CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Anthony Joshua Perez, a high school English teacher, was charged and convicted of three counts of having sexual intercourse with a minor (Pen. Code, § 261.5, subd. (c), counts 1-3), one count of oral copulation on a minor (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1), count 4), and one count of resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 5), arising from an intimate relationship with one of his students. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of five years in state prison and appealed.
On appeal, defendant argues that (1) his conviction for resisting arrest (count 5) should be reversed because it occurred in Riverside County, rather than San Bernardino County, where the matter was prosecuted, (2) his federal due process rights were violated because the information alleged under penalty of perjury that the resisting arrest charge occurred in San Bernardino County, and (3) his rights to due process and equal protection were violated by the order requiring him to register as a sex offender. We a

A jury convicted Brock Mackinzie Myers of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1). The jury also found true Myers personally used a handgun in the commission of the murder as set forth in section 12022.5, subdivision (a). However, the jury found not true that Myers personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, which caused great bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
The court sentenced Myers to prison for 15 years to life on count 1 as well as an additional consecutive term of three years for the section 12022.5, subdivision (a) enhancement.

A jury convicted Robert Michael Guernon of six child sex offenses against two minor victims and of possessing child pornography. (Pen. Code, §§ 288.7, subd. (b), 288, subd. (a), 311.11, subd. (a).) On appeal, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in discharging a juror on the second day of trial. Next he claims the admission of minor A.W.'s forensic interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because she gave vague and unresponsive testimony at trial. Finally, he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney did not object to statements made in the prosecution's closing arguments that appeared to dilute its burden of proof. As to the first two claims, we find no error. As to the third, we conclude there was no prejudice from the failure to object to any prosecutorial error under People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659 (Centeno). Accordingly, we affirm.

In March 2016, an inebriated Thomas Boyd Chandler, Jr., went to the home of his longtime neighbors, Michael L. and Jessica J., kicked in their front door, stepped inside, and said he was going to kill them and blow up the house. Charged with burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and criminal threats, the jury convicted Chandler of only the lesser included offenses in counts 1 and 2, attempted first degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a), 664) and misdemeanor assault (§ 240). The court imposed the upper term on count 1, resulting in an 11-year sentence based on a prior strike and five-year serious prior felony enhancement.

A jury found David Len Williams guilty of battery with serious bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), and found true attached allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on another person who was not an accomplice (§§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8), 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Williams to prison for three years on the assault conviction (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), plus a consecutive term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and imposed and stayed execution of a three-year term on the battery conviction (§§ 243, subd. (d), 654, subd. (a)). Appointed appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders) and People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) raising no claims of error and inviting this court to review the record independently for error. We affirm the judgment.

After a crime spree, defendant Paul Phipps entered into a plea agreement with a San Diego prosecutor in which he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and two other felonies. His sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm ran concurrently with his term on another state felony. Phipps was also charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm for the same conduct underlying the state charge. Phipps pleaded guilty to the federal offense as well and received a sentence that was consecutive to his state sentence.

After a crime spree, defendant Paul Phipps entered into a plea agreement with a San Diego prosecutor in which he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and two other felonies. His sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm ran concurrently with his term on another state felony. Phipps was also charged in federal court with being a felon in possession of a firearm for the same conduct underlying the state charge. Phipps pleaded guilty to the federal offense as well and received a sentence that was consecutive to his state sentence.

A jury convicted Samuel Rodriguez of one count of making a criminal threat to his attending psychiatrist, Dr. S. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) At the time of the threats, they were in the emergency department of the County Mental Health hospital (CMH), while Rodriguez being detained on a hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of self-defense. We affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At trial, a jury convicted Rodriguez of one count of making a criminal threat in violation of Penal Code section 422, subdivision (a). The court sentenced Rodriguez to three years formal probation with conditions, including that he not have any contact with Dr. S., and required Rodriguez to pay specified fees, fines, and penalties. Rodriguez timely appealed.

Larry Allen appeals his jury-tried convictions for assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and battery (§ 242; count 2), as a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon. On count 1, the jury also found that Allen personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(23). Subsequently, the court found that Allen had two serious felony and strike convictions and that he served five prior prison terms. The court sentenced Allen to 15 years in prison, 10 years of which was imposed under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for the two prior serious felony convictions.

The minor, 16-year-old Gabriel W., contends the juvenile court (1) erred in making true findings at the May 2017 dispositional hearing on the amended original petition counts for receiving stolen property and robbery as the charges were for the same property and (2) erred in failing to compute his maximum time of confinement at the November 2017 dispositional hearing on the subsequent amended petition. The dispositional order on the amended original petition was entered on May 3, 2017. Gabriel W. did not file a notice of appeal as to the May 3, 2017 dispositional order. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to consider an appeal of that order. The dispositional order on the subsequent amended petition was filed on November 16, 2017. Because the juvenile court failed to state the minor’s maximum term of confinement, we will remand the matter for the juvenile court to determine the minor’s maximum term of confinement.

Appellant A.R. was aged 14 when the complaint in this matter was filed. After the case was transferred to adult court on March 7, 2017, he pleaded no contest on August 10, 2017, to six felonies, admitting a firearm enhancement as to each, and received a stipulated state prison sentence of 19 years 6 months on September 6, 2017.
Originally, appellant contended his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a Franklin hearing (People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261) before sentencing, and sought a limited remand with directions to hold such a hearing. However, after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1391 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1391), which prohibits the trial of offenders under age 16 in adult court effective January 1, 2019, appellant requested and was granted leave to file supplemental briefing on whether this court should deem his convictions to be juvenile adjudications and remand the matter to the juvenile court for disposition. The Attorney General agrees that

Minor A.C., then a dependent of the court, came under the jurisdiction of the delinquency court in 2014 after he admitted committing robbery in an inhabited dwelling, while acting in concert. What followed was a series of probation violations and placement failures at both Level A and Level B facilities caused by the minor’s problematic behavior and repeated absconding, ultimately culminating in the juvenile court’s disposition order committing him to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (the division). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 731.)
The minor appeals, arguing substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s probable benefit finding. (§§ 734, 800.) We affirm the juvenile court’s disposition committing the minor to the division.

G.S. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s August 9, 2018 orders declaring minors M.S., Katherine S., W.S., and Isaac S. dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) on one count, (b) on two counts, and (j) on two counts. Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. Because we find substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s findings, we affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
The juvenile court sustained two of three counts in a dependency petition and ordered 12-year-old I.M. removed from both parents’ custody. Only L.R. (father) appeals. Substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding as to father; he forfeited his challenges to the dispositional order and the jurisdictional finding as to mother. Accordingly, we affirm.