CA Unpub Decisions

Appellants Leonard James Gaines, Raymond Louis Bradford and Rodney Levence Mitchell were sentenced to prison after a jury convicted them of gang-related attempted robberies with the use of a firearm. They contend: (1) the court violated their right to confront the witnesses against them when it admitted case-specific hearsay evidence as part of the expert testimony on the gang allegations, in violation of People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) and Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford). They further contend the case must be remanded for resentencing on the firearm allegations because they are entitled to the ameliorative effect of Senate Bill No. 620, which was enacted after their convictions in this case and which made such enhancements discretionary.

Defendant Jennifer J. Jimenez stole and cashed a money order belonging to Paulita Jimenez. She also made unauthorized charges on Jennifer Andrea Jimenez’s store credit card accounts.
Defendant was charged by felony complaint with two counts of acquiring personal identifying information with the intent to defraud after suffering a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (c)(2)). She entered into a plea agreement under which she agreed to plead no contest to one count in exchange for an agreed sentence of probation conditioned on one year in jail “NERP” and dismissal of the other count. The plea agreement also included defendant’s admission to a probation violation in a separate case and her stipulation that the court could impose restitution for the dismissed count.

J.J. and his siblings were removed from their mother’s care. When later notified of the proceedings, alleged father Cole M. (appellant) said he did not want to have anything to do with the case. J.J. and his siblings were eventually returned to mother’s care.
Shortly thereafter, the children were again removed from the mother, and a subsequent dependency petition was filed with respect to J.J. and his siblings. This time, the Department did not notify appellant of several hearings, including the dispositional hearing. All parties concede this was error. Later, the Department did notify appellant of the section 366.26 hearing. Upon receipt of the notice of the proceedings on the subsequent dependency petition, appellant hired an attorney and sought DNA testing. When DNA testing revealed appellant is J.J.’s father, appellant sought services, visitation and custody.

Petitions were filed on behalf of appellants M.S.F., M.J.F., and S.W. (collectively, “minors”), alleging they came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (b) and (f) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The juvenile court found the subdivision (b) allegations true but found the Fresno County Department of Social Services (department) had not met its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that minors came under subdivision (f), that mother, E.B. (mother), caused the death of a child by abuse or neglect. Accordingly, the juvenile court found the reunification services bypass provision set forth in section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4) did not apply because it could not find by clear and convincing evidence that mother caused the death of a child by abuse or neglect. Minors appeal these jurisdictional and dispositional findings, alleging no substantial evidence supports them. We find no error and affirm.

Appellant A.V. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his reunification services as to his son, A.V., Jr. (A.V.), at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (f). He contends the court’s order finding the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) offered reasonable reunification services to him must be reversed and he should be granted further reunification services because (1) the juvenile court’s finding that the agency made reasonable efforts to provide reasonable services was supported by insufficient evidence and (2) the court improperly used father’s level of engagement in its determination the agency offered reasonable services. We disagree and affirm.

At the conclusion of a jury trial, Candee Jean Hall was found guilty of transportation for sale of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count 1), possession for sale of methamphetamine, a controlled substance (§ 11378; count 2), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (§ 11364; count 3). With regard to counts 1 and 2, an enhancement (§ 11370.2, subd. (c)) was alleged; at a bifurcated hearing, the trial court found true that Hall had a prior felony drug conviction.

Defendant Steven Mathew Berrigan was convicted after a jury trial of first degree burglary of an occupied residence (Pen. Code, § 459; count three) and simple assault (§ 240; count two). In a bifurcated proceeding, Berrigan admitted five prior prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Berrigan was sentenced to the upper term of six years on count three and to consecutive terms of one year for each of the prior prison term enhancements. This included sentences on prior prison term enhancements of one year for a 1992 conviction and prison sentence for violating section 4532, subdivision (b) and a 1997 conviction and prison sentence for felony possession of methamphetamine pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). Berrigan was sentenced consecutively to two years for convictions on three counts in an unrelated criminal action. Berrigan’s total prison sentence is 13 years.

On March 4, 2016, at the conclusion of a jury trial, Brenda Estefania Barrera was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and driving under the influence of a drug, causing great bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (e); count 3). The jury also found true allegations that two of the three surviving victims were 70 years of age or older when they suffered personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)), and that the third surviving victim suffered personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), but was not 70 years old or older.

Appellant was convicted following a jury trial on one count of child abuse (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a)) , and one count of corporal injury to a child (§ 273d, subd. (a)), both involving infliction of great bodily injury upon a child under the age of five (§ 12022.7, subd. (d)). Appellant admitted that he suffered a prior strike and prior serious felony conviction for robbery (§§ 211, 667, subds. (a)(1), (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and two prior prison terms for drug possession and felon in possession of ammunition (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced appellant on count one to the upper term of six years, doubled pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law, plus four years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and five years for the prior serious felony. The sentence on count 2 was stayed pursuant to section 654 and, in the interests of justice, the court struck the two prior prison term enhancements. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 ye

A third amended information charged defendant and appellant Marshall Eddie Jones, Jr., with mayhem under Penal Code section 203 (count 1); assault with a firearm under section 245, subdivision (a)(2) (counts 2, 7); assault with a deadly weapon under section 245, subdivision (a)(1) (counts 3, 8, 9); willful infliction of corporal injury under section 273.5 (counts 4, 10); false imprisonment under section 236 (counts 5, 12); possession of ammunition by a prohibited person under section 30305, subdivision (a) (count 6); and dissuading a witness under section 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) (count 11). The information also alleged that defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of counts 2 and 7 under section 12022.5. The information further alleged for counts 4, 8, 9, and 10 that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under circumstances involving domestic violence under section 12022.7, subdivision (e).

In 1995, when he was 17 years old, Donte Corothers shot and killed a man and took his gun. The following year, a jury convicted him of first degree murder with a lying-in-wait special circumstance and the trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP), which was then the presumptive punishment under Penal Code section 190.5. Contending his sentence is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual and the trial court did not adequately consider mitigating circumstances of his youth in sentencing him, Corothers petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. He asks this court to vacate his LWOP sentence and remand the matter for resentencing, or resentence him to 26 years to life in prison on the counts for which he received his LWOP sentence.

A jury convicted Kevin Lee Bryant of two counts of premeditated attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and one count each of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), corporal injury to a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and false imprisonment by violence or menace (§ 236). As to certain offenses, the jury found that Bryant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim under circumstances of domestic violence. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).) In bifurcated proceedings, the jury found that Bryant was sane during the commission of the offenses. It also found that Bryant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subds. (a), (c).) In this case (No. INF1200501), the trial court sentenced Bryant to a total term of 43 years to life imprisonment.

Agustin Jimenez attacked his wife and stepdaughter in the family's home. As a result, Jimenez was arrested and eventually convicted by a jury of multiple crimes related to the incident: Two counts of false imprisonment (Pen. Code, §236 ), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a)), vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)), evading police (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)) as a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor child endangerment as a lesser included offense of felony child endangerment. The jury also found Jimenez not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and could not reach a verdict on a second count of the same crime. After trial, Jimenez admitted a prior serious felony conviction and the court imposed a total sentence of 12 years and two months, which included a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a).

A jury convicted Jonathan Kim of the first degree murder of Wileysha G., with the special circumstance of lying in wait (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15); count 1), and attempted murder of Samantha F. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); count 2). The jury found that Kim personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon while committing each offense (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(23)) and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Samantha (§§ 12022.7, subd. (a), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)). In separate proceedings, Kim admitted one prior serious felony conviction (§667, subd. (a)), which is a strike prior. The court sentenced Kim to prison for 33 years plus life without the possibility of parole, which includes in each count a five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction.