison term of 19 years plus 30 years to life in this eight-count case involving sex crimes against a minor. His court-appointed counsel has filed a brief raising no issues, but seeking our independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders). We find no arguable issues and affirm.

While in custody in a San Mateo County jail, defendant Richard Steven Daniel, Jr., attacked another inmate, and a peace officer was injured while trying to stop the attack. Defendant was convicted of actively participating in a criminal street gang (among other offenses), and the jury found true the enhancement allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the officer in the commission of the offense. Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the finding he personally inflicted great bodily injury on the peace officer. He also argues remand is required to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion under Senate Bill 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1393).
We reject defendant’s first contention, but we will remand for resentencing under S.B. 1393.

Appellant Jason I. Sandefur was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 16 years after a jury convicted him of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon and one count of resisting arrest, the court found true recidivist allegations, and appellant pled guilty to a single count of soliciting the murder of one of the victims in the original case. In this appeal, appellant originally argued the court should have granted his request for self-representation and should have stricken both of his two prior convictions under the “Three Strikes” law, rather than the one it actually struck. He also argued the trial court erred in setting direct victim restitution. We affirmed the judgment.
The California Supreme Court has directed us to reconsider the matter in light of the advent of Senate Bill 1393, which amends section 667 and section 1385 such that a trial court has discretion to strike a prior serious felony conviction under section 1385. We therefore vacate our earlier deci

Appellant Mark Anthony Nelson was convicted following a jury trial of first degree murder. On appeal, he initially contended substantial evidence did not support the verdict under either theory presented at trial: premeditation and deliberation or lying in wait. He further contended the trial court erred when it refused to give the jury a unanimity instruction. We affirmed the judgment, but the California Supreme Court subsequently granted review and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1-2), which amended Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2019, to give trial courts new discretion to dismiss or strike prior serious felony convictions under section 667, subdivision (a). We shall again affirm the judgment, but shall remand the matter for resentencing so that the court can exercise its new discretion to determine whether to s

Defendant Juan Cabrera appeals after he was found guilty of having sexually abused his girlfriend’s daughter. A jury found him guilty on 15 of 16 counts involving the commission of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under the age of 14, including acts accomplished by use of duress (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced him to 75 years in state prison. Defendant contends the court improperly admitted expert testimony on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, and argues insufficiency of the evidence as to some of the section 288, subdivision (b)(1) counts. He also asserts that his sentence is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We affirm, but modify the judgment to award defendant conduct credit for presentence confinement.

Appellant David S. Karton, A Law Corporation (Karton) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion to “set aside” our 2009 opinion in David S. Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 133 (Karton) (2009 Opinion), and all subsequent orders, rulings and proceedings. Our 2009 Opinion is the law of the case, however, the doctrine providing that the decision of an appellate court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it determinative of the rights of the same parties in any subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case. The 2009 Opinion is final and controlling on the trial court, which had no authority to reverse or vacate it. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s denial of Karton’s motion.

Ava Whitmire appeals from a judgment resolving a dispute over ownership and control of property in Oakland that was previously used as a church (the church property). Whitmire, who is representing herself on appeal, has failed to articulate a valid claim of error. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted Lazaro B. Guzman of 11 sexual offenses against two children, C. Doe (C.) and M. Doe (M.) and found several enhancement allegations true. The trial court sentenced Guzman to 75 years to life in state prison. Guzman appeals. He challenges the consolidation of the charges and raises claims of evidentiary and instructional error. We strike the jury’s finding regarding the use of obscene material in the commission of count 6 (Pen. Code, § 1203.066, subd. (a)(9)) and the jury’s multiple victim finding in count 9 (§ 667.61, subd. (e)). In all other respects, we affirm.