CA Unpub Decisions

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Jamar Meneese of multiple offenses for his involvement in a home invasion robbery in which he pistol-whipped three different victims. In this appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for aggravated mayhem (Pen. Code, § 205) because the evidence did not show that he specifically intended to inflict a permanent disfiguring injury on one of his victims. He also argues that the trial court violated his right to due process by allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him regarding specific details of prior crimes. We affirm, but we remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in light of the enactment of Senate Bill No. 620 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 620) and Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 1393).

After a traffic accident took the life of a 29-year-old man, three people sought to sue for his wrongful death—his grandmother who raised him, his biological mother who occasionally provided him support, and his biological father who had been in prison all but one year of the man’s life. The trial court ruled that the biological mother had standing to sue for wrongful death, but the biological father did not. The biological father challenges that ruling as well as the court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. We conclude there was no error and affirm.

Defendant West Monnett appeals from an order denying his special motion to strike Mohamad Dakhil’s defamation cause of action under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. We agree with the trial court that Dakhil has established a probability of prevailing on his claim and, therefore, affirm.

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, R. Keith Davis, Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Defendant Tarell Johnson appeals the trial court’s judgment sentencing him to 24 years 8 months for burglarizing the home of Stephen Yeh (count 1, in violation of Penal Code section 459), possession of burglar tools on the day of the Yeh burglary (count 2, in violation of section 466), and possession of Yeh’s personal information with intent to defraud (count 3, in violation of section 530.5, subd. (c)(1)). Johnson argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions on counts 2 and 3. Because substantial evidence does not support the possession element of either offense, we agree. We therefore need not address Johnson’s section 654 argument that the trial court should have stayed his sentences for these counts.

This appeal requires us to consider two Revenue and Taxation Code sections that address a real property’s “base year value” (base value), a core metric for assessing property taxes in California. Specifically, we must consider the interplay between section 51.5, subdivision (a), which removes any otherwise applicable time limits on the assessor’s ability to correct base value errors that do not involve an exercise of judgment (so called “nonjudgmental error”), and section 80, subdivision (a)(5), which limits the years for which a property owner is entitled to have a property’s base value reassessed.

In September 2012, plaintiff and appellant Melissa Ryers fell from a set of bleachers and injured her ankle while watching a softball game at a Los Angeles City park. She filed suit against defendant and respondent the City of Los Angeles (City) alleging that her injury was caused by a dangerous condition of City property. (See Gov. Code, § 835.)
At trial, Ryers produced evidence suggesting that the bleachers were defective in two ways. First, they were not anchored to the concrete beneath them, and as a result they bounced off the ground when walked on. Second, the railing behind the fifth and final row of bleachers was bent backwards and wobbled when touched. A City employee, whom City designated as the person most knowledgeable and qualified to testify about the condition and maintenance of the bleachers, agreed that the bleachers were unsafe as a result of these defects.

Cordale Liner was convicted by jury on one count of assault with a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)). The jury also found true allegations that appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the case must be remanded to the trial court for it to exercise its discretion under section 12022.5, subdivision (c), as amended by Senate Bill No. 620 (SB 620) effective January 1, 2018, whether to strike the section 12022.5 enhancement. We agree with appellant and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion.

This is a marital dissolution case where, in the words of the trial court, the former spouses have “litigated themselves into financial ruin.” The litigation opened with a 38-day trial regarding dueling petitions for domestic violence protective orders that ended with stipulated dismissals; moved on to a six-day bench trial that ended with a dissolution judgment resolving all issues but attorney fees, costs and sanctions; and concluded with a several hour hearing on attorney fees and sanctions that produced a judgment on those reserved issues. The husband seeks to overturn both the dissolution judgment and the fees and sanctions judgment, but we lack jurisdiction over the former and conclude the latter was properly entered. Accordingly, we dismiss in part and affirm in part.

Defendant Henrico Southward, currently serving a third strike sentence, appeals from the denial of his petition under Penal Code section 1170.126 to recall his sentence. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.

A jury convicted Jeremy Brown of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(1); count 1), aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of forcible sodomy (§ 269, subd. (a)(3); count 2), and two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of forcible oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4); counts 3, 4). The trial court sentenced Brown to 60 years to life in prison.

Chinese Gospel Church and several individuals (appellants) contend that the installation and maintenance of a “pissoir” in Mission Delores Park constitute an illegal expenditure of public funds, entitling them to injunctive and declaratory relief. (Civ. Proc. Code § 526a.) Rejecting this contention, the trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to appellants’ first amended complaint (Complaint) and entered judgment in favor of respondents, the City and County of San Francisco and the General Manager of its Recreation and Parks Department (the City). In this court, appellants argue the demurrer should have been overruled because the allegations in their Complaint, if accepted as true, establish that the City violates at least seven laws by installing and maintaining the pissoir. Our standard of review is de novo. (Rufini v. CitiMortgage, Inc. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 299, 303–304 (Rufini).) We affirm the judgment.

Defendant Charles Young was convicted by jury of residential burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), assault with a deadly weapon (a cane) (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) and false imprisonment (§ 237, subd. (a)), as well as an enhancement for personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The trial court found prior conviction allegations to be true and sentenced Young to a prison term of 45 years to life.

Appellants A.L. (Mother) and S.L. (Father) are the parents of S.L., now five years old, and her four-year-old brother, A.L. Appellants seek review of the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights and freeing the children for adoption, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. They also appeal from the denial of their petitions under section 388 to modify previous orders. Both appellants focus solely on the termination decision, contending that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding that the minors were likely to be adopted, within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1). We disagree and affirm the order as to both parents.