CA Unpub Decisions

M.J. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order summarily denying her Welfare and Institution Code section 388 petition, seeking reinstatement of juvenile court jurisdiction and the return of her son, D.B., who is subject to guardianship with his grandparents, to Mother’s custody. The juvenile court summarily denied Mother’s petition, finding Mother had not demonstrated sufficient changed circumstances or how modification of the court’s orders would promote D.B.’s best interests. Mother argues that she made the requisite prima facie showing under section 388 to warrant a full evidentiary hearing on her petition. As we shall explain, we agree with Mother and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In 2012, Serafin Torres Urbina, who is a Mexican citizen, pleaded no contest to one count of driving while having 0.08 percent or more of alcohol in his blood (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)). After Urbina was released from jail, federal immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings against him. In response, Urbina filed a motion in superior court to vacate the 2012 conviction on the basis that he was mistaken as to the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court denied the motion, and Urbina appealed. We affirm

Mother A.H. appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders for her three youngest daughters, ranging in age from seven to 11. Mother has two teenaged daughters who reside with their father, who are not at issue in this appeal (separate proceedings were initiated as to them). Mother contends substantial evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional findings under subdivisions (a), (b), or (j) of section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. She also contends the order removing her daughters from her care was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services’ (Department) reports and court’s findings do not support a conclusion that there were no reasonable means to protect the children in her care. We affirm.

T.R. (mother) appeals from a juvenile dependency court order finding jurisdiction over her two children, G.S. and K.S., under Welfare and Institutions Code, section 300. She also appeals from a dispositional order requiring her to participate in individual counseling and a parenting education course. We find that substantial evidence supports the court’s orders, and affirm.

Plaintiffs and appellants FIVE Hotel FZCO, Assas Investments Limited, and FIVE Holdings (BVI) Limited challenge a trial court order granting defendants and respondents Viceroy Hotels, LLC, Viceroy Hotel Management, Inc., William Walshe, and Kristie Goshow’s motion to strike their first amended complaint (FAC) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, California’s anti-SLAPP statute.
We conclude that plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute and that plaintiffs have not demonstrated a probability of prevailing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Petition for extraordinary writ. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.456) Kristen Byrdsong, Commissioner. Petition denied.

Rosalinda B. and Travis P., in pro. per., for Petitioners.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Kristine P. Miles, Acting Assistant County Counsel, and Tracey Dodds, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles – CLC3, Rebecca Stahl and Nancy Sarinana for child Paris B.

Maria M. appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring her daughters, then
15-year-old J.M. and 10-year-old Y.B., dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (j). The juvenile court found Maria’s emotional problems and mental illness, and her failure to take prescribed psychotropic medications consistently, rendered her unable to provide regular care for her children, endangered their physical health and safety, and placed them at risk of serious physical harm. Because substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings, we affirm.

Matthew Edmund Hathaway was convicted at separate times of possession of a controlled substance while armed with a firearm and attempted possession of contraband in jail. He contends the second conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed pursuant to Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d 822 (Kellett) because the conduct underlying both convictions was inextricably intertwined. We conclude that although evidence of both crimes was discovered during the same investigation, Hathaway’s conduct in committing them was divisible. Therefore, we affirm.

On March 13, 2012, defendant, then 36 years of age, was arrested with 191 grams of marijuana and charged with two felony offenses: transportation of marijuana (former Health & Saf. Code, § 11360; count 1) and possession of marijuana for sale (former § 11359; count 2). Defendant, represented by counsel, entered no contest pleas to both counts. Counsel stipulated the police report and early disposition probation report established a factual basis for the plea. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on formal probation for three years, with various terms and conditions. Defendant successfully completed probation.

Respondents Antonia Vasquez and Cecilia Zacarias were hired by appellant Employer’s Depot, Inc. (EDI), a staffing agency. EDI was respondents’ employer when they worked on assignment. Respondents and EDI agreed in writing to arbitrate “all disputes that may arise within the employment context.”

Plaintiff and appellant Valerie Pryor, both in her individual capacity and as a successor in interest to her late husband, Roderick T. Bennett (Pryor), appeals from a judgment sustaining a demurrer to her complaint against Fitness International LLC, dba LA Fitness (LA Fitness), and dismissing it without leave to amend. The complaint alleges that LA Fitness is vicariously liable for Bennett’s death in a fatal car-on-bicycle collision with then-LA Fitness employee James Guidroz. The accident occurred shortly after the company had ordered Guidroz to prematurely end his shift selling health club memberships at an LA Fitness facility, because he appeared to be intoxicated. The complaint also alleges LA Fitness was directly negligent in failing to take safety precautions when it ordered Guidroz to leave the workplace in an impaired state on the day of the accident and, more generally, in failing to address Guidroz’s suspected drug abuse.

At appellant Rudy Meza’s sentencing hearing for committing lewd acts with a minor and misdemeanor child molestation, the trial court issued a 10-year protective order that prohibits Meza from having contact with the four children Meza was alleged to have abused in the original six-count information against him. On appeal, Meza argues the trial court lacked the authority to issue the protective order regarding M.P. and D.P., the alleged victims in charges dismissed pursuant to Meza’s plea agreement.
We conclude that Meza did not forfeit his jurisdictional challenge to the protective order by failing to object below. We therefore consider Meza’s argument that, because M.P. and D.P. are neither victims of the underlying convictions, nor alleged to be victims of domestic violence, they are not “victims” for whose protection a court may issue a post-conviction restraining order under Penal Code section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) (section 136.2(i)(1)). We do not agree that th

Walter Linares appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of robbery, one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, and three counts of dissuading a witness, together with true findings on various firearm and gang enhancements. On appeal, Linares challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s true finding on his gang enhancement and contends the trial court committed a variety of sentencing errors. We affirm Linares’s conviction, but reverse as to the trial court’s imposition of prior serious felony enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a) and order the clerk of the superior court to amend the abstracts of judgment.

Danielle V. appeals from the juvenile court’s August 9, 2017 jurisdiction findings and disposition order concerning her son, J.D., contending substantial evidence did not support the court’s finding it had no reason to know J.D. was an Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act. Danielle argues the finding was based on “an apparently inaccurate assertion” by counsel for the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services at the jurisdiction hearing “that notices to Indian tribes had been mailed by first-class mail to tribes, and that no responses to those notices had been received for more than sixty days from the date of mailing.” Danielle argues there are no copies of any notices or mail receipts in the record to support assertion by counsel for the Department that the notices were mailed.