CA Unpub Decisions

Anthony Nguyen appeals from six postjudgment orders entered by the trial court, following the court’s entry of a restraining order in favor of Thien Tran against Nguyen in June 2014. This appeal is closely related to another appeal (G055078) that is currently pending, as are two other related appeals filed by Nguyen (G055097 (consol. w/G055130) and G054555), all of which were argued before us, along with an additional appeal Nguyen has filed from a different restraining order (G054555). As to the six orders Nguyen challenges in this matter, the governing standard of review on appeal requires us to presume the orders are correct unless Nguyen meets his burden to demonstrate error. While listing the six orders in his notice of appeal, Nguyen neglects to mention or challenge several of them in his appellate brief, and provides no compelling reason to overturn any of the orders. We therefore affirm the trial court’s rulings.

Tuan Nguyen, also known as Anthony Nguyen, appeals from a restraining order the trial court entered against him on behalf of his former fiancée and housemate, Bich An Thi Nguyen (Bich An), on August 10, 2016, and from the subsequent denials of reconsideration motions that Nguyen brought before three different superior court judges. As we explain, Nguyen’s appeal is untimely because an order denying a motion for reconsideration is not itself an appealable order. Nguyen’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the original, underlying August 2016 restraining order therefore fails.

Penny R. (mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s May 15, 2018, order terminating her parental rights to her daughters, H.H. and P.H., now eight and six years of age respectively. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) After reviewing the juvenile court record, mother’s court-appointed counsel informed this court he could find no arguable issues to raise on mother’s behalf. This court granted mother leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Mother submitted letters in which she asks for another chance to demonstrate she can be a good parent to the children. She does not allege the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights.

Defendant Shaun Reginald Shaw and William C. had what is perhaps most politely characterized as a misunderstanding regarding storage of Shaw's cars on William's property. William had one of the cars removed. That day or the next, he was in his kitchen cooking when Shaw burst through his front door, swinging a hatchet and threatening, " 'Where's my mother fucking cars? I'm going to kill your ass.' " He cut William's lip with the hatchet. Shaw continued to pursue William through the home, punching him and again verbally threatening his life if the cars were not returned. Based on that encounter, Shaw was convicted by jury of first degree residential burglary with a nonaccomplice present (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 667.5, subd. (c)(21), count 1), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 2), and making a criminal threat (§ 422, count 3).

Defendant Enrique Cuevas Ayala appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine for sale and transportation of methamphetamine. He contends the reconstructed record is inadequate for a meaningful review of the search warrant officers obtained to search his home and car, along with his accomplice’s home. In the event we conclude the record is adequate, he requests we review the search warrant to determine whether it is supported by probable cause. Defendant further challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, the giving of the aiding and abetting instruction, and the admission of several portions of his police interview. Lastly, defendant contends cumulative error resulted from these individual errors.

In October 2013, defendant and appellant Hosea Maldonado attempted to leave a Wal-Mart store without paying for $1,253.43 worth of merchandise. He was charged in count 1 with second degree burglary (Pen. Code , § 459) and in count 2 with grand theft of personal property of a value exceeding $950 (§ 487, subd. (a)). The People further alleged that Maldonado suffered four separate prison priors.
Maldonado pled no contest to count 2 and count 1 was dismissed. The court stayed imposition of a three-year prison term and sentenced Maldonado to three years of formal felony probation. The court also credited Maldonado with 21 actual days in the county jail plus 20 good time credits, for a total of 41 days of time served in the county jail.

Nicole Smith and Charlie Smith (the Smiths) appealed from an order denying their application for a preliminary injunction to enjoin a trustee’s sale of their property pursuant to a power of sale provision in a deed of trust. Because the trustee’s sale has taken place and the property has been sold, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

Jorge Franco and Yohana P. Mendoza (together, Appellants) appeal from a judgment ordering specific performance of a contract following a bench trial. Respondents Louis and Dora Aguado (the Aguados) sued to compel performance of a handwritten agreement concerning a change in ownership of a house that they had previously sold to Franco. The trial court ordered specific performance of the contract, rejecting Appellants’ arguments that Franco’s English was not good enough to understand the contract and that the Aguados waited too long to enforce it. Appellants make various arguments concerning the formation and enforceability of the contract that they did not present at trial. We reject those arguments and affirm.

Patrick F. Bily appeals from the judgment entered, after a non-jury trial, in favor of respondents Daniel Encell and Berkshire Hathaway Homeservices on Bily’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Appellant, who is representing himself, has filed an opening brief which is difficult to understand but which appears to contend that the trial court erred when it: denied him a jury trial; denied his motion to disqualify (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1) ; failed to consider a brain injury appellant suffered during trial; failed to provide a court reporter for the trial; denied appellant a fair trial; refused to consider appellant’s motion for summary judgment; and excluded evidence proffered by appellant. We affirm.

Appellants challenge the trial court’s order denying their anti-SLAPP motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) For the reasons we discuss below this was error.
This appeal is the latest, but by no means the final, stage in litigation between appellants, a number of entities associated with the British media company ITV, and respondents, Scott and Deirdre Gurney and their holding company, Little Win LLC (collectively the Gurneys).
ITV invested approximately $40 million to obtain a majority ownership stake in the Gurneys’ television production company, Gurney Productions, LLC. The Gurneys retained a minority stake. Later, ITV discovered evidence of what it believed was misconduct by the Gurneys in the operation of Gurney Productions. ITV fired the Gurneys from their positions as co-CEO’s of Gurney Productions and filed suit. The Gurneys filed a cross-complaint.

Michael Van Bemmel appeals from the order denying his special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (section 425.16) directed to the cross-complaint for defamation filed against him by Joseph Ra. The trial court ruled the allegedly defamatory statements were not made in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest and, therefore, were not protected speech activity within the meaning of section 425.16. We affirm.

D.K., now 18 years old, appeals from a disposition order providing that he remain a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) and that he be placed on probation in the home of his guardian. The order followed appellant’s admission that he had committed first degree residential burglary. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a).) Appellant argues: (1) substantial evidence establishes his mental incompetency, (2) he was erroneously presumed to be competent, and (3) the juvenile court erroneously refused to conduct a second competency hearing after he had been found competent at an earlier hearing. We affirm.

Ashkan Karimi, representing himself as he had in the trial court, appeals from the judgment entered in this eminent domain action after the jury found Karimi was entitled to $14,020 in compensation for the property taken and $37,000 in damages to the value of his remaining property (also known as “severance damages”). Karimi contends he was denied his constitutional rights to a fair trial and just compensation due to numerous procedural and evidentiary errors committed by the trial court. Karimi also argues the amount of compensation awarded by the jury was inadequate and not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

D.J. sought a restraining order against his former wife, C.C., under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (CVPA, Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), alleging that C.C. had harassed and abused him by posting humiliating details about him on the Internet. D.J. used a Judicial Council form and checked the box with pre-printed language to request an order that C.C. not harass him or disturb his peace. He also checked the box for other orders that he drafted, including one prohibiting C.C. from posting any information about him or any reference to him on any Internet site.
After a hearing, the superior court found that C.C.’s conduct constituted abuse under the statute. The court issued a restraining order prohibiting C.C. from engaging in the conduct specified in the pre-printed form, but declined to issue the additional orders D.J. drafted.