CA Unpub Decisions

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristen P. Miles, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Timothy M. O’Crowley, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION
I.C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that he violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) by engaging in domestic violence with the mother of his seven-year-old daughter V.C. He also appeals from the juvenile court’s finding that release of V.C. to father would be detrimental to V.C. and the court’s order requiring father to participate in individual counseling and monitored visitation with V.C. We reverse the jurisdictional and detriment findings and the individual counseling order and dismiss the appeal from the monitored visitation order.

Erick C. (father) appeals from a finding of dependency jurisdiction pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 over his young son, E. Father contends the single instance of domestic violence between him and E.’s mother was insufficient to constitute a risk of harm to E. We disagree and affirm.

A jury found defendant Mario Jijon guilty of premeditated attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon after he slashed a man’s neck at a bus stop. Defendant challenges his conviction on appeal, asserting that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation, that the court should have offered a sua sponte jury instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request a pinpoint instruction as to provocation. We disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.
Defendant also asserts that the case should be remanded for resentencing under recent changes to Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a). The Attorney General agrees that defendant’s sentence is available for reconsideration. We therefore remand to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).

Father Jorge C., Sr., is the father of the child at issue in this appeal, Jorge C. (Jorge, born November 2007), as well as Jorge’s older half-sister, Princess (born February 2000), who is not at issue and whom we mention only as necessary to describe the relevant evidence. Jorge’s and Princess’s mother died in 2014, while father was incarcerated. Further, he remained incarcerated throughout the relevant events in this case. Before her death, mother left the care and custody of Jorge and Princess to Roberto N., father’s adult brother. Roberto was unable to provide appropriate care, leading the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) to file a petition alleging under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), that Jorge was at risk of serious physical harm because he had no parent to provide care. Proceeding under section 360, subdivision (b), the juvenile court amended the petition to allege in addition that father had

Brandon S. (father) appeals from orders of the juvenile court (1) granting restraining orders against him protecting the foster parents of his son, Ceasar, and the social worker formerly assigned to the case (the CSW); (2) granting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition filed by the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the Department) and terminating his visitation with Ceasar; and (3) terminating his parental rights as to Ceasar. He contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the restraining orders. He also contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the section 388 petition because the circumstances were changing, rather than changed, and it was not in Ceasar’s best interest to terminate father’s visits. Finally, he contends the termination of his parental rights was improper because (1) the juvenile court failed to evaluate the paternal grandparents for placement; (2) good cause exi

Jose Francisco Orozco appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of the following offenses he committed while incarcerated after his arrest for crimes unrelated to this case: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), battery with injury on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), attempted escape by force or violence (§ 4532, subd. (b)(2)), misdemeanor violation of civil rights (§ 422.6, subd. (a)), and battery of a non-inmate by a jail inmate (§ 4131.5). The jury also found true the special allegation that, in the commission of the assault, battery, and escape attempt offenses, Orozco inflicted great bodily injury on a deputy sheriff. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced him to seven years eight months in prison.
Orozco contends he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court admitted into evidence incriminating statements he made to sheriff’s deputies while in jail that violated

In this juvenile writ proceeding, Jodi P. (mother) seeks extraordinary relief from the juvenile court’s dispositional order refusing to return her son Jonah J.-B. (born October 2006) to the care of either parent and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Mother’s writ petition—which was filed in propria persona—is substantially deficient, failing to comply with the requirements of rule 8.452(b). Even when liberally construed, as mandated by rule 8.452(a)(1), however, it provides no meritorious issues for our review. We thus deny the petition.

J.D. (mother) and A.J. (father) have each filed a writ petition challenging a juvenile court order terminating their reunification services and setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine whether their parental rights should be terminated. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Mother claims that she did not receive reasonable reunification services and that services should have been extended. Father contends that the record does not support the juvenile court’s findings that he failed to make progress toward achieving the goals of his case plan and there was no probability that the parties’ son J.J. could be returned home if services were extended. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we conclude the juvenile court’s findings are supported by law and the record. Accordingly, we deny the petitions.

J.B. (Father) appeals the denial of his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition in which he sought to change the juvenile court’s order bypassing reunification services between Father and C.B. (Minor). Father also appeals the juvenile court’s decision, at the section 366.26 hearing (.26 hearing), to terminate parental rights and make adoption the permanent plan for Minor. Father contends the juvenile court should have applied either the beneficial relationship exception or the sibling relationship exception to adoption. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1)(B)(i), (c)(1)(B)(v).) We disagree and affirm.

Appellant Alejandro Zamora was convicted by a jury of one count of sodomy of a child 10 years of age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)), two counts of oral copulation with such a child (§ 288.7, subd. (b)), two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 (§ 288.5, subd. (a)), two counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 16 (§ 261.5, subd. (d)), and one count of lewd conduct with a 14- or 15-year-old child at least 10 years younger than himself (§ 288, subd. (c)(1)). The victim of all of these offenses was appellant’s stepdaughter, referred to in the record and the parties’ briefs as “E.”
On August 21, 2017, appellant was sentenced to a determinate term of 19 years and 8 months followed by an indeterminate term of 55 years to life. This timely appeal was filed on September 27, 2017.

In August 2002, 18-year-old Jane Doe was raped by multiple men. Fourteen years later, a jury convicted defendant Orlando Ellison of her rape. He asserts a multitude of alleged errors on appeal, including that his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations, various evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance of counsel, and erroneous denial of his motion to dismiss based on preaccusation delay. We conclude that none of his arguments has merit, and we affirm.

J.F. (Mother) appeals from an order made after a hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 366.3 and 388, in which the juvenile court suspended visitation between her and her disabled daughter, M.F. Mother contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that visits between her and M.F. were detrimental to the child. We will affirm the order.

Defendant Efren Fregoso pleaded no contest to conspiracy to sell methamphetamine; three counts of possession of methamphetamine for sale; possession of a firearm by a felon; possession of ammunition by a prohibited person; and possession of a false compartment for storing controlled substances. He admitted several enhancements, including allegations that he had suffered two prior strike convictions. At sentencing the trial court imposed a total term of 25 years to life consecutive to four years in state prison.

Plaintiff Jacqueline Dupont Carlson owns plaintiff Dupont Residential Care, Inc., doing business as Irvine Cottages Memory Care (Irvine Cottages), a residential care facility. Defendant Patrice Gilgan’s father (Gerald) briefly stayed at Irvine Cottages, where he suffered a fall. Afterward, Gilgan began publicly campaigning against perceived neglect at Irvine Cottages. Among other things, she was interviewed for a television talk show and posted three videos with commentary on a Web site called LiveLeak.
Carlson and Irvine Cottages sued Gilgan for defamation and related causes of action. Gilgan responded to plaintiffs’ complaint with an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), which the court granted in part. The court determined the complaint arose out of protected activity, but that claims arising from the first two videos were time-barred. As to the third video, however, the court determined plaintiffs’ claims were timely and presented a prima f