CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant appeals the denial of a resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1170.18, subdivision (a) relating to his violation of Vehicle Code section 10851 occurring one year after California’s electorate created the resentencing mechanism with Proposition 47. The trial court denied the petition, reasoning that offenses under Vehicle Code section 10851 were not among those qualifying for relief under Proposition 47. That view has since been rejected by the California Supreme Court in People v. Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Page).

A jury convicted defendant of two counts of attempted voluntary manslaughter and other offenses resulting from an encounter with police officers on a late night in downtown San Jose. Defendant challenges the admission of post-arrest statements, the sufficiency of the evidence to support attempted carjacking, and the finding that a juvenile assault adjudication qualified as a prior strike. Defendant also seeks remand for resentencing in light of recent statutory amendments making specified sentencing enhancements discretionary. Finding no error and no purpose to be served by a remand, we will affirm the judgment.

Defendant Val Valden and his then wife Lilli Rey together formed a venture capital fund, whose name was later changed to Outfitter Ventures, LLC (Outfitter). Val’s younger brother, plaintiff Erich Valen, went to work for defendant Outfitter, first as an independent contractor and then as an employee. Erich was eventually laid off in February 2010 after working for Outfitter for a number of years. Erich sued defendants Outfitter and Val in December 2012, claiming, among other things, that Outfitter had not, as promised in 2004, paid him 25 percent of the company’s “carry”—which was alleged in the complaint to be “the net profit on investments Outfitter [had] made after deduction for costs”—in exchange for his continuing to work for the company for a period of five years. Following summary adjudication of the second through the seventh causes of action (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c) and the dismissal of the first cause of action at Erich’s request, judgment was entere

Appellant Morgan Hill Hotel Coalition (Coalition) appealed from the superior court’s order granting a writ petition by respondent City of Morgan Hill (City) and removing from the June 2016 ballot Coalition’s referendum challenging City’s ordinance changing the zoning for a parcel owned by respondent River Park Hospitality (River Park). Although Coalition’s referendum had properly qualified for placement on the ballot, City claimed that the referendum was invalid because, if the electorate rejected the ordinance, it would create an inconsistency between the zoning for the parcel and the general plan’s land use designation for the parcel.

Plaintiff Just a Fluke, Inc. and defendants Jacques Litalien and Anita Litalien were parties to a JAMS arbitration (Arbitration) concerning certain breach of contract and fraud claims arising out of a construction contract. But a further dispute arose after defendants demanded the Arbitration be designated a consumer arbitration.
Plaintiff eventually filed this action (Action) in the superior court seeking a declaration that the Arbitration could not proceed as a consumer arbitration, and that the arbitration provision in the construction contract was unenforceable based on JAMS’s preliminary decision to have the Arbitration proceed as a consumer arbitration.
Defendants then filed a petition to compel JAMS arbitration of this Action. The court treated the petition as a motion to dismiss, dismissed this Action and ordered JAMS to decide whether the Arbitration should proceed as a consumer arbitration. The court reasoned this Action was an improper attempt to have it enforce

Defendant appeals from an order revoking his probation. We conclude the court’s failure to ensure defendant received written notice of the charged violation deprived defendant of due process. Accordingly, we reverse.

Plaintiff Daniel K. Miller’s father, Donald, and defendant John L. Jonkman were partners in storage business. The business leased the land it operated on, and each partner had an equal share of the leasehold estate. However, record title to the leasehold estate was solely in Donald’s name. After Donald passed away, his share of the business and leasehold estate was split evenly between plaintiff and his sister Lona Gray. In June 2007, defendant agreed to purchase plaintiff’s interest in the business and leasehold estate. He promised to pay on a $575,000 promissory note by a certain date, and to pay monthly interest-only payments in the interim. Defendant made the monthly interest-only payments until October 2013, and never repaid the principal. Subsequently, plaintiff sued defendant for breach of the promissory note.
Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. It determined that certain contractual provisions deferring t

Appellant Satish Trikha, Jr. (Trika Jr.) successfully defended a will contest and then filed a motion to recover his attorney fees and costs under the common fund doctrine, arguing his efforts benefited the other beneficiaries of the will who did not actively participate in the will contest. Although the trial court granted his motion, it deferred payment and the determination of the fee award’s priority vis-à-vis other claims against the estate until the time of final distribution, finding “a sufficient showing ha[d] been made to justify” such a deferral. Trikha Jr. argues the court was required to order prompt payment of his fees and give his fee award priority over all other claims against the estate.

As defendant Marlin Thompson was walking out of a store with a pack of beer, a store employee asked to see the receipt for the beer. Defendant threatened the employee and exited the store without paying for the beer. A jury found defendant guilty of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; all statutory references are to the Penal Code). In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that defendant had served a prior prison term. The court sentenced defendant to three years in state prison.

Alyssa R. (mother) appeals from the January 31, 2018, order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her son John K., now age three. Mother contends the juvenile court erred by failing to, sua sponte, hold a hearing and appoint a guardian ad litem for her at or before the January 2017 detention hearing on the section 387 petition. Mother contends this purported failure tainted all subsequent proceedings and the case must be returned to the point of filing of the section 387 petition. We affirm.

Defendant Aimee Lynn Jacoby was convicted of various drug charges. On appeal, she contends several of her concurrent sentences should have been stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The People concede and we agree. We will stay the terms.

Plaintiffs brought this negligence action against officials of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging their father’s death was caused by valley fever he contracted in prison. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the claim was barred because plaintiffs did not comply with the claim presentation requirements in the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) before filing suit. In response, plaintiffs argued defendants are estopped from asserting the untimeliness of their claim because plaintiffs reasonably relied on an implied representation that their application for leave to present a late claim had been granted. In addition, plaintiffs argued the untimeliness defense had been waived. The trial court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments, granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, and entered judgment in favor of defendants.

J.A. (Father) and C.C. (Mother) have a history of abusing controlled substances and a history with child protective services that led the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) to remove their newborn daughter, L.L., from their care and custody. Following a dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied the parents services pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(13). The court also found reunification services were not in the child’s best interest and set a section 366.26 hearing.

After separating from defendant John Ruhlman, L.R., his wife, obtained restraining orders prohibiting contact. Nevertheless, defendant called and emailed her continuously, showed up at her apartment complex, and rummaged through her car. On one occasion defendant went to the residence of the deputy sheriff who had served him with the restraining order, because he thought L.R. was having an affair with the officer. He was eventually charged and convicted of stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (b), driving without a license in his possession (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a)), and driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.1, subd. (a)), and placed on formal probation. Defendant appeals.